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Official Reports Troop Withdrawal on Schedule
LD3107083689 Moscow TASS in English 0826 GMT 31 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 23 TASS—"Soviet troops are withdrawn from allied countries, according to schedule," Colonel-General Bronislav Omelichev, first deputy chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, told TASS.

He said that almost 21,000 men have been withdrawn from the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland by August 1. Besides, over 3,100 tanks, 383 rounds of artillery, and 81 aircraft have been moved out. By the same date, 7,325 men, 404 tanks, 307 rounds of artillery and 41 aircraft have left Mongolian territory.

The unilateral troop withdrawal by the Soviet Union "is an example of good will and undoubtedly helps relieve international tension", Omelichev said. Troops are leaving the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland in an atmosphere of openness. Military experts from various countries and representatives of public monitoring groups could observe the withdrawal.

Part of the military hardware is subject for destruction, Omelichev said. The other part will be modified to find aplication in the national economy. "The Soviet troop withdrawal will be continued this year, according to schedule," Omelichev said.

Akhromeyev, NATO's Altenburg Appear on 'Studio 9'
OW2907125589 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0600 GMT 29 Jul 89

["Studio 9" program presented by Professor Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin, political observer of Soviet radio and television, with General Wolfgang Altenburg, chairman of the NATO Military Committee—participating in the program via a television hookup with NATO headquarters in Brussels—and Marshal Sergey Fedorovich Akhromeyev, adviser to the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet; Altenburg speaks in English fading into Russian translation]

[Text] [Zorin] Hello comrades. "Studio 9" has received many letters from you requesting not only that we analyze the political processes occurring in the international arena but also that we examine military problems in particular. For example, in his letter, scientific worker Yevgeniy Ivanovich Ryabov from Novosibirsk writes: An important process of international detente is under way, but in my opinion, it will become reality only if it occurs in both the political and the military spheres. I would like to hear authoritative military leaders on "Studio 9" analyze the situation and prospects in this area.

Well, this is quite a reasonable idea, and it has been expressed in many of your letters; therefore, we have decided to devote today's program especially to military-political problems and to give you, comrade television viewers, an opportunity to not only learn about our viewpoint—although of course you need to familiarize yourselves with it and preferably from the primary source—but the assessments of the other side as well. That is why today, a telebridge will link "Studio 9" at the Ostankino Television Center with Brussels.

As you know, NATO headquarters is located in the Belgian capital. Among the various facilities in this imposing building, there is a television studio. Today in that studio is General Wolfgang Altenburg, chairman of the NATO Military Committee, or, in other words, the chief of staff of this organization. I will ask Kipras Mazheyka our correspondent, to introduce our guest today. Kipras, can you hear us? Please go ahead.

[Mazheyka] Army General Altenburg is 61 years old. He is married with three children. He began his military career at the age of 28. He was an artillery officer and was a commander of an Honest John operational-tactical missile battery. After graduating from the Bundeswehr Higher Military School, he held various staff positions and then commanded an artillery battalion. At 43 he became a colonel, and several years later he became a brigadier general. He was deputy commander of a section on general nuclear policy on the staff of the supreme commander in chief of NATO Armed Forces in Europe; commander of the 7th Motorized Brigade of the Bundeswehr; and head of the Third Department, Military Policy and Combat Operations, of the General Staff of the FRG Armed Forces. His service record is quite comprehensive.

Now, here are the higher levels of his military career: In January 1979, Army Corps General Altenburg was the FRG representative on the NATO Military Committee in Brussels. Four years later, with the rank of army general, he became chief of the general staff of the West German Armed Forces. Since 1 October 1986, he has been chairman of the NATO Military Committee in Brussels, an organ to which all military departments within the framework of the North Atlantic alliance are subordinate.

[Zorin] Participating in today's dialogue from the Soviet side is Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Fedorovich Akhromeyev, adviser to the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, our head of state. Obviously, you know him quite well, and he needs no special introduction. I would like to begin our talk today with a question to both participants in the program, a question that was in many letters received from television viewers. How would you assess the current military-political situation in Europe? Has it changed in the past 2 years? And if it has changed, what are those changes? General Altenburg, please give us your answer first.

[Altenburg] First of all, thank you very much for such a good introduction. I would like to say good afternoon to you, Professor, and to Marshal Akhromeyev. I am very happy to be able to talk with you here today. Now, to your question. Of course, I think the military situation has changed, but we must bear in mind that the military situation is a reflection of political actions, and as West-East relations change, so does the military situation. I have noticed that both sides are interested in easing tensions between our blocs, by decreasing military potentials, for example, and other steps. And of course, Mikhail Gorbachev is doing much in this direction. NATO has also made its proposals. I am very happy that we are already, I think, reaching agreement and that the Soviet Union is already beginning to decrease its military potential—what Gorbachev spoke about in December last year. This is why I think we are moving in the right direction, and apparently, we will achieve better relations in the military sphere than before.

[Zorin] Sergey Fedorovich, what can you say on this issue?

[Akhromeyev] Good day, General Altenburg. I am happy to get to know you, even if indirectly. As far as the question is concerned, of course, in the past 2 years the military-political situation in Europe has improved. More confidence has appeared, both between the two military alliances and among the states that make up the alliances in general and, I must say, among the military. Worthy of mention are such events as the meetings our leader, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, has had with the U.S. President and, of late, the leaders of West European states. At the same time there have been contacts among the highest military leaders of the Soviet Union and military leaders of the corresponding countries, and discussions have been held on military doctrines. There have been talks on specific questions of strategic arms and armed forces in Europe. In accordance with the Stockholm agreement, there have been inspections of exercises, both by us within the NATO forces as well as by NATO inspectors within Warsaw Pact forces. Practical realization of the agreement with the United States on eliminating intermediate- and short-range missiles is being carried out. At the same time, the unilateral reduction of armed forces by the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states is greatly contributing to easing military tensions. All of this has improved the situation in Europe.

[Zorin] My next question is directed to both participants in this program. We know that both sides have their military doctrine. Therefore, I would like to hear your views on the doctrine of the other side. General Altenburg, since you are a guest on our program, let us continue by having you respond first.

[Altenburg] Well, thank you very much; you are very polite indeed. Of course, I would like to explain our doctrine, or as we say, our strategy. Our strategy is preventive. But, since Marshal Akhromeyev will be talking about our doctrine, I will talk about yours. For many years we considered your doctrine as offensive. In assessing your doctrine—and this included many questions such as political issues, general behavior, as well as your capabilities—I must say that, including the Brezhnev years, we assessed your intentions toward us as a threat. This situation existed from the 1960's until the 1980's. We also thought that your plans— and this was discussed at your party congresses—were to maintain the security of your country by acting beyond your territorial borders. This concerned us since we never planned any kind of aggression. In other words, we viewed your doctrine—as you call it—as an offensive one in relation to us. This is why we adopted preventive measures in order to make ourselves secure. We are now finding very interesting pronouncements in some of your publications, in particular those of Marshal [Altenburg is heard to say "General"] Ogarkov, on averting conventional wars. I am now hearing voices on your side that are directed toward an understanding of our strategy. There is only one exception here. So far, we have been talking about the nuclear element in our strategy as a means of deterring aggression, and only this and nothing else. But, I think your doctrine is moving more rapidly toward a defensive one, and I must say in particular, the unilateral reduction of troops announced by Mr Gorbachev very clearly indicates—yes, yes, very clearly—that the Soviet Union intends to go in a defensive direction in the future, both in the military sense and as regards your intentions. It seems to me that you are moving in that general direction. Therefore, as you can see, I view the future optimistically.

[Zorin] Sergey Fedorovich, what can you say about NATO's military doctrine?

[Akhromeyev] Well, I am forced to speak precisely about the NATO military doctrine, although of course, I would like to respond to what General Altenburg has said. I think I will say something about that a little later. As far as NATO military doctrine is concerned, when applied to the Warsaw Pact or any possible actions, NATO is guided by the so-called flexible response doctrine. Now, the United States in particular—and it has a considerable number of its armed forces in Europe—is guided by a doctrine or theory of air-land [vozdushno-nazemnaya] operations. What concerns us in this flexible response doctrine? First of all, it is the fact the doctrine envisages the use of nuclear weapons. This in itself, the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons in Europe, makes this doctrine unacceptable to us. Now, the U.S. air-land operations theory in particular envisages deep strikes, up to 1,000 km, into Warsaw Pact states. We are not concerned about the theory itself. We are concerned about its practice. Now, take... [changes thought] I would like you to look at this map. [video shows a map of Western Europe with a title indicating it shows a comparison of Warsaw Pact and NATO troop strengths in Europe] Every autumn, the NATO states conduct the "Autumn Forge" exercise. This exercise involves the entire territory of Western Europe, from northern Norway to Denmark, the FRG, Italy, Greece, Turkey, as well as the other states located deep in Western Europe, and

also the seas and oceans adjacent to Europe. The armed forces deploy up to 400,000 people, more than 2,000 tanks, some 2,500 aircraft, and a large number of naval ships during the exercise.

I must say quite frankly that when monitoring this exercise, we at times cannot distinguish whether it is an exercise or actual military preparations, and this bothers us. Then, there is the United States, which is a member of the North Atlantic alliance. Just take a look. Even though detente is proceeding—and we are talking about this—and military tensions are decreasing, nevertheless military bases remain around the Soviet Union in Alaska, on the Aleutian Islands, on the territory of Japan, the Philippines, and in the Indian Ocean. [video pans a map of the world with the title "U.S. Military Bases and Facilities on Foreign Territory, in Alaska, and the Hawaiian Islands," with bases identified by various symbols, from East to West] The same goes for Europe. I can show the other side, in Greece, Turkey, the FRG, and Norway. These are all real bases on which more than half a million U.S. soldiers with their corresponding equipment are deployed. Now, you cannot alienate theory from practice. So, these actions concern us very much.

[Zorin] General Altenburg, would you like to say something in connection with what the marshal has said?

[Altenburg] I certainly would like to say something. I am very glad that the marshal mentioned this because I think there are some obscure things here that need to be clarified now. Unfortunately, I did not bring similar maps with me; they are most impressive. Nevertheless, I did not know that there would be maps. I am very glad that you showed them.

First, the marshal spoke about our war games, "Autumn Forge." It is not a single exercise. It is a whole series of different autumn maneuvers. They include something that might be occurring somewhere in the Atlantic and Europe, in the south and north. They all occur in various regions and at different times. Marshal, I think that your people who analyze these actions of ours can confirm that these are separate maneuvers. But, I am very glad that you mentioned this because now we can clear up some points.

Then, you mentioned that we have bases around the Soviet Union that generally encircle the Soviet Union, and you are concerned by this, so to speak. Well, I could show you a map on which the positions of the Soviet Union are approximately the same. Possibly, this neutralizes the situation to some extent. You said that the United States also participates in this. Marshal Akhromeyev, the Americans have four divisions and two-thirds of one division in Europe. You know that they are the V and VII Corps, and that is all. You also know the equivalent on your side. I do not want to go too far into this, but I must say something about the U.S. forces. I think you have 28 divisions and an equivalent of approximately 2 divisions, what Mr Gorbachev spoke about when he said that you will unilaterally cut six tank divisions. [U vas pomoemu 28 diviziy i ekvivalent primerno dvukh diviziy, o chem govoril Gospodin Gorbachev, chto vy budite sokrashchat shest tankovykh diviziy odnostoronne] Therefore the corresponding forces on your side are also quite big. In actual fact, this is why disarmament is being carried out, and in this connection, we are taking into consideration various weapons. That is why we want to arrive at a common denominator. If you look at NATO forces as a whole, then you will realize that our first reaction must come from the United States, and the I Corps, as a matter of fact, must arrive here—it is currently stationed in the State of Texas—and these three divisions will be added to the four that are already here. And of course, this represents no danger to you.

[Zorin] Sergey Fedorovich, would you like to comment on this?

[Akhromeyev] Yes, I think we must respond to each other's questions and concerns. In connection with what General Altenburg has said, I would like to make two points. First of all, Mr General, allow me to disagree with you in connection with the "Autumn Forge" exercise. In actuality, this exercise lasts 2 and ½ or even 3 months, and it is an exercise that is united and has a single purpose. It does in fact consist of a number of exercises, but there is only one purpose, and the system and issues are being handled as one exercise. That is why it concerns us. We, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, do not conduct similar exercises.

Now, you say that the Americans have three divisions and another half division in Europe, but they have 325,000 men there. This is a considerable group. Yes, the Soviet Union has—even on the territory of its allied states—more than the U.S. Army. But if we take all the armed forces of the NATO alliance states that are deployed on the territories of foreign states, then they are in fact comparable in number to our armed forces on the territories of our allies. In other words, in this case, an approximate balance is maintained of these forces and means.

Now, as far as our military doctrine is concerned, I must tell you that our doctrine has always been defensive in the political sense, and the Soviet Union has never intended to unleash a war. But in terms of methods of action and methods of rebuffing aggression up to 1987, it is true that it was offensive in character. In other words, after repulsing aggression, we planned to proceed further with offensive operations. Then, we realized that this bothers the people of Western Europe, and on the whole, our foreign policy began to change too. As a result, we considered the problem for a very long time, we worked on it, and in 1987, in May, our highest organ, the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact adopted a new defensive doctrine, both in form and substance.

This doctrine envisages only defensive operations, even on the largest scale. Only defensive operations are envisaged in the European Theater of Military Actions—for example—in the case of aggression against the Warsaw Pact, and on the basis of this theory, Mr General, we work things out in practice. Our exercises are now carried out only at a defensive level, both on a large and smaller scale. We have not concealed but have shown both our theory and practice to those military leaders of the North Atlantic alliance who have visited us, and they have included U.S. Defense Secretary Carlucci, your colleague General Willershoff, Admiral Crowe, and other military leaders. In other words, the doctrine has now become defensive both in substance and form, and moreover, the reduction of our armed forces itself also testifies to this.

[Zorin] I think Marshal Akhromeyev has responded to talk often heard in the West of late that there generally is no real change in Soviet military doctrine, that there is only talk of changing it. The marshal has specifically stated the changes actually taking place. So now, I would like to turn to you, Mr General, by saying that in the mail received here at Soviet television, there are many letters that say: Well, the Soviet Union is carrying out unilateral arms reduction; at the same time, NATO is intensifying its military preparations. Now, the Soviet people are concerned about whether NATO is really preparing for war. This is one question that is raised. Second, is it correct that the NATO leadership is wagering on victory in a nuclear war. I would like a NATO leader to respond to this question for our television viewers.

[Altenburg] There is just one answer to this. No, NATO is not preparing for nuclear war. No, NATO is not preparing for any kind of war in general. NATO does not intend to increase its forces above what it has now. We want to partially modernize them, but it is only a plan. In general, this has not even been decided yet. As far as your unilateral reduction is concerned, I think that what Mr Gorbachev has said can only be welcomed in the West. I think that he has thereby demonstrated a firm determination to reduce certain forces, certain forces that we consider to surpass ours. I have already said previously that I do not want to go too deeply into this—this is being done in Vienna—but the information that we have at our disposal shows that you have more tanks, artillery, and particularly motorized units, and we hope that we can arrive at a common level. We do not want superiority.

I can tell you something else; for our countries, everything that concerns the budget is very sensitive. Budgets in the West are now being cut. Of course, this excludes preparations for war. As far as the nuclear element of our strategy is concerned, I think it is not explained quite correctly by your journalists and politicians and in your literature. We feel that there should be selectivity in the use of nuclear weapons. It will not be a first strike; it can only be in reaction to aggression on our territory and if we have no other option to end the war.

Marshal Akhromeyev, I say this frankly. I was a child during the last war, and Marshal Akhromeyev saw this war at first hand in Leningrad. We do not want this to happen again. We do not want to see a nuclear war, and we also do not wish to see a conventional war. The only reason we still adhere to our weapons is to terminate a war that might occur on our territory where many people live. We do not want this to happen. The use of nuclear weapons can only be in reaction to aggression by an enemy. We will never start it first.

[Zorin] If I understand you correctly, Mr General, then—without talking about any ifs that you have used—nevertheless, NATO allows the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons. I draw this conclusion from both what you have just said and because both the United States and NATO refuse to pledge not to use nuclear weapons first. I stress first. In other words, we are not just talking about defense. NATO refuses to pledge to use nuclear weapons first. [sentence as heard] How would you explain this?

[Altenburg] That is correct, but remember that the word if is the key word because nuclear weapons will be used only if there is aggression. If there is no aggression, professor, if there is no aggression, then nuclear weapons will not be used. The only reason NATO will not repudiate this is because the imbalance in conventional weapons is so much in your favor, and many people on our side are afraid that your forces are so large that the only thing we can come up with in order to avert war is to have such forces that a potential aggressor will know what risks he takes by beginning a nuclear war. If there is no aggression then nuclear weapons will not be used, and this must be correctly understood. We simply cannot renounce everything. There must be corresponding conditions, and we must talk about this. Aggression is the condition. I have heard this many times from Mr Gorbachev, from Marshal Akhromeyev on different occasions, and he spoke of this with Admiral Crowe and others, that the Russians do not intend to start aggression. If such is the case, then there is no reason to have nuclear weapons.

[Zorin] Sergey Fedorovich, obviously it is not proper for me here to get involved in the discussion between you two, so please say something on this question.

[Akhromeyev] Well, I think it is precisely here that we get into a discussion. All I ask is that you do not think that I am very eager to argue, but I want to state my position clearly. After all, Mr General, you say that under no circumstance will NATO begin combat actions, be the first to start a war, that it will not commit aggression. However, on our part, we declare the same thing, that neither the Soviet Union nor the Warsaw Pact will begin aggression under any circumstances. They will not initiate military actions first. At the same time, we

also say that under no circumstance will we be the first to use nuclear weapons. So, the questions is, what stops the North Atlantic alliance from adopting this thesis, not to use nuclear weapons first?

You say that the obstacle lies in the military superiority of the Warsaw Pact. Excuse me, but this is a myth. I will not use any other words. After all, the matter is that you are taking—when you calculate the correlation of forces—only ground and air forces. You and I are career military men who have devoted our lives to military service. In order to calculate the combat might of the two alliances in Europe, all the armed forces of the alliances must be included. Now, if we take all the armed forces, including naval forces—which your alliance categorically refuses to consider when correlating forces—then the picture changes completely. If we consider naval forces, then the correlation of forces is one on one. The questions arises, why does NATO not take the naval forces into consideration when correlating forces and refuse to hold talks on reducing naval forces?

I can see only one reason. The reason lies in the fact that as soon as you include naval forces into the correlation of forces, the myth about the so-called Soviet military superiority, about the superiority of the Warsaw Pact, falls apart. Now, besides this, neither you nor your allies of course, particularly the United States, wants to begin talks on reducing naval forces. But it is unfair to hold talks on reducing strategic arms, ground forces, and air forces while leaving naval forces on the sideline.

I would like to answer the question that you asked. Does a direct threat of war exist in Europe today? I believe that today, there is no direct threat of war in Europe. In fact today, I do not think the North Atlantic alliance plans to initiate a war, and obviously the Warsaw Pact has no such intention. However, this is one side of the issue. There is another side. Does a military danger exist in Europe? If you will allow me to answer this question, I will answer it a little later, but now, maybe we should let General Altenburg have a word.

[Zorin] Please, general.

[Altenburg] Marshal, I am very glad to hear that you are not thinking of aggression and that we are not thinking about aggression. That is true. It seems to me that this is the best thing for mankind because then there will be no war. This is what we want and what we need. But why have we thought that you represent a danger? In past years, the years prior to Andropov, and roughly during the Brezhnev years, we armed ourselves because we perceived a danger. We figured that our reaction would only be a response to aggression, not otherwise. I have seen our planning for many years now, and I have never seen a plan of aggression against the Warsaw Pact. I say this honestly, and the 16 countries that are members of our alliance will tell you the same, that not one of them plans to begin aggression and that no one in our military plans to do this.

Now you said that there is approximate parity in our naval forces [as heard]. But I think that it is difficult to compare tanks to aircraft carriers. If we now begin to overburden the talks in Vienna, then I think it will be very difficult because there is a big difference. Let us continue the talks in Vienna, let us conduct the talks in Vienna in the manner in which they are proceeding now. I am not saying this simply because I want to be polite. I want to thank you because we have begun the talks in Vienna well. They are proceeding very well. It seems to me that you also want parity.

As far as naval forces are concerned, I consider that here we should conduct talks between our and your experts, because Marshal, in the classical sense, as you well know, naval forces have a different mission to ground forces. Take, for instance, the naval forces of the United States. It needs them throughout the world. You know that the United States is separated from its allies by oceans. Therefore it requires a different type of force. I think we must talk about this; this must be discussed so that we know more about either side. However, I think that we will not move our ideas forward at the talks in Vienna if we overburden them with naval forces as well.

[Zorin] Sergey Fedorovich, I think you want to say something.

[Akhromeyev] I would like to tell you right away, General, that I am not putting the question this way. We are not raising the question that talks on a reduction of naval forces be started in Vienna. The topic of the talks in Vienna has been determined. We are raising a different issue, that separate talks on a reduction of naval forces should be started. We cannot cut ground forces and air forces while leaving naval forces inviolate. We immediately become apprehensive that you are striving for this to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union through naval forces. However, this is already the case. Let us take Europe, for example. The size of the naval forces of the NATO countries, according to our calculations, is 750,000 men and more than 500 large ships, whereas the naval forces of the Warsaw Pact in Europe come to some 300,000.

In other words, talk must be started on a reduction of naval forces—separate and independent talks. We cannot leave them outside of talks. This is wrong. This induces apprehension, great apprehensions among the Soviet people.

[Zorin] I think that you two high-ranking military men have many more arguments in reserve to continue the discussion, but I would now like to change the discussion to a slightly different track and to ask you the following question. NATO and the Warsaw Pact came into existence during a period of confrontation when a military threat really existed. General Altenburg spoke eloquently about this. A military threat was very real at the time. Now, in

your opinion, what justifies the continued existence of these organizations today and tomorrow under presently developing conditions? General Altenburg?

[Altenburg] I think that now our bloc is needed and as far as your side is concerned, obviously your bloc is also needed by you. However, I am sure that in the future, developments will move towards a change in the military aspects of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Economic aspects are becoming very important, and I think that this is very good. I have read Gorbachev's books "Perestroyka" and "A New Thinking" and it seems to me that he put it well when he said that there is a need to change the economic system in the Soviet Union as well as the economic policy in relation to the West. This is very good. Relations between the West and East are such that changes are occurring, and at the time when these changes are occurring our military missions will probably also change. We must see how this will change in the future. Of course, I can see that the military aspects of our blocs and the military aspects in West-East relations are changing and perhaps they will have less weight in the future.

But before this time, neither side should strive for superiority, should not think of war. Of course, nobody can now talk seriously about war, because the tasks of mankind in the future are such that it will be very good if we establish better relations to tackle these tasks jointly, and not the problems of war. Such issues as economics and ecology are so important that probably there will be no room for military confrontation. However, before this happens we must exhibit caution so that there is stability on both sides and not superiority. I consider that we must talk about this, about all of this, and determine what must be done about strategic arms.

I think that talks between the United States and the Soviet Union are also proceeding well. That is why we are conducting talks not only from one side. Marshal Akhromeyev, I understand you very well as far as naval forces are concerned. You know that the Warsaw Pact has considerable naval forces at its disposal, but of course ours are somewhat bigger. I think that it is always useful to discuss this and then we will know how things will be in the future.

[Zorin] Sergey Fedorovich?

[Akhromeyev] Now when I said earlier that I really thought that today there is no direct military threat, well, that is my conviction. At the same time, if we raise the issue of a military threat, does a military danger persist in Europe, does a military danger persist for the Warsaw Pact? I consider that such a threat remains, and it remains because a policy of force is being pursued in relation to us, a policy from a position of strength. Generally the political leaders of all the North Atlantic Alliance countries talk about this. The conference of the seven, the seven states of the Western world, has ended. Formally this is not a conference of the leaders of the North Atlantic Alliance but of the leaders of the Western states. A good statement was made there from the point of view of further development of mutual relations in the political and economic spheres. At the same time, these leaders also stressed that they would continue to be guided by a strategy of deterrence and they would continue to retain powerful armed forces for this.

The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact must take stock of this; there is no alternative. At the same time, you raised the question of two military alliances. Of course, the creation of the two military alliances, the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact, was probably one of the major realities of the 20th century. It is a different matter whether or not their creation was a good thing, but that is history. They were created and they are operating. In the sense of how to proceed further, I am in agreement with much that was said by General Altenburg, that our mutual relations in the sphere of politics and economics will develop. Apparently we can find here...[changes thought] After all, they are not directly part of the North Atlantic Alliance, but the system of states is united by the European Economic Community. We have the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance. So these organizations will act. However, apparently it would be good if the military organizations also cooperated. In other words, those contacts that we are pursuing in military matters between military leaders and other lower units—discussions of military doctrines, a lifting of mutual concerns in relation to one another—all these are big problems that could be solved, not only on a bilateral basis but within the framework of these two military alliances as well.

[Zorin] General Altenburg, in connection with what Marshal Akhromeyev has said I have a question for you. Do you consider it possible for there to be cooperation between the two blocs in the military sphere, as the Marshal mentioned, besides the possible economic and ecological spheres of future cooperation? I have in mind not confrontation but cooperation.

[Akhromeyev] Well, if not cooperation, then at least contacts.

[Altenburg] The answer is yes. In addition to economic and political contacts military cooperation is not only possible but I think obligatory. I fully agree with Marshal Akhromeyev that this is what we should be thinking of. We are in favor of developing our relations on the basis of the Stockholm agreement. We must have trust and confidence. Contacts should be multifaceted. Talks are now being held in Vienna, and we must have guarantees of stability. Contacts have already begun. In particular, you talked with Admiral Crowe and others. I know that you, Marshal Akhromeyev, sat behind Mr Gorbachev during your talks in Reykjavik as the chief adviser. This has apparently led to good things. I think that in our cooperation we should not—maybe I am not putting this correctly—read lectures to one another. We should tell one another what we have in mind when we describe our

doctrine, or strategy, as we say. Why do we misunderstand one another? For instance, I cannot understand why we represent a danger to you. Our reaction would only be a response to aggression. Yes, you talk about our naval forces, you say that we have some aggressive elements. We should explain to one another, and explain most profoundly, exactly what we have in mind when we talk about doctrine and strategy. We should know one another thoroughly. For many years we did not know or understand one another. For example, from history you know about the relations between Germany and France. There were three wars and everybody knows about them. Yet, now we are friends and we cooperate. When we say something we understand one another. This is why I think that between us and you it should also be this way. This will be useful for our cooperation.

[Zorin] I think it is very promising that besides the discussion obvious points of contact and agreement have appeared between the two high-ranking military men. Now, in conclusion of our talk I would like to ask one question. I know that military people prefer to think in specific categories, to use real facts as a basis; nevertheless, I will ask my question. I would like each one of you participants in our discussion to express his opinion on the future of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Will they remain into the 21st century. General Altenburg?

[Altenburg] Well I do not have a crystal ball. You say the 21st century. Because I do not have a crystal ball I can only express my hopes, and my hopes are such that in the 21st century our relations will be based on trust and friendship.

[Zorin] Sergey Fedorovich, please.

[Akhromeyev] Well [laughs], I must say that General Altenburg spoke of the many contacts that are taking place between political and military leaders. However, these are bilateral contacts. They are contacts between specific countries, but no contacts of military alliances, General Altenburg. I think that the time has come when there should be contacts between the two military alliances. Why can experts not meet to review certain problems, including military doctrines and strategies? Why can we not discuss the proposal that we made on the establishment of joint centers of security in Europe? These are centers of communications and management where we could quickly summarize a specific situation that has arisen and adopt measures.

Now, concerning the future of military alliances, well, our position is such that we are ready for these two military alliances to disband themselves on a mutual basis. However, apparently this is impossible to solve unilaterally. While there are no partners in this kind of agreement we will have these alliances. Then it is necessary for as many contacts as possible to be held between them, for as much trust as possible, and military danger and military tension will decrease as a result.

[Zorin] Thank you. I think the very fact that such a discussion was possible, although it was a discussion that at times led to arguments but in general was friendly, is to a certain extent a sign of the times. I think Soviet television viewers found it very interesting to hear from the horse's mouth the opinions of both a leading Western military man and a prominent Soviet military leader.

Insofar as our time on the air has run out it remains for me to thank you for taking part in this talk and to express the hope that this will not be the last talk of its kind. Thank you, General Altenburg, and thank you, Sergey Fedorovich. Thank you.

Zorin Comments on Akromeyev-Altenburg Program
LD3007022589 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 29 Jul 89

[Text] Next, Moscow viewpoint, prepared by Valentin Zorin. And this is what he writes:

For the first time the guests of the television program that I have been the host to were the Soviet high ranking military official and the chairman of the NATO military committee: They were Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev of the USSR, and General Wolfgang Altenburg. Their television audiences in this country amounted to about 100 million people. I have the impression that, though rather sharp on certain issues, the discussion was marked by a friendly spirit, and I agree with Gen Altenburg, who said that of no less importance than the views expressed during the discussion is the fact that this discussion did take place. It's important that the discussion has revealed not only different approaches to certain issues but also points of contact, showing that cooperation between NATO and the Warsaw treaty organization is possible.

Only 1 year ago a television dialogue of this kind was unthinkable; today it has become a reality. I'd like to draw your attention to one aspect of the discussion. Addressing its two particpants, I said that I had quite a few letters from Soviet people in my mail who voiced their concern over the fact that, while the Soviet Union continues carrying out unilateral disarmament measures, NATO keeps building up its military potential. I asked Gen Altenburg in this context if it would be right to say that NATO was really preparing for war and that the leadership of that organization had put its stakes on a victory in a nuclear war? Gen Altenburg replied that NATO was not preparing for a nuclear war or any war in general. In reference to the nuclear element in NATO's strategy the general underlined that NATO would never be the first to strike a nuclear blow, one could talk only about retaliatory steps.

The military adviser to President Gorbachev, Marshal Akhromeyev, put a very reasonable question in this connection. If this is so, why do the NATO countries, including the United States, show such a stubborn resistance to

the Soviet proposal calling on the two sides to take upon themselves a pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons? The chairman of the NATO military committee failed to give a convincing answer to this logical question and switched over the conversation to another topic. Incidentally, no convincing answer to this question has ever been given by officials of either the previous or present United States administration.

The Soviet people are bewildered by this position of the United States and NATO. If the United States and NATO are really not preparing for the first nuclear strike, why can't they take corresponding commitments on themselves on a mutual basis with the Soviet Union? I believe this question also requires an answer. The television discussion between the two military officials of the Soviet Union and NATO has confirmed this once again.

Ligachev, Yeltsin Appear on Budapest TV
LD2607150289 Budapest Television Service in Hungarian 1905 GMT 25 Jul 89

["Special edition" of "Panorama" program, with unidentified presenter and reporters, including recorded remarks by CPSU Central Committee Secretary Yegor Ligachev, Aleksandr Dubcek, and Boris Yeltsin; Ligachev and Yeltsin in Russian with superimposed Hungarian translation, Dubcek in Slovak with superimposed Hungarian translation]

[Excerpts] [Presenter] Good evening. This evening we will speak with Yegor Ligachev, but Aleksandr Dubcek and Boris Yeltsin will also enter into the debate. Ligachev for a long time stood in second place in the Kremlin pecking-order. He was responsible for cultural and ideological matters. The 68-year-old politician is the person whom the liberal Soviet intelligentsia love to hate. They accuse him of utilizing dictatorial methods and of handling people in an intolerable manner. In the course of the great reorganization that was carried out by Gorbachev last September, Ligachev was stripped of his previous powers and was appointed head of the agricultural committee. But he still remains a Politburo member and Central Committee secretary. [passage omitted, citing FRG paper DIE WELT and outlining Ligachev's biography.]

Now let Yegor Ligachev speak:

[Reporter] In Bucharest, at the latest session of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, a good resolutuion was made which completely rules out interference in the internal affairs of any country of the Warsaw Pact. Yet, President Ceausescu, while not naming Hungary, pointed out the need to examine, nevertheless, the kind of processes taking place in certain countries. In other words, there are still certain people according to whom there is a need to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. What is your opinion on this?

[Ligachev] To tell you the truth, I do not know what Ceausescu said; I simply have no information about it. However, in reply to your question I would like to say the following. Indeed, your comment is correct, the Warsaw Pact declaration emphasized that every country has the right to resolve in an independent manner its own internal affairs. Really, this is because it is the parties themselves which constitute the determining political force of a given country, who are responsible for the working out of decisions, the implementation of the decisions—not to foreign governments but to their own people, to their party memberships. I regard this as natural.

However, I would like to emphasize still that this is not the first declaration in this sense. Recently similar statements have ben made repeatedly. I have to say, what's more, that not only have documents been issued laying down these principles, but such policies are carried out—at least as far as our party is concerned.

[Reporter] But on 30 October 1956 similar statements were made relating to the Hungarian events, too, and then on 4 November the troops marched in. It is understandable if people are suspicious regarding such declarations.

[Ligachev] Excuse me, but when I advocate that this was not the first such declaration I had in mind the recent past and not the 1950's and I repeat; we are not talking about simply a declaration. I think you will agree with me that the CPSU's policy also reflects this. Gorbachev himself has announced repeatedly that one must not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries and that one must believe in the ability of any particular people, and the party of that people, to resolve their own programs, and as everybody to decide freely their own path of development.

Therefore, I support this policy in its entirety. And if some individuals are still worried—history surely has given grounds for this—I still do not see [word indistinct].

Our people... [changes thought] I am now inviting you to Moscow, or Siberia, or anywhere else, and you can convince yourself that there is no need for anxiety whatsoever. It is out of the question that we are preparing for intervention, because, after all, we ourselves have have enough problems.

[Reporter] You have spoken about the people, but the people never support military intervention in other countries. Look at what happened in Afghanistan. The Soviet people never approved intervention there. However, many people in Hungary worry because here there is a multiparty system and at the election the comrades' party might possibly become a minority—as has happened in Poland already—then in these people the temptation might surface that assistance should be extended via the well known or the methods [as heard]; provided that in Moscow, the balance of power may change and the pro-[word indistinct]—as the terms would have it—take the upper hand.

[Ligachev] Why are you so worried that in our country such a turning point might take place?

[Reporter] Is the anxiety thus unfounded?

[Ligachev] It is unfounded. It has no basis whatsoever, and I think in recent years we have proved with deeds that we are not willing to carry out any interference whatsoever and that we fully trust that the people, the party, and the country can overcome the situation themselves. For, after all, no military force of any kind can alter the thinking and mood of a man, and any problem surfacing in a country can be solved by political means alone. I am fully convinced of this.

[Reporter] However, if this is the case, should the assessment of that intervention, on the basis of which the countries of the Warsaw Pact (?went) into Czechoslovakia—precisely on the basis of that Brezhnev doctrine which you now reject, not be reviewed?

[Ligachev] Well, I would like to tell you that according to our information the events then took such a turn that the dissatisfaction of the people brought about by the previous [name indistinct] government was used for aims that were far from the interests of the people. Therefore, when the Prague request for assistance was voiced, we were forced to extend help. What's more—well, I did not participate in the events of those days, but I read a lot about it, I know about a lot of things and there are eyewitnesses among my acquaintances—events reached a stage that terror and violence were raging and the safety of the civilian population was endangered.

[Presenter] But let us hear the opinion regarding this request for and offer of help from Aleksandr Dubcek, then general secretary of the CPCZ, who was more affected and threatened than anyone else by the entrance of the Warsaw Pact's troops.

[Dubcek] In this republic, in the 2 weeks until 20 August, there was no kind of counterrevolution whatsoever. Please, who would have taken steps against Svoboda, president of the republic? I don't want to brag, but who would have taken steps against me, against Cernik, or against Smrkovsky, the leader of the Prague uprising, or others? The police here? The army here? Ours, the Czechoslovak, or the people's militia, of which I was commander? Who would have defeated the socialist system against them? It is an enormous lie, an entirely unacceptable stance, and even today, after 20 years, they are repeating it, they are teaching it in schools. For example, in the seventh grade, this is what they teach about me. And my little grandchild cries that he will not learn that, because his grandfather is a good man.

[Reporter] Who asked for assistance in Prague in 1968?

[Ligachev] In Prague it was also the government who turned to us for assistance.

[Reporter] But neither Dubcek, nor Smrkovsky, nor Cernik, nor Svoboda requested assistance.

[Ligachev] People asked for assistance who themselves were similarly members of the Politburo, the leadership.

[Reporter] On 20 August, how did the news reach you that foreign troops had stepped onto Czechoslovak soil?

[Dubcek] It was late at night. A minister called me, and Cernik, the premier, also telephoned. It was necessary to verify whether it was true that they had crossed the border. So it was at night, who knows what time?

[Reporter] And by then they had occupied the Prague airport, Ruzyne.

[Dubcek] Then we passed a resolution, according to which the whole thing was unlawful, contrary to the agreement, contrary to our relations, and no one had invited them. However, the Soviet ambassador in the United States handed over a note, addressed to the president, that some people had invited them in. In later publications, this is also what they referred to—this invitation. However, even that night we announced on the radio that no one had called them in, neither the president of republic, nor the first secretary, nor the president of the National Assembly, nor the president of the National Front. Indeed, from these institutions there was no one who endorsed this, and nothing of this type was made public. This slowed down the action.

We remained at Central Committee headquarters, and as is customary at such times in civilized states, we waited to see if perhaps someone would come sometime, and who knows, perhaps....

[Reporter]...hand over a note.

[Dubcek] Yes, or that someone would come who was authorized to say something to the first secretary or to the premier. This did not happen. But then, in the end, they came in order to arrest us.

[Reporter] Soldiers?

[Dubcek] Soldiers.

[Reporter] Yes, but these are very unpleasant memories.

[Reporter] So it is just if any member of the leadership, in opposition to the president, the premier, the party first secretary, appeals to a foreign power for military assistance?

[ligachev] I can tell you only one thing. A year after the Soviet troops were deployed, I visited Czechoslovakia. And even at that time I did not sense any resentment toward Soviet soldiers. By the way, the Soviet and other troops behaved extremely humanely, and I think it would be difficult to find people in Czechoslovakia who could cast aspersions on the behavior of our soldiers.

[Reporter] Yet the issue here is not the behavior of common soldiers Ivanov or Petrov. They might have been very decent lads. However, the issue in question is the principle, whether one-two members of the leadership have the right, by bypassing the legitimate party and government organs, to request foreign military assistance.

[Ligachev] It is an internal matter, a matter for those leaders.

[Reporter] But it became international.

[Ligachev] But still I believe that the principle which we have now promulgated in the declaration issued by the Warsaw Pact is the only correct principle, according to which we must not interfere, the principle of independence, the principle of the sovereignty of parties. Still, I would like to emphasize that this does not mean that these parties cannot meet, cannot exchange experiences, cannot elaborate measures for the resolution of their problems, for the coordination of their efforts, for the establishment of peace and security, for cordination, dialogue, in order to ease international tension.

So I repeat: an absolutely voluntary and free participation, the full independence of the individual parties, their responsibility toward their people, and at the same time the possibility that they can gather together at any time, they can consult, they can decide certain issues, but not to the detriment of one another. However we are not the only ones; the Western leaders meet regularly and they resolve vital issues.

[Reporter] That is natural. I was not even speaking of the meetings of official, legal organs. However, let us speak of something else. Yegor, perestroyka is approaching a turning-point. Supplies are deteriorating everywhere. There is a crisis. There are not goods in the shops, nationality problems are also surfacing in several regions of the Soviet Union. How do you view the condition of perestroyka at present?

[Ligachev] At such steep turns of history there are periods where, before we might get up the hill, before we set off upward, the difficulties grow and grow. And we are just at such a period—the period of perestroyka which, properly speaking, is a revolutionary breakthrough, and we have reached this period.

You mentioned that supplies in our country are deteriorating, and there are other problems, too. I would put it somewhat differently: the situation is that serious contradictions have been aggravated on the consumer market in our country. However, the reason for this is not that might we might manufacture less food or prime necessities, or that we might we might manufacture less food or prime necessities, or that we might deal more poorly with social problems. No. The situation is that in our country, and this applies both to the past and the present, serious disturbances are manifested in money-turnover. And the growth which exists in the sphere of the prime necessities, services, food production, and especially in the building of homes, schools, hospitals, commercial, and social establishments—here, I mean by growth, 15, 20, indeed 40 percent growth—is all swallowed up by the gigantic money market, like a monster, and for this reason, society does not sense any substantial growth.

Apart from that, I say openly: To a certain extent it was a surprise for us, too, that the relations between the nationalities grew more and more and became seriously aggravated. At the same time, we are of the view that the matters related to the development of culture and language are entirely justly raised by the nationalities populating our country, and it is clear here that we have to provide full equality and every possibility for the development of one's own national-culture and one's own language.

Matters are also raised which, I would say, are related to the growth in independence and responsibility for economic activity—not only at the level of colectivities, but at that of regions, border regions, and republics, as well. We consider this entirely to be a progressive phenomenon. Sometimes, we even refer to it as being a sort of regional self-accounting. At the same time—this is my stand—these relations have become aggravated in our country because the fight has weakened greatly, recently, against nationalism, extremism, separatism, and—I would put it—social chauvinism.

[Reporter] By this, do you mean local nationalism?

[Ligachev] Yes. Furthermore, I think that when we weaken the fight against certain political or social dangers, it is natural that this danger increases.

[Reporter] However, according to the Baltic people's fronts, for example, for 40 years, they were unable to express in any way their national, indeed patriotic, feelings because a central, big- power chauvinism was ruling, and thus it is a natural reaction that now they are expressing the thoughts about which they could not speak then, even if they wanted to.

[Ligachev] If we interpret the rule of big-power chauvinism so as to mean that in the meantime every Baltic country grew from an extremely backward agricultural country, republic, into a country with a developed industry, and we say openly, with a much better material and social existential basis, then I am of the view that there is no chauvinism in this.

[Reporter] But they say that the Estonians are becoming a minority in, for example, their capital, Tallinn. It is as if, for example, in Russia the population of the Russians, let us say in Moscow, were to plunge to 50-60 percent. This causes them alarm.

[Ligachev] But I shall tell you something else. There is, for example, Bashkiriya, whose population is mainly made up of Bashkirs Tatars, and Russians. The Russians have the largest number; they are followed by the Tatars and finally the Bashkirs. Nonetheless, the Soviet authority and the party once felt it necessary to create an autonomous republic. And there, and in many other republics, there are no problems.

I am of the view that here, arithmetic is not always able to correctly shed light on the political issues. Second, the population of the Russians is decreasing. I saw a statistic: In the past 30-40 years, the population of the Russians

has decreased in the entire union. However, I have not yet met one single Russian who might have been enormously distressed by this phenomenon.

[Reporter] Yet the one million Estonians are worried about their national future, because the Russians, after all, number 140 million while the Estonians total 1 million. And soon, they will be a minority in their own republic. You, after all, acknowledge this argument.

[Ligachev] No, I say something else. The national value which was created in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—I have been in these republics—is the matter of our entire people and not just that of the Baltic peoples.

[Reporter] They say that industrialization has involved terrible environmental damage.

[Ligachev] Unfortunately, in our country there are environmental problems that are more serious than that—especially in industrially developed regions such as the Kuznetsk basin, the southern Urals and this pertains, in a certain way , to areas of Siberia, too. There are historical reasons for this, although to admit the truth there have also been many mistakes. The situation is that when we were facing the task of industrialization, when we had to create economic strength, we really were entirely alone in [word indistinct] this, and the standard of neither science nor technology enabled a solution to environmental problems. At that time, we could not pay attention to this, and we built more and more. In the course of this, we harmed many things from the view of modern requirements.

[Reporter] The Baltics also complain that they were annexed without their assent to the Soviet Union in 1940, on the basis of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and that after this, several hundreds of thousands of people were deported, and their national character was endangered. Thus, they have this complaint, and for example, this is supported in the Estonian Central Committee by comrades in the party. Do you not agree with this either?

[Ligachev] No. Now, in connection with what I said about the positive phenomena, my opinion at the same time is that the Baltic republics—and unfortunately not only them, but all our people—lost very much during the time of the personality cult. You probably do not know that people perished in our family, too.

[Reporter] In your family?

[Ligachev] Yes, in mine. Several people were shot through the head, they were expelled from the party. I lived through very difficult times in the thirties and forties. I felt this on my own skin. Some people pass judgment on this only—the basis of conversation; I, however, am acquainted with it from my own experience. Unfortunately, illegalities raged at that time; their effect was felt very strongly in the Baltic republics. I understand very well their feelings, their mood, and I share it fully with them, but I think they have no basis to say that Soviet authority in the past decades has not taken measures to prevent this and to guarantee that such things should not be repeated. For this reason, naturally, these people, like our people—just think how many of us perished in the war years: more than 20 million—went through a great tragedy.

[Reporter] We Hungarians are worried about the fate of perestroyka. Many people say that, due to the worries, one or another representative of central power in Moscow is tempted to put an end to this so-called dirty liberalism, and to silence the opposition liberal forces—that is, to shut them up and, following the example of the Tiananmen Square, to clean up. Is there such a danger in the Soviet Union today?

[Ligachev] Regarding the Tiananmnen Square, that is the affair of the Chinese people and the Chinese Government. So let us put it aside.

[Reporter] Of course.

[Ligachev] Regarding the question as to whether, let us say, not the liquidation of perestroyka but perhaps its considerable slowing down could come about, well, I would like to say the following: Name at least one fact which proves that the leadership, or some force within the leadership, would attempt something similar to this. However, another phenomena does exist: Persons or groups try to increase tensions by incitement and scaremongering and arousing doubts. Now Gorbachev does not even have to go away for people to presume that a change can occur in the political situation of the country, that some sort of serious change could take place. Why do they do this?

In my view, the reason is that these persons and groups would like to realize their ambitions—in an atmosphere of doubt and insecurity they can get nearer to power.

[Reporter] Who do you mean?

[Ligachev] I think of those whom we call extremists, separatists and nationalists, those who want to leave the Soviet Union, who want to destroy the union and want to diverge from the road of the alliance system, the correctness of which I am fully convinced. What is more, I see the substance of my life in the unity of our power, in the unity of our people and of our party, this is the lesson of history.

[Reporter] So, are these political forces in danger of not being able to speak freely from now on?

[Ligachev] No, no, no. We, as you can also see, fight with political means. You can not give a single fact which would prove that we would have violated the law. We apply political means and in our decisions we take public opinion into consideration. If it is so, we support pluralism.

[Reporter] However, the press published the appeal of Nina Andreyeva and Gruber, true, only in the form of letters. These people, standing outside of the political leadership, say that it is time to clean up, that liberalism has to obliterated. Isn't it so—there are such appeals, even if, naturally, not from the government. But in the West, they often say that you, Ligachev, could be the person who would able to clean up, who would be able to put an end to this ugly liberalism.

[Ligachev] Look, there are also other appeals—to leave the Soviet Union, moreover, together with the property which the entire people created.

[Reporter] Are you talking about Georgia and the Baltics?

[Ligachev] I am not talking about republics, but about persons, groups. There are appeals, that individual nations should become separate.

[Reporter] And that Russia should leave.

[Ligachev] There is an appeal that military service should be fulfilled only in one's own republic. In that case, who would defend our borders? There are appeals saying our entire army ought to be dissolved. There are all kinds of appeals. And as for Nina Andreyeva, whom you mentioned—Ligachev knows nothing of it, and I otherwise am in no contact whatsoever with the publications of Nina Andreyeva.

[Reporter] I was told in Paris that you personally helped her, via one of your (?Tomsk) friends, who worked in the editorial staff of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. (Michel Tatu) Sovietologist, said in Paris that the clues lead to you.

[Ligachev] I do not know who said what? At which newspaper does he work?

[Reporter] (Michel Tatu) works at LE MONDE.

[Ligachev] I think I gave him an interview. He is an old acquaintance of mine. He worked in Moscow for a long time. I remember that we spoke for a couple hours, but he did not ask me any such question. Possibly, this was said at an earlier or later meeting, but I at least can say one thing: Ligachev should not be presented as something that is so omnipotent, who can do everything, which others contrive. Why? I work in the politburo, and I fully subordinate myself to the collective leadership. It is not difficult for me to deal with the discipline and order within the Politburo. Thus, I work in a collective, and I subject myself to the collective's discipline, moreover consciously, on an ideological basis, out of deep conviction.

[Reporter] Not long ago, as far as we knew Gorbachev chaired at the politburo sessions, and you chaired at the sessions of the secretariat. Is this invariably the case?

[Ligachev] You know, the situation is that the work of the secretariat has now been somewhat reorganized in our country. You, too, know that in October of last year committees subordinate to the party Central Committee were created to deal with ideological, party organizational, economic, agricultural, and international issues. These meet in session quite diligently. Not long ago the agricultural committee examined a very important issue, connected to the development of prices of agricultural products. Other committees meet even more often. For this reason, there is no need for us to continue the secretariat's work in the previous form. As regards chairing the Politburo, this is done by Mikhail Sergeyevich, and we very actively (?support) this. That is why I find it curious that reports are spread that there are differences of opinion. The Politburo works in a stable manner; it passes resolutions. Of course we have debates on certain matters. This is a great advantage, and by no means can it be attributed to being to our detriment.

[Reporter] It is difficult for me to talk to you sincerely without mentioning Boris Yeltsin, who often mentions you. In your view, what is the difference between you—Ligachev and Yeltsin?

[Ligachev] The first difference is that he keeps on talking about me all the time. I, however, have never talked about him by name.

[Reporter] But you had an argument at the party conference.

[Ligachev] Yes, but in my opinion that was an exchange of opinion rather than an argument, this is what has to be pointed out first of all. I think that the principle of comradeship has to be observed always between party members in every party, so in our party too. Second, tactics, like our finding something about our partner, our attributing something to him and then our attacking him, should not be used. This is not right.

[Presenter] Thus, it was precisely Boris Yeltsin who was the other famous and notorious, passionate and outspoken grey-haired Siberian, who complained at the session of the supreme leadership in 1987 that Ligachev, who was considered the number-two man, was behaving like a dictator in the Politburo and in the secretariat leadership. For this crime, among others, Yeltsin was condemned and removed from his post. At the demand of Ligachev, not long ago a commission was set up to investigate the accusations connected with Yeltsin's so-to-say aberration. The two Siberians cannot stand one another.

[Yeltsin] I would not, for all that, say that Gorbachev stood up in my defense. True, he at least spoke in quite a restrained manner. A very good relationship took shape between us in the beginning. Then, however, this relationship deteriorated—and in my view Ligachev's hand is also in this.

[Reporter] Why? You, as far as I know, came to Moscow at Gorbachev's request.

[Yeltsin] Yes. It is difficult to say. Ligachev....

[Reporter, interrupting] On what do you not agree?

[Yeltsin] With Ligachev?

[Reporter] Yes.

[Yeltsin] With Ligachev or Gorbachev?

[Reporter] With Ligachev.

[Yeltsin] My opinion differs from that of Ligachev in several matters. First, as for the tactics of perestroyka: I spoke about this at the beginning [as heard]. Second, there is the decree on drinking, restricting alcohol consumption, which obviously gave rise to negative feeling in public opinion, as it took measures in a forced, arbitrary, prohibitive manner. I categorically opposed it. It is not possible to fight alocholism in this manner. It would be necessary for us to study international experiences, and not once and for all ban the selling of wine and champagne, to eradicate grape vines that have been developed over centuries, to destroy the most valuable vintage wines that are produced in any country of the world.

This was a grave excess. Or let us take, for example, the issues of social justice. My stand in this has not changed in spite of the fact that I have been floored by knockouts four times in the past year. I continue to adhere to my principles. The situation must be achieved in which everyone has equal opportunities to buy goods. I am speaking about opportunity. It is another matter that people take part in different ways in social production, and that they should receive pay that accords with this.

However, everyone must be ensured equal possibilities regarding what kinds of goods they can buy for the rubles in their pockets—whether they are workers, general secretaries, ministers, or anyone.

[Reporter] That is not so now?

[Yeltsin] It is not.

[Reporter] Are you thinking of the special, closed-off sections of the shops?

[Yeltsin] Naturally, naturally. true, as for preferential food allocations, these have ceased to exist in part. Thus, we have 3C"B)5on a very small step forward. Hoi:N'=still are at the very beginning. Ligachev, however, was of a different opinion. His opinion was that we, leaders, work the most. For this reason, no kind of restriction can pertain to us. Why?

[Reporter] Are you of the view that Ligachev was victorious?

[Yeltsin] No.

[Reporter] In this duel?

[Yeltsin] No, No. The fight is continuing.

[Reporter] [words indistinct]

[Yeltsin] As I said, concerning food allocations Ligachev has already lost, and in the matter of the decree restricting the consumption of alcoholic drinks, as well. It was necessary to adopt a new, modifying decree that, although it does not eliminate the old one, at least formulates the stand that the problem must be resolved gradually. Naturally, we must fight alcoholism, but not with such barbaric methods, not with a policy of prohibition.

[Reporter] In this debate, on whose side does Gorbachev stand?

[Yeltsin] I would say that he stands somewhere in the middle.

[Reporter] Gorbachev probably would not like for you to argue all the time, for perestroyka to fall victim to conflicts between the leaders.

[Yeltsin] Naturally. There has not even been a need for argument. Ligachev should have been dismissed from the Politburo, that's all.

[Reporter] However, you were dismissed from the Politburo instead.

[Yeltsin] Well, yes. I spoke quite sharply at the October 1987 session of the Central Committee. He often resorts to this method.

[Reporter] But why was it you who was chosen as a target?

[Yeltsin] Second, [as heard] I should have liked to mention the matter, which is no less important, that one must not behave in a manner so that, when the party, united does its work, and this is rather successful, one attributes the success to himself. He recently made statements that he had submitted six demands—I do not know about what—of which four had already been fulfilled. This does not in the slightest indicate modesty and comradeship.

As for why precisely I was the one who was chosen as the target of attacks, ask him, since he was one who did the choosing and not I. However, I believe a certain role in this is played by the fact that my stand in many issues of principle is clear and unequivocal, which, it appears, is not to the person's liking. [interviewer returns to Ligachev]

[Reporter] He [Yeltsin] says that in agriculture, you wish first and foremost to rely on large-scale farms—kolkhozes and sovkhozes—and to a lesser extent on tenancies, on family ventures, and that this, on your part, is not a progressive attitude.

[Ligachev] You have raised a very interesting and important issue regarding the variety and equality of socialist property forms, including in agriculture. Yesterday, I held a long conversation with Comrade Burgert. There are two kinds of international practice, in this regard. According to one, the food supply problem is resolved on the basis of small farms. Unfortunately the believers in the first trend cast doubt on the other, even though it is in fact, which says that when the food problem is resolved with glorious success, it is done by relying on large-scale agricultural units of cooperative or state property.

[Reporter] Where is there an example of this?

[Ligachev] This is the easiest for me to answer, because it is Hungary. Do you know where in Hungary Burgert [Dr Robert Burgert, head of the Babolna Agricultural Combine in Hungary] told me yesterday that more than 90 percent of agricultural products, that is food industry goods, are produced? In the cooperatives and in the state farms, including the integrated family, or as we say individual, farms, too—that's where. In this manner, 95 percent of the products are produced in Czechoslovakia—not long ago I was there. And nearly 97-98 percent of the products are produced in cooperatives and state farms in the GDR. We commonly say, among one another: God permitting we should be able to resolve the supply of food, like our Hungarian, German and Czechoslovak comrades! Isn't that proof?

[Reporter] But in your country, the large-scale agricultural units somehow are not so efficient.

[Ligachev] Look, what is the situation? By now, we have attained considerable consumption norms, especially concerning valuable products, such as meat and milk. We have a very serious shortfall in the production of vegetables, potatoes, and mainly fruit, and so forth.

I have already mentioned that the money market has swelled in an astonishing manner. Last year, monetary growth amounted to 40 billion; this year, over a half year, it has exceeded 20 billion rubles. So, everything will settle down when we reach scientific consumption norms and there is full consumption.

So there are difficulties, but we have 1,000 farms—in the past 5-7 years we have reduced the number of farms operating at a deficit to a minimum, and there are scarcely any—which operate excellently. And if we compare our peasant to the Hungarian, or to a U.S. farmer, then we see that he is three to four times more poorly equipped, and that his social provisions are much more mediocre. If we give our peasants excellent technology, like that given to the U.S. farmers, and to the agricultural workers in Hungary, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia, and if from a social viewpoint as well, we create as good a situation for them, we give housing, cultural and living conditions, telecommunications, and production forces of a standard quality, then I guarantee that agricultural production will increase by one-third.

[Reporter] But from where will you get the money for such investment?

[Ligachev] Well, I tell you that if society recognizes that it is a matter of existential importance, it will be duty-bound to find it.

[Reporter] From where?

[Ligachev] From where? I should like to tell you. I shall expound, in what might appear to you to be a somewhat curious manner, the following. It is my deep conviction that our enormous military outlays are justified—it is not owing to the intentions of a few bad people that we make these outlays, as there have been periods when the objective was mere survival, when the international situation was such that it was necessary to strengthen, better still, it was necessary to achieve a military-strategic balance, although to put it mildly there also was a certain squandering in the course of this. These enormous expenditures—and within this it is not money that is decisive, but the enormous productive- intellectual resources, moreover, the best of everything—do not make it possible for us to develop seriously and transform our economy and for us to resolve large social problems.

[Reporter] It is indisputable.

[Ligachev] I should like to emphasize that it depended not on the ill intentions of one or two leaders, but on objective necessity.

[Reporter] For all that, Brezhnev, in his final years....

[Ligachev, interrupting] I have already told you that excesses, squandering, occurred, and these had to be eliminated. However, at present, when, as a result of the extremely clever foreign policy of our party and friends and thanks to the soberly-thinking peoples of the world, we are beginning disarmament, when the reduction of military expenditures is beginning, I tell you openly: that finally there exists a realistic opportunity to redirect the better part of this potential—to where?—to resolving important social issues, thus food supplies.

[Reporter] Thus, you want to lay foundations on large-scale investments and not on the people's material....

[Ligachev, interrupting] No, no, not at all. You have very correctly noticed: We want things as follows. First, no matter what the issue, whether it is agriculture, or another the issues must be raised in a complex manner. Our big problem was that we tried to resolve the agrarian issue with the aid of two or three cure-alls, but this amounted to nothing. What matters have to be resolved? Economic, organizational, legal, ideological, material, technical problems, social and cadre-matters. So if we deal with all of these issues, if we ensure priority for certain spheres, the thing will progress.

[Reporter] In your view, how will perestroyka appear in 2 or let us say, in 4 years? Will enough be given to the people in the markets in the shops? Will supplies improve? Will there be success in drawing forth the many billions of rubles still lying in the pockets and lost to the economy at present?

[Ligachev] First, it would be difficult to find a person in the Soviet Union who could say exactly when everyone can reap the fruits of perestroyka. For all that, we can say that we already are enjoying the fruits of perestroyka, because if we look at our rather informal conversation, do not deny it: You, too, feel the verity that great changes have really taken place in our country, when a member of the Politburo can informally give his stand on any issues. Of course, as long as he does not go against the principles, the stand of the entire Central Committee.

Thus, in our country, in politics the people are harvesting much from what has happened in the country, and they value this highly. It is a matter of glasnost, of democratization, of readiness to take initiative, of greater respect befitting every member of society.

There is also an improvement in economic life, and in morals, too. Nonetheless, I say, an my opinion is, that perestroyka demands long years. Moreover, this is a deep-reaching transformation affecting the social, political and economic structures which makes it possible for us to raise our country to a qualitatively new level, toward light and progress.

In my opinion, we should have said this at the very beginning, since all of us got enthusiastic, and we believed that we would sort everything out very quickly. Yet experience shows that this is not the way it goes. Of course, Ligachev's popularity does not increase if he says that long years are necessary for perestroyka, but I consider this to be true, and the truth must be spoken.

And this obligates us to work, exceptionally, at a stepped-up tempo, since difficult tasks await everyone, all of society. Turning to a serious note, the responsibility is also enormous.

[Presenter] We hope that we shall be able to continue the conversation soon. You have been watching the special edition of "Panorama".

Chervov Cited on Warsaw Pact Bucharest Summit

AU2707123789 Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WARSZAWY in Polish 24 Jul 89 p 4

[NOVOSTI interview "special for ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI" given by Colonel General Nikolay Chervov, chief of a directorate of the general staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, to NOVOSTI reporters Olga Trofinova and Oleg Zadecki: "A New Course Toward Disarmament"—date and place not given]

[Text] An experiment with remote control detection and the approval of the Strasbourg initiative are some of the things that Colonel General Nikolay Chervov, chief of a directorate of the general staff of the Soviet Armed forces and the Soviet delegation expert at the recent session of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact in Bucharest, talks about in an interview for NOVOSTI.

[Chervov] I have now attended four meetings of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member states. These were: Budapest 1986, where we accepted the program for the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe; Berlin 1987, where we agreed on the defensive doctrine of the Warsaw Pact, which prepared the ground for restructuring the armed forces of the pact; and Warsaw 1988, where we called on the world to protect the natural environment. Each such meeting of the leaders of the socialist "seven" sketches out new paths which take us forward.

The same is characteristic of the Bucharest 1989 session. Three matters must be noted. First, we have undertaken an in-depth analysis of the changing European and world situation. Second, we have accepted the guidelines for making further improvements to the political character, I repeat, political character of the Warsaw Pact, and the appropriate mechanisms of cooperation. Third, we exchanged opinions on the internal situation in the Warsaw Pact countries.

The problems of disarmament and security were given priority at the Bucharest meeting. Its subsequent documentation contains information on what was done after the Budapest meeting in order to strengthen peace and stability in Europe, and was based on the relations of trust and cooperation between the countries of the West and East.

Let us turn to the Soviet-American INF Treaty, which was a breakthrough in nuclear disarmament. Almost half of all the arsenals of intermediate and short-range missiles have been eliminated and both sides are strictly adhering to the provisions of the treaty.

The Bucharest session stressed that the main aim is now to reach agreement on a 50 percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons, and great hopes are put on the negotiations taking place in Vienna of the 23 and 35 CSCE countries. Their success would be a turning point in European history. The participants of Bucharest 1989 expressed their disquiet with the position adopted by the NATO leadership in Brussels, putting stress on the politics of strength and its doctrine of "nuclear containment", that is to say, those things which are in clear conflict with the new reality. The West's continuing research into space weapons, in line with the "star wars" program, and its plans of modernization of its tactical nuclear weapons give cause for deep concern. If these are successful, they will impede the Vienna negotiations and could even reverse all that has been achieved to date.

I attach a great deal of importance to the project accepted in Bucharest, that there now exists a possibility of supplementing the 1963 Treaty with a chapter banning all underground nuclear testing. In this connection, I would mention the Soviet Union's tests carried out at the beginning of July on remote control detection of the presence of nuclear weapons on surface ships that were carried out with the participation of Soviet and American scientists.

Let me explain. The instrument is placed in a helicopter and is able to detect the presence of nuclear weapons on any given object, at a range of 200 meters. The Soviet leadership invited the Americans to participate in the testing of this instrumentation, but the invitation was not accepted. They maintained this was impossible.

However, I believe there is a different reason. When an American warship enters harbor, the Americans do not as a rule inform the host country whether there are any nuclear weapons on board. The existence of such an instrument would, I suppose, make them change this practice. Why bother talking about an instrument which is presently available, that can effectively detect even self-guiding sea-based nuclear missiles?

Having listed the most important decisions made in Bucharest, I would just like to mention one more. It concerns the suggestion to create a European Security Center which would include all 35 CSCE countries. Initially, it would act as an information center, and later its functions could be extended.

This firmly manifests the desire of the socialist countries to create a comprehensive international security system, especially in Europe. This is a pressing need. In our mutually dependent world, periodically shaken by sharp conflicts and hot-spots which threaten to explode, such a need is of the utmost importance.

This is in full accord with Mikhail Gorbachev's tactical nuclear weapons initiative presented in Strasbourg. If the NATO countries agree to negotiations on this subject, then the Soviet Union, after having consulted its allies, could immediately undertake further unilateral reductions of its tactical missiles in Europe.

More on Gerasimov Comments on Bloch, B-2 Program
LD2807144189 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0030 GMT 28 Jul 89

[Text] On 27 July there was a briefing on current questions of international policy in the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center. Speaking to Soviet and foreign journalists, Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry, dwelled in particular on the anti-Soviet spy mania campaign under way in the United States. Here is the recording:

[Begin Gerasimov recording] Yesterday, a correspondent of the ABC television company put some questions to me about the U.S. diplomat—what is his name?—Felix Bloch. He put them persistently. At the time I was surprised at this persistence, but in the evening I looked through the reports, and discovered the reason. It turns out that it was precisely this television company, ABC, which had opened the latest page of spy mania even before the FBI had completed its investigations into the suspicions in relation to this U.S. diplomat. Its assistant was THE WASHINGTON POST. There I read that Mr Bloch had stopped going to the State Department a month ago. But nobody noticed it in the State Department. Everyone thought that he had a new job. So there is a curious situation reigning in the State Department. I went on to read that the nameplate on his office on the sixth floor in Room 6519 had disappeared—Now you see him, now you don't—although no charges had been made against him.

But much has already been written of all the passions which are raising the latest wave of spy mania in the United States. For example, a State Department official is cited who stated, supposedly: It is a disaster. To all these assessments I want to add that the name of Bloch, until the past few days, meant nothing to us, and we have nothing to do with him. It is a pity that the U.S. papers are inflating this whole story.

Some observers link it, incidentally, with the discussion of the military budget. In Congress, appropriations are being discussed for the production of 132 B-2 bombers. They are talking big money—$23 billion has already been spent, and altogether the program costs $70 billion. There are differences over it between the Senate and the House of Representatives, which wants to spend less money than the administration is asking. But the question is: Why is this futuristic aircraft needed? Recently it was shown to the whole world in photographs and on television. Here is the view of Senator Sam Nunn on this score—So that we can scare the Soviets so strongly that they will stop to think what we are capable of after they make the first strike.

This is a very strange statement—although Sam Nunn himself, as we know, is a good disarmament specialist—because the Soviet Union adheres to the strategy of defensive sufficiency, and there is no place in it for a first strike. Apart from this, it seems, we have already reached a general understanding that a first strike is suicidal, as both sides have the possibility for a retaliatory strike. Unfortunately, in the United States they are again returning to thinking the unthinkable—discussing how to wage a nuclear war.

This is seen in a series of articles published recently in the LOS ANGELES TIMES by Robert Toth. He speaks of a change in the so- called strategic integrated operative plan. The plan envisages, in the first hours of a conflict, a preemptive strike with the aim of beheading the political leadership of the Soviet Union and the neutralization of control points. It is being seriously argued that with a 50-percent cut in strategic offensive weapons by the parties—which we are intending to do with the United States, and over which we are negotiating—with such a cut there is an increasing possibility for a beheading strike.

Of course, this type of exercise by desk-bound strategists appears at the time of discussion of the budget allocations for military systems. But we feel that with the present state of Soviet-U.S. relations this type of change in U.S. strategic concepts can create the material basis for strategic instability. To show once more the speculative nature and absurdity of these concepts of beheading, I remind you that even according to assessments of U.S. experts, a preemptive strike can put out of action not more than 20 percent of Soviet mobile strategic missiles. The remaining ones will be more than sufficicient to deliver unacceptable damage to the other side. So this wretched story causes no emotions in us apart from regret. [end recording]

Shevardnadze, Perez de Cuellar Meet in Paris
LD2907163689 Moscow TASS in English 1611 GMT 29 Jul 89

[Text] Paris July 29 TASS—Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee amd USSR foreign minister, who is currently here in connection with the start of an international conference on Cambodia, met with United Nations Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar on Saturday.

Shevardnadze conveyed Mikhail Gorbachev's greetings and best wishes to the U.N. chief.

Perez de Cuellar pointed out that he highly appreciated the large-scale support which the Soviet Union gives to the United Nations Organisation and emphasised that Gorbachev's address at the U.N. General Assembly in December 1988 remained the source of inspiration not only to the staff of the U.N. secretariat but also to all members of the world today.

A wide range of problems were discussed during the conversation from the viewpoint of the role of the United Nations, its secretary-general, and the Security Council in addressing international and regional issues.

The state of affairs concerning a settlement of the problem of Cambodia was discussed in detail. An opinion was expressed that it would be highly useful if already the 43rd session of the U.N. General Assembly succeeded in adopting a resolution which would reflect new realities of the situation in and around Cambodia. Other possibilities for ensuring the peace-making role of the United Nations in a Cambodian settlement, specifically through participation in an international control mechanism were also considered. Versions of the holding of consultations among the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council as a step towards settlement were discussed with due regard for the situation taking shape in the Middle East.

Concern over the explosive situation in Lebanon was expressed. It was pointed out that the situation required close attention and constructive participation on the part of the entire international community.

The interlocutors emphasised the need for further consistent efforts to implement Resolution 598, which will make it possible to take the strain off Iran-Iraq relations.

Special attention was devoted to the discussion of the Afghan issue. The Soviet minister emphasised that in recent months the Najibullah government had demonstrated its vital power and that its international prestige had markedly augmented, which created new conditions for headway to a settlement of the Afghanistan situation.

The idea of holding a conference on Afghanistan with the participation of the parties concerned and its closest neighbours evokes interest in a number of countries.

Speaking of the need in every way to contribute to raising the importance of the UNO at this crucial moment in mankind's history, Shevardnadze voiced the idea of convening a special session of the U.N. Security Council on 1990 on the occasion of the 45th jubilee of the United Nations Organisation to consider major issues of contemporary international life and the functioning of the organisation.

Concern over the state of U.N. financial affairs and over the non-repayment by some members of the organisation of their dues to it was expressed during the conversation.

Perez de Cuellar was gratified to note that the Soviet Union was steering matters to full payment of all its dues.

Shevardnadze reaffirmed that this was a principled political decision by the Soviet leadership reaffirming the Soviet Union's serious attitude to the organisation.

The conversation was notable for constructiveness and a high degree of mutual understanding.

Chernyshev on Helsinki Final Act Anniversary

LD2607171189 Moscow TASS in English 1525 GMT 26 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 26 TASS—By TASS military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshev:

One of the coming days it will be fourteen years since Helsinki hosted the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), crowned with the signing of the historic final act. The years since have confirmed the undying significance of that forum which drew the line under the second world war and mapped out a general course of the states' long-term activity to make Europe a continent of lasting peace and cooperation.

After a severe setback in the late 1970s and early 1980s the all-European process began again to pick up momentum in the subsequent period. The Stockholm conference and then the Vienna conference scored spectacular results. Pursuant to the latter, two rounds of talks have already been held on conventional armed forces in Europe and on confidence-building and security measures.

It will be noted that the socialist countries not only strive to perfect the achievements of Helsinki and Stockholm but also to agree to adopt a new generation of intercomplementary and large-scale confidence-building measures embracing the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. Elaboration of such measures might be undertaken in three main directions. The first would be limiting military activity of the participating countries, including the scope, frequency and duration of military exercises. The second would be to extend the confidence-building measures to the activity of air force and navies, including measures of notification, supervision and limitation of such activity. And the third direction would be enhancing openness and predictability in military matters, including exchange of information, control and verification.

On all these problems the delegations of socialist countries have tabled relevant documents at the negotiations and expressed other considerations, including the idea of setting up a centre for reducing the military threat and preventing a surprise attack on the continent.

And what about the NATO countries? Regrettably, none of these new ideas has so far been reflected in the Western proposals. Essentially these proposals boil down only to specifying the agreements already finalised at the Stockholm conference. In the same manner as they did in Helsinki and Stockholm the NATO countries strive to confine the sphere of application of confidence-building measures to only the land forces while leaving the entire air force and naval activity "intact".

Of course the confidence-building measures adopted are in need of improvement. There is a need to lower, in a certain set of conditions, the parameters of land forces

activities subject to notification and to broaden the possibilities for the work of the observers, etc. But this is clearly not enough to produce a package of measures meeting the requirements formulated in the final document of the Vienna meeting. Naturally, this question arises: And do the Western participants in the talks really want to achieve a greater practical openness in the field of activity of the armed forces if they are reluctant to extend control and supervision measures to such of their key components as the air force and navy?

In marking the anniversary of the Helsinki final act and paying due tribute to the accomplishments of that time, one would wish to stress that today the need is not only for making cosmetic improvements in the Helsinki and Stockholm agreements. There is a need to make bold headway, deepening and broadening the all-European process, and this requires concentrated efforts by all states which participated in the Helsinki process.

Security Committee Head on Helsinki Accords

LD2707171189 Moscow TASS in English 1314 GMT 27 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 27 TASS—World public opinion plays a great role in elaborating concepts and ideas which develop the Helsinki accords, Yevgeniy Silin, chairman of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation believes.

The Helsinki accords form the basis for the work of the Soviet committee which owes its birth to the warming of the political climate in Europe, Silin said in a TASS interview connected with the approaching 14th anniversary of the signing of the final act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

"Over the 14 years we have kept an eye on the evolution of the Helsinki process. One cannot say it was a smooth process, it had its ups and downs. And if we now say it is irreversible, it is largely owing to new political thinking in the international scene," Silin said.

Increasing numbers of people are now actively joining the discussion of the would-be model of an all-European Home, and this is the distinctive feature of the current stage of the Helsinki process, Silin believes. The Soviet committee's partners include many influential organisations which can directly influence their governments' official policy, he noted.

Suffice it to mention the Mroz Institute for East-West Security Studies (US) and the Ebert and Benecke Foundations (West Germany), he said.

The Soviet committee does not stand aside from the elaboration of theoretical models for the future of the European continent. The publication of a book, "Europe on the Threshold of the Third Millenium", has been the result of cooperation with the North Rhine-Westphalia Foreign Society in Dortmund. "The topics raised in the book are in tune with President Gorbachev's recent proposal that a second Helsinki-type conference be held to discuss the next stages of advance to a European community of the 21st century," Silin said.

COCOM 'Obvious Anachronism,' Should Be Removed

LD2607170689 Moscow TASS in English 1507 GMT 26 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 26 TASS—By TASS Political News Analyst Albert Balebanov:

A spokesman for the Norwegian Foreign Ministry has said his country wishes to reduce the list of goods banned under the regulations of the Coordination Committee on Export Controls (COCOM) and called for the creation of a mechanism which would not hamper the extension of East-West trade links.

This statement is the latest in a flurry of criticism by West European governments of the domination of East-West trade relations by COCOM, set up on U.S. insistence in 1949. It is widely believed in the West that, in the improving international climate, COCOM's discriminatory restrictions are increasingly irrelevant and even hold back political relations with the East.

In April this year there was an open conflict between COCOM and France, West Germany and Britain, which rejected Washington's attempts to block deals and decided to supply advanced equipment to the Soviet Union. The Italian Government, for its part, simplified export procedure on a wide range of goods on the COCOM list.

The obtaining situation has forced the U.S. to amend its position. It is no coincidence that George Bush decided to cancel the so-called "without exception" rule, thus paving the way for wider high-tech exports to socialist countries. Following this step, COCOM is expected to simplify regulations on the exports of computers to socialist countries. The intention to take such a decision has been recently disclosed by a representative of Denmark's Industrial Council.

It is increasingly obvious today that NATO's restrictions on trade not only violate the spirit and letter of the Helsinki Final Act on security and cooperation in Europe but also hamper efforts to remove mistrust, establish normal business relations in the international scene and clear obstacles to the implementation of the idea of the Common European Home. COCOM is an obvious anachronism today and should be discarded.

United States & Canada

Baker, Shevardnadze To Meet 19-20 Sep in Washington

LD2907200789 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1900 GMT 29 Jul 89

[Text] Paris, 29 Jul (TASS)—A meeting has taken place here between E.A. Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker.

A considerable place in their conversation, which began on a one-to-one basis, was taken up by questions on a Cambodian settlement, and primarily by the external aspects of this settlement.

The ministers agreed that the Paris conference opens a new and important stage in the matter of resolving the Cambodian problem. They stated their intention to promote the creation of favorable conditions for a dialogue between the Khmer sides in the interests of bringing national reconciliation closer in Cambodia and also for a resolution of the external aspects of a settlement.

During an exchange of opinions on the state of Soviet-U.S. relations, E.A. Shevardnadze and J. Baker devoted a considerable amount of time to an informal discussion of issues of perestroyka in the Soviet Union. The secretary of state stated that President Bush and his administration support the aims of perestroyka and wish it success.

The ministers spoke of the fact that at the present crucial moment, when the "cold war" period is coming to an end and when the foundations are being laid for qualitatively new interstate relations in the 21st century, much depends on the degree of maturity and the confiding nature of the dialogue between the USSR and the United States. It is also essential to bear in mind that other countries see a factor of international stability in the improvement of Soviet-U.S. relations and link the prospects for moving over to stable peace and cooperation with this.

The ministers reviewed the status of the talks on limiting and reducing armaments and expressed satisfaction with the constructive direction of the mutual efforts and with the drawing together that is taking place in the positions of the sides, including their positions at the talks on nuclear and space armaments.

The substantial progress at the talks on reducing conventional armed forces in Europe was noted with satisfaction. It was confirmed that in accordance with the political statements of the sides they will strive to reach an initial accord in 1990.

The task of completing work on a convention banning chemical weapons was singled out as a priority. The progress achieved at the last round of Soviet-U.S. consultations on this problem creates good prerequisites for this.

The intention to complete the agreement of protocols on the monitoring of nuclear explosions [o kontrole za yadernymi vzryvami] to present the 1974 and 1976 treaties for ratification in the very near future, was confirmed.

Summing up existing experience of Soviet-U.S. cooperation in favor of a regional settlement, the sides touched upon situations in a number of regions of conflict in the world—in Afghanistan, Central America, and the Middle East.

There was detailed discussion of the state of affairs in the field of bilateral cooperation, which, despite substantial achievements in recent times still lags behind the level of the Soviet-U.S. political dialogue. In this connection the Soviet side put forward a "package" of specific proposals and expressed ideas on a possible timetable for implementing them.

Considerable attention was given to formulating an agenda and to questions of priority for discussion at the next meeting of the ministers in September of this year in Washington. It was agreed that this will take place on 19-20 September.

Both sides proceed from the fact that this meeting must be politically full and put down specific prerequisites for a new stage in the dialogue at summit level.

E.A. Shevardnadze and J. Baker described the exchange of opinions that had taken place as productive, interesting and useful.

Shevardnadze, Canada's Clark Meet in Paris

LD2907192189 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1835 GMT 29 Jul 89

[Text] Paris, 29 Jul (TASS)—Eduard Shevardnadze, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and USSR minister of foreign affairs, who is here in connection with the beginning of the international conference on Cambodia, today met Joseph Clark, Canadian secretary of state for foreign affairs. Several questions on the development of Soviet-Canadian relations, on deepening political dialogue, and on further increasing the volume and quality of bilateral cooperation in various areas were discussed. Problems relating to the Cambodian settlement and to the work of the international conference on Cambodia were also discussed.

The exchange of opinions, which were of a businesslike and substantive character, expressed the readiness of both sides to extend the areas of mutual understanding and agreement where possible.

Joint Briefing With U.S. Held on UN

LD2807165889 Moscow TASS in English 1639 GMT 28 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 28 TASS—The Soviet Union and the United States have held consultations ahead of the forthcoming 44th session of the United Nations General Assembly and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State John Bolton today described them as very fruitful for both sides.

He told a news conference here that the discussions had covered a wide range of issues, including U.N. efforts to maintain peace and settle regional conflicts, and drives against terrorism and drug trafficking.

Both parties, Bolton said, had reaffirmed their interest in joint efforts to increase the effectiveness of the United Nations and its specialised agencies, rationalise their work and overcome confrontational attitudes.

The U.S. diplomat expressed hope for continued Soviet-American cooperation also at the forthcoming U.N. General Assembly session and in other U.N. steering bodies.

Speaking at the same news conference, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy singled out ecology as a "promising area of Soviet-U.S. interaction in international organisations".

"We think it very important to organise work so as to ensure that by 1992, when an international conference on ecology is to be convened, it will be possible to achieve some real, palpable results in the form of specific conventions and possibly a general agreement on the norms of states' ecological conduct.

"We agreed that it is essential to work even today towards specific results at the upcoming forums on ecology. Some 30 such forums are expected by 1992," Petrovskiy said.

He and Bolton said that when discussing struggle with international terrorism, they had concentrated on looking for ways to increase the effectiveness of these efforts not only by the United Nations in general but also by its specialised agencies like the International Civil Aviation Organisation. The U.S. assistant secretary of state said: "We hope to have a resolution on terrorism that will avoid some of the political confrontation that has arisen in connection with that issue before."

The Soviet deputy foreign minister said, for his part: "The eradication of terrorism should be among the crucial tasks for the coming years. In order to build a safe world and a comprehensive security system, it is imperative to prevent any acts of terrorism.

"I believe that the international community should deal with this issue on a collective basis."

Commenting on the spread of drugs, Bolton said that all governments were beginning to realise drug trafficking as a truly international problem. He stressed the importance of international cooperation in advancing new ideas in the drive against drug dealers.

One question asked at the news conference concerned U.S. Diplomat Felix Bloch, the central figure in another case of spy mania unfolding in the United States.

Yuriy Gremitskikh, first deputy chief of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Information Directorate who conducted the news conference, said that "since U.S. authorities have not confronted Bloch with any charges, the question oughtn't be answered".

Information Directorate Chief Gennadiy Gerasimov, replying to a similar question on Thursday, said nobody in the Soviet Union had known of Bloch before the latest outcry in the U.S. press.

"We have no connection with him", he added.

The Soviet-American consultations were held under an understanding reached between Eduard Shevardnadze and James Baker to include transnational problems—the so-called fifth basket—in Soviet-American dialogue.

Bush, Akhromeyev Hold 'Interesting' Meeting

LD2907091789 Moscow TASS in English 0906 GMT 29 Jul 89

[Text] Washington July 29 TASS—By TASS correspondent Nikolay Turkatenko:

A meeting between President George Bush and Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, adviser of the president of the USSR Supreme Soviet (parliament), who is now on a visit in the United States at the invitation of Admiral William Crowe, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had been planned to last 15-20 minutes on Friday. American and foreign journalists who gathered on the lawn in front of the White House in the scorching sun, thought that the marshal would presently emerge and describe for them his meeting with the President. But instead of 15 minutes they had to wait for about an hour. The meeting was attended by Secretary of State James Baker, Defence Secretary Dick Cheney and assistant to the President for national security affairs Brent Scowcroft.

To all appearancs, the meeting was an interesting one. In an exclusive interview with TASS, Marshal Akhromeyev said: "During the meeting I described my tour of the country to the President and said that, judging by the impression I got from my meetings with Americans from various walks of life, the U.S. population approved of improvement in relations between the USSR and the United States. Then we discussed military and political matters and issues of cuts in European armed forces. The President favoured contacts between the military. I

conveyed the best regards and good wishes to the President from Mikhail Gorbachev. In turn, the President asked me to convey the best regards and good wishes to Mikhail Gorbachev. In my opinion, it was a very good meeting."

President Bush told journalists that the American side was greatly impressed by the stay of Marshal Akhromeyev in the United States and his human interest in American servicemen.

After the meeting the White House press section circulated a report on behalf of the president, which says, inter alia, that the President and Marshal Akhromeyev exchanged opinions on a broad range of questions, including the state of the talks on arms control. The president confirmed his wish to achieve the earliest agreement. The President displayed special interest in hearing Marshal Akhromeyev's opinion concerning correlation between Soviet domestic reforms and the Soviet policy in the sphere of security. The President and Marshal Akhromeyev discussed the progress of perestroyka, and the President availed himself of this chance to confirm his support for President Gorbachev's programme of reforms.

Marshal Akhromeyev was invited to the Washington National Press Club before his visit to the White House. The marshal described to meeting participants at the club who represented the leading mass media in the United States and some other countries, the Soviet stand at the arms control talks, successes achieved and problems which, in the opinion of the Soviet side have to be tackled by joint efforts.

Admiral William Crowe, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, took part in the meeting at the National Press Club. In an exclusive interview with TASS, Crowe pointed to the importance and usefulness of an exchange of visits between Soviet and U.S. military leaders to improve relations between the two countries, to strengthen confidence and to promote relaxation of international tension.

In an exclusive interview with TASS, Frank Carlucci, the former defence secretary in the Reagan administration, who was present at the National Press Club, expressed satisfaction that an exchange of visits between the Soviet and U.S. military had been started during his term of office at the Pentagon. He recalled with satisfaction his visit to the USSR and meetings with Soviet Defence Minister Dmitriy Yazov. He was glad, he added, that Marshal Akhromeyev visited the United States again. The exchange of such visits enabled the two sides to learn each other better and to tackle many problems which seemed insoluble quite recently, he said.

It is worth noting that the marshal's speech at the National Press Club and his frank and witty replies to the most cunning questions by sharp journalists were met with understanding. One of them told TASS that the Soviet marshal spoke like an ordinary normal man, which makes understandable his toughness, when it is necessary, in discussing positions of the sides at the arms control talks. This man, as Admiral Crowe, is a war veteran, and he knows what he says, added the American journalist.

Bush Reacts to House Defense Budget Vote

LD2907120289 Moscow TASS in English 1154 GMT 29 Jul 89

[Text] Washington July 29 TASS—By TASS correspondent Igor Ignatyev: President George Bush expressed his dissatisfaction with the decision of the House of Representatives to cut allocations for a number of major strategic programs proposed by the administration.

"I am disappointed that the House did what they did," Bush told a press conference at the White House held to announce the decision by Tommy Robinson, Arkansas's representative, to change his allegiance from Democrat to Republican.

The President made it clear that his annoyance was provoked, above all, by the House decision to cut from 4.9 billion to 3.1 billion dollars the administration's request for "Star Wars" program and by the decision to cut from 4.7 billion to 3.73 billion dollars allocations for the production of the latest, B-2 strategic bomber. "We don't need further cuts in SDI," he said. "What I need is a strong SDI program, a strong B-2 program", President Bush stressed.

Seeking to put additional pressure on the Congress, President Bush reiterated that a full compliance with the administration's request for allocations for these large-scale military programs was necessary for successful negotiations with the Soviet Union on the curtailment and reduction of strategic arms. "I do not want to negotiate with the Soviet Union without as many cards in my hand as possible," Bush stated.

The President stressed that, rating the Congress's performance on the whole, he "wouldn't give it very high marks". But he refrained from criticizing the legislature too strongly. "I have to work with these people. I will work with these people," Bush said. Stating that the White House was planning to press the Congress for meeting the administration's war program proposals in full, Bush voiced confidence that he was "going to prevail" on most of the issues.

The Senate will consider the defence budget next week. It is expected that the Senate will give more support to the administration's original version. Later, a special commission on agreement formed of representatives of the two chambers will take up the working out of a combined variant.

Bush Cited on POWs, MIAs in Afghanistan

LD2907115989 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0010 GMT 29 Jul 89

[Excerpt] Washington, 29 Jul (TASS)—TASS correspondent Igor Ignatyev reports:

On Friday President Bush announced that the U.S. government is prepared to give assistance to the USSR in obtaining "as much information as possible about the fate of Soviet citizens" who continue to be held as prisoners-of-war by groups of the Afghan armed opposition or who are missing in Afghanistan.

Speaking at the Washington conference of the national league of families of prisoners-of-war and those who have been reported missing, the President noted "with satisfaction" that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev recently made this "humanitarian appeal". Replying to this message, George Bush said: "We shall do everything we can, everything possible," in order to help establish the fate of the Soviet citizens reported missing in Afghanistan or captured as prisoners-of-war. As the President noted, the United States "is hopefully awaiting" for the USSR, in response, to undertake efforts to "encourage more serious and timely cooperation on the part of its allies" in establishing the fate of U.S. servicemen reported missing during the years of the war in Indochina which, is known, the United States conducted for almost 10 years. [passage omitted]

Exchange of U.S.-USSR TV Programs Proposed

18001422 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 22 Jul 89 p 10

[Report by Viktor Merezhko, playwright, chairman of the board of the Central House of Cinematographers, and Yuliy Gusman, director of the Central House of Cinematographers: "Video Center: USSR-USA"]

[Text] We read with interest the announcement of the "Monitor" project in SOVETSKAYA KULTURA of 1 May under the rubric "Alternative." The author, G. Simanovich suggested creating two video houses in the USSR and the United States and showing films about all aspects of life in the two countries on a permanent basis. Additionally, one must not fail to take into account the specific nature of the American audience, which prefers home videos and has broad possibilities in this respect because of multiple programming and cable television.

The board of the Central House of Cinematographers in Moscow is offering a slightly altered version of this project, taking into account an idea we have been supporting for a long time. There is the possibility of creating a video center on the basis of the House of Cinematographers without having to get into costly construction. In addition to the video club and the video library, this center would be "fed" foreign programs via the satellite bridge. In exchange—under an agreement with the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting—our foreign partners would receive our programming. Who could become such a partner? Anyone who has a cable channel under conditions that are advantageous for himself. Any board of directors of a national or local television channels.

There are essentially two additions to the "Monitor" project: the studio and the television center, and, let us emphasize, no large amount of special construction is required. It will be necessary to have a group of directors, script writers, telex, fax machine, and permanent exchange of ideas for programs. One of them is literally hanging in the air: videotapes of interesting evenings here in the Central House of Cinematographers and in other creative houses in the capital. Let not only 1,200 cinematographers see them, but also millions of viewers here in our country and abroad.

And so we envision the outline of the "Monitor" project as follows: Movie house-studio-space-television channel in the United States (and subsequently in other countries as well). A shuttle exchange of videocassettes and film crew could also be arranged.

The board of the House of Cinematographers is prepared to participate with SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in its implementation.

China

Shevardnadze, Qian Qichen Discuss Cambodia

LD3007180289 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1706 GMT 30 Jul 89

[Text] Paris, 30 Jul (TASS)—Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and USSR foreign minister, had a conversation with Qian Qichen, PRC foreign minister, here today.

The ministers noted with satisfaction that since the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations in May at the summit in Beijing, useful work had been done to implement the impressive potential for cooperation between the USSR and PRC in the economic, scientific, and cultural areas.

The aspiration was expressed to maintain this momentum and to keep up the high-level and varied character of bilateral contacts.

Agreement was reached to hold the first meeting of diplomatic and military experts in Moscow in November this year to examine the question of cutting armed forces in areas adjacent to the Soviet-Chinese border and strengthening trust in the military field.

The fourth round of talks on border questions will take place in October in Beijing.

The two exchanged opinions on the principles for the process of a Cambodian settlement in light of the international conference in Paris. It was noted on both sides that the calling of the conference is creating a real basis for finding the best ways of unblocking this regional conflict by political means, and that this is achievable given constructive efforts from all those taking part in the forum.

The conversation took place in a friendly atmosphere and was of a businesslike and constructive character.

Tian Jiyun, Maslyukov on Sino-Soviet Cooperation

OW2907024789 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0600 GMT 26 Jul 89

[Text] The fourth meeting of the Soviet-Chinese Commission on Economic, Trade, and Scientific and Technical Cooperation is being held in Moscow. The Chinese government delegation, headed by Vice Premier Tian Jiyun, has called the current meeting an important event. Tian Jiyun said: The Chinese government believes that this meeting is of great significance. During the meeting we will not only sum up the past but also discuss new areas of cooperation and ways to expand cooperation.

Maslyukov, head of the Soviet delegation and first deputy chairman of the Soviet government, pointed out: Soviet-Chinese cooperation is becoming an important factor in the economic development of the two nations. He disclosed that it has been decided that bilateral trade will be further increased. The volume of bilateral commodity trade is approaching 2 billion rubles and will probably exceed this figure. Our two nations agree that they have great potential for developing cooperation and for raising this cooperation to a level commensurate with their size. The ongoing reform in the Soviet Union and China is designed to bring into fuller play the superiority of socialism, enhance mutual appeal, and promote cooperation.

Northeast Asia

Shevardnadze, Japan's Mitsuzuka Meet in Paris

LD3007174189 Moscow TASS in English 1731 GMT 30 Jul 89

[Text] Paris July 30 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze met with his Japanese counterpart Hiroshi Mitsuzuka in the French capital today.

The ministers expressed satisfaction with the level and intensiveness of the political dialogue between the two countries in the recent time.

At the same time, both said that potentialities of Soviet-Japanese relations have not been exhausted and that these relations have good prospects.

Mitsuzuka expressed conviction that success of revolutionary perestroyka processes, now under way in the Soviet Union, creates conditions for closer cooperation.

The ministers discussed the situation in the Asia-Pacific region. Shevardnadze pointed to the favourable effect of the normalisation of Soviet-Chinese relations on the situation there.

The sides also discussed the Soviet Union's and Japan's approaches to Cambodian settlement, which proved close on a whole number of aspects.

The ministers confirmed their agreement to meet in New York during the forthcoming session of the U.N. General Assembly, and mapped out some topics for discussion.

Shevardnadze and Mitsuzuka agreed that their deputies will meet early in September in Moscow to prepare the meeting.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Shevardnadze Travels to Paris for Cambodia Talks

Arrives in Paris 28 Jul

LD2807144789 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1412 GMT 28 Jul 89

[Text] Paris, 28 July (TASS)—Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of foreign affairs arrived in Paris today to take part in the international conference on Cambodia. Eduard Shevardnadze was met at Orly Airport by Yakov Ryabov, USSR ambassador to France, and other officials.

Addresses Conference

LD3007195389 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1645 GMT 30 Jul 89

[Speech by USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on 30 July in Paris to the International Conference on Cambodia]

[Text] Esteemed messrs co-presidents!

Esteemed participants in the conference!

We have been brought to Paris by a common goal: to unblock a conflict that for so many years now has been complicating the situation in Southeast Asia and throughout the Asian-Pacific region.

In our eyes, the composition of the conference and its broad representation, in itself symbolize the unity of the countries and peoples in their desire to save their brothers on this planet of chronic bleeding wounds.

We consider this fact noteworthy for current international life, and not only because the Paris conference on Cambodia is designed to play a beneficial role directly in Cambodian affairs.

Its profound philosophical, political, and moral significance, in our opinion, resides in the fact that it reflects the growing realization by states and governments of the oneness and interdependence of the modern world, and the connections between national interests and those of mankind as a whole.

In it the new political thought continues to gain force.

In it the fog of confrontation, suspicion, and mistrust is dispersed by the desire of people for mutual understanding.

In it the oversimplified, ideologized, black and white approach to events of international life gives way to polychromatic realistic concepts of the vital interests of the peoples.

I would like to express a brief remark to some of my colleagues who have addressed the conference before me.

Our conference should be a true peace forum, and not a tribune for reciprocal accusations and insults which cannot be justified by all the drama of the situation.

We have come to Paris with the hope that the international conference on Cambodia will fall precisely into this channel.

This far-from-easy path which led the participants in this conference here to the Avenue Kleber, strengthens our hope.

Now that we have traveled this path, we realize that without efforts for its realization, the foundations of the political talks would not have been laid that enable us to discuss Cambodian affairs at this common table.

This foundation has been built through the efforts of many. We also give the countries of Indochina and the ASEAN [Association of Southeast Nations] states their due, whose realism and good will provided the initial impetus for the holding of informal meetings on Cambodia on a regional basis. These meetings can only be described as a turn by the states of Southeast Asia toward a search for mutually acceptable approaches in Cambodian affairs. We hope that the documents adopted by consensus by the participants in these meetings will be widely used in our discussions.

The Jakarta meetings on Cambodia demonstrated the aspirations of the countries of the region to investigate their problems on the basis of independence, bilateral or multilateral partnerships and to seek solutions along the paths of dialogue.

The decision by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam [SRV] to withdraw its troops from Cambodia by the end of September 1989 was undoubtedly an accelerating factor for all the positive processes taking place around Cambodia.

The meetings between Hun Sen, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the state of Cambodia, and Prince Norodom Sihanouk were marked by a lofty aspiration for the Cambodians themselves to find approaches to national reconciliation and to solve the problems of a settlement by themselves, unaided and without interference and pressure from outside.

We know well how long the road to this day has been. Two years ago, when we first visited the ancient land of Angkor, we felt its pain but did not feel that this was irreparable. The goal appeared improbably distant, but it was illuminated by many rays. And although at that time many people spoke and wrote about the futility of the efforts being expended, we believed that there would be a result.

To achieve this, the Soviet Union conducted an active and constructive dialogue with many of the world's states.

The exchange of opinions with the ASEAN countries, which became especially dynamic after the visit to the region in 1987 and the meetings and discussions held there, was useful in the highest degree.

The contacts with the People's Republic of China, in the course of which the sphere of practical mutual understanding and agreement was substantially expanded, were of great importance.

Questions about a Cambodian settlement were invariably present on the agenda in our negotiations with the United States of America, Britain, Japan, Australia, and many other states.

One cannot avoid speaking about the positive role which the nonaligned movement and its representatives such as great India, Zimbabwe, and Yugoslavia have played all these years.

We want to express gratitude to all our partners in the dialogue who have displayed an interest in the swiftest resolution of the Cambodian conflict. Above all, here one should mention the initiative of French diplomats, the French Government, and President F. Mitterrand personally, which gave us the opportunity to meet in Paris.

We accepted this invitation without hesitation, being guided by the consideration that the conference can and must become a milestone event in the Cambodian settlement.

While understanding well that each of the participants in the conference has its own position and is prepared to defend it, we are convinced that there are no insurmountable obstacles to finding solutions, the main content and orientation of which would be in accordance with the interests of the Cambodian people, above all. In developing them, none of us has the right to forget the millions of lives which the genocidal regime tore from the people. Not only those who are alive, but also those who were killed and, tormented, appeal to our conscience, our sense of justice and wisdom.

Will we be able to arrive at accords which will ensure favorable conditions for the construction of a society free from violence, hatred, fear, and suspicion? A society in which human life would be recognized to be the highest value? Will we be able to do everything to ensure that the spectres of the recent monstrous nightmare never return to the shores of the Mekong River and the Tonle Sap?

Each of the delegations present here is faced with giving answers to these questions. And however difficult it may be to formulate them, we are all obliged to know the kaleidoscope of views and to discover the threads which connect us all.

We do not preclude that this will be a complex, time-consuming, and gradual process of moving toward an all-embracing settlement, from aspect to aspect and from accord to accord.

Each conflict has its roots, its origins and its specific characteristics. For this reason, what is required and ways uniquely suitable for its cure. We shall find these if, grounding ourselves in reality, we are guided by the necessity to balance interests.

Everybody in this hall is united, in that the ultimate goal of the international conference is an all-embracing political settlement of the conflict. In this context, it would be useful to draw particular attention to those aspects of the Cambodian problem which have already become ripe for resolution. In our view, these are the external aspects. Their immediate resolution will facilitate the progress of intra-Cambodian talks—that is, bring closer an all-embracing settlement of the problem.

This is possible because with respect to the range of questions which make up the nucleus of the external aspects of the conflict, the positions of those taking part in the conference have grown closer and present themselves for agreement.

This concerns, first and foremost, the elaboration of steps capable of excluding any possibility of a break-out of civil war, and preventing the restoration of a regime of genocide in any of its forms after the withdrawal of foreign troops.

We have to concentrate on helping the sides to establish a cease-fire even before the withdrawal of Vietnamese volunteers is completed.

It is extremely important to elaborate practical steps to end external military aid to all the belligerent Cambodian sides.

One of the main tasks of the conference is to guarantee Cambodia's status as an independent, neutral, and nonaligned state. We welcome the statement of the government of the state of Cambodia on the country's permanent neutrality, seeing in this a serious step toward a solution of the problem.

Our forum is called upon to create an effective international mechanism for monitoring and observing the withdrawal of foreign troops and the implementation of the accords on a Cambodian settlement.

To date, the world community has accumulated a certain amount of experience in the settlement of regional conflicts. We consider that a start was made with the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan. But, speaking of that, we have no right to keep silent on the negative side of the matter.

I wanted to remind you: One of the reasons for the protracted Afghan drama is the ineffectiveness of the monitoring mechanism, although it does operate under the aegis of the UN.

To our common regret, it turned out to be incapable of impeding open, broad interference in the affairs of the sovereign state. It is not in a position to react even to openly and blatantly unceremonious violations of the Geneva agreement by the Pakistani military.

The monitors and observers do not even protest about obvious facts of interference.

This sad lesson in ineptness is instructive to all of us; and we have no right to permit its repetition in Cambodia.

One would like to believe that a reminder of this will not cool the world community's resolution to make a success of things in that country.

We highly appreciate and welcome the participation of the UN secretary general in our conference as attesting to that organization's commitments to promote the achievement of a Cambodian settlement.

It will progress faster if the UN and its secretary general occupy a worthy place in the process of developing a solution and compromises. Everything said in this context by Mr Perez de Cuellar deserves the most serious attention.

The UN's role in this would acquire greater effectiveness if it adopted a new consensus resolution on Cambodia in accordance with today's realities. In our view, this should be done as soon as possible.

The issue of Cambodia's representation in the UN requires a new approach, too—I stress, a new approach.

We are convinced that a Cambodian settlement opens a way to turning Southeast Asia into a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality, which will be free of both nuclear and chemical weapons.

The Soviet Union, as all other states, is interested in this.

In the current stage of developing practical solutions to the internal aspects of the problem, the role of the Cambodian sides themselves is extremely great. They, and only they, are the masters of their fate and their country; and no outside state should impose upon them its own prescriptions or its own blueprint for a future state structure.

The first and, perhaps, the chief step toward a settlement will be made if the Khmers themselves jointly determine the balance of interests which would enable Cambodia to establish peace, strengthen the integrity and unity of the country, and preserve its unique national identity.

We call on the Cambodian sides to make further consistent efforts in advancing toward national reconciliation, toward tolerance, realism, and constructive approaches.

It is our profound conviction that the conference's participants have every opportunity, while undeviatingly observing the sovereign right of the Cambodian people to the freedom of choice, to promote in a productive way the realization of this right in the interests of a final and just solution to the problem.

Participating in the international conference on Cambodia, the Soviet Union sees as its task to help to unblock the conflict, in cooperation with the other states represented here and guided by fairness, common sense, and the realities which exist in the world, in Southeast Asia, and in Indochina. Conscious of all the significance of this goal, our delegation will make every effort to ensure that the international conference on Cambodia achieves positive results.

Meets Indochinese Foreign Ministers

LD2907150889 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1353 GMT 29 Jul 89

[Text] Paris, 29 Jul TASS—The prospects and problems of a Cambodian settlement were at the center of a conversation which took place here today between Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister; Hun Sen, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Cambodian People's Revolutionary Party and foreign minister of the state of Cambodia; Nguyen Co Thach, member of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee Politburo, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, and SRV minister of foreign affairs; and Phoun Sipaseut, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the People's Revolutionary Party of Laos, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and Lao minister of foreign affairs.

The participants were united in the opinion that the international efforts for an all-embracing political settlement has been undertaken in a very timely manner, in a situation which gives hope for them to have a positive outcome. This would be in the interests of the whole world community and would develop the tendency toward resolving regional conflicts by political means along the path of dialogue between all the interested sides. From this point of view the international conference on Cambodia is of importance to the whole of mankind and places great responsibility on all of its participants.

Eduard Shevardnadze noted the important role of the countries of Indochina in creating favorable preconditions for the international conference to be conducted in such a way as to produce results and in making it possible to have a discussion of the Cambodian question with the participation of all interested sides and states.

The jointly held opinion was expressed that questions which have reached the stage of practical solutions at an international level should be to the fore on the agenda and constructively discussed. This concerns, in the first place, the external aspects of the problem, for in this sphere there is a perceptible proximity of positions among the interested sides and it is precisely here where they could to the greatest extent facilitate the creation of the necessary conditions for the successful development of inter-Khmer dialogue.

It was recognized at the same time that it is also essential not to relax efforts in other directions for a Cambodian settlement, encouraging the sides in the conflict to search for a reasonable, mutually acceptable compromise.

The general political situation in South East Asia and the state of affairs with regard to the progress of the proposal on creating here a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality as well as with regard to implementing the ideas of guaranteeing security and of the development of cooperation in the Asiatic-Pacific region, contained in the well-known Vladivostok initiatives, were also discussed.

The sides ascertained with satisfaction the advancing and dynamic nature of the further development of bilateral relations between the USSR and the states of Indochina in all aspects of political, trade, and economic cooperation in the spirit of the new political thinking and in the context of the processes of renewal which are occurring in their countries.

Meets With Australian Counterpart

LD3007140789 Moscow TASS in English 1354 GMT 30 Jul 89

[Text] Paris July 30 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze met with Australia's Minister for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade Gareth John Evans in the French capital Sunday [30 July].

They exchanged views on matters concerning an international conference on Cambodia, under way here, and expressed the desire to promote its success.

The ministers discussed also other aspects of the situation in the Asia-Pacific region and called for more efforts to further improve it.

During the discussion of disarmament issues, special attention was paid to the need for early headway toward a chemical weapon ban.

The ministers expressed satisfaction with the present-day state of Soviet-Australian relations and confirmed their governments' intention to continue political dialogue and extend mutually advantageous cooperation between the two countries in various practical areas.

The two countries will extend contacts at various levels. A Soviet parliamentary delegation will visit Australia in September. At the 44th session of the U.N. General Assembly in New York, the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union and Australia will continue preparations for a planned visit to Australia by the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

Conference on Settling Cambodia Problem Detailed

LD3007223189 Moscow TASS in English 2227 GMT 30 Jul 89

[Text] Paris July 31 TASS—By TASS correspondents Nikita Yermakov and Yuriy Lopatin:

The foreign ministers of 18 countries and representatives of two international organisations, who have gathered at the international conference centre on Avenue Kleber in Paris, continue discussing ways to settle the Cambodian conflict.

Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, a co-chairman of the conference, said that the Cambodian problem should be settled politically, rather than by force of weapons, adding that this would promote peace and stability throughout South East Asia.

He said that all sides agree that the final goal of settlement efforts should be an independent, sovereign, neutral and non-aligned Cambodia and that this goal should be achieved on the basis of national reconciliation and self-determination through free and democratic elections under effective international control.

This conference has gathered in the new international situation of reconciliation and accord, and military confrontation in many regions of the world is giving way to political dialogue, the Indonesian minister said.

U.S. Secretary of State James Baker pointed to the need to seek mutually acceptable settlement of the Cambodian problem, which will bring the people of that country security and possibility of electing a government. This goal can be achieved by solving external and internal aspects of settlement.

In Baker's opinion, international aspects of reconciliation should not replace internal aspects. The secretary of state said that Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who symbolises unity and national reconciliation, could become Cambodia's leader.

Baker said that the Khmer Rouge "should play no role in Cambodia's future."

Baker said that an international control mechanism should be set up to monitor the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, ensure interim stability, including supervision of compliance with the ceasefire agreement and termination of foreign military supplies to Cambodian factions, and control over free and fair elections.

The United States is ready to recognise the outcome of such elections, whatever it may be, the secretary of state said.

Britain's Foreign Secretary John Major called for long-term political settlement which would lead to Cambodia's independence and neutrality and let its people independently choose a form of government.

Major pointed to the need to rule out Cambodia's degradation under a yoke similar to the Pol Pot rule. The international community should support Cambodians' efforts toward national reconciliation, he said.

The secretary pointed to Vietnam's special responsibility and welcomed its decision to withdraw its troops from Cambodia without any preconditions by the end of September.

Cambodia's Prime Minister Hun Sen said that the conflict in his country has been going on for almost 20 years and has led to huge losses and suffering. The country is largely destroyed and has seen a period of genocide.

This is the essence of the Cambodian problem, although some forces still make attempts to mislead the international community, reducing the conflict to relations between Vietnam and Cambodia, Hun Sen said.

The people's struggle liberated the Khmers from the genocide regime, and one can imagine what could have happened in Cambodia if Pol Pot continued ruling there, he said.

Noting that the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops will be completed by September 27, the prime minister pointed to the need to solve two major problems: preventing a recurrence of the genocide regime in Cambodia and preventing a civil war there.

Hun Sen denounced calls to give the Khmer Rouge a share of political and military power in the interim period, as he said, that would open way to civil war.

He said the problem's solution should take into account vital interests of the people and not let the people become hostages of the Khmer Rouge.

Hun Sen called for recognition of the Cambodian people's right to self-determination and for guarantees of independence, sovereignty, neutrality and the status of a non-aligned state for Cambodia.

The creation of an international control mechanism should be completed before the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops to monitor observance of the ceasefire agreement and then elections, he said.

The prime minister said that Cambodia will not participate in military alliances, will not allow foreign troops and bases on its territory, and will not render its territory for interference in affairs of other countries. Prince Norodom Sihanouk said that the day of the opening of the international conference on Cambodia in Paris will be a historic day for the Cambodian people who have been suffering for so many years. This day, he said, marks the beginning of a process leading toward peace and Cambodia's return to full independence and territorial integrity.

At the same time, Sihanouk leveled accusations at Vietnam, reducing the problem to Vietnamese-Cambodian relations. In his view, the main goal of the conference should be to ensure Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia.

Breakdown in Talks Reported

PM2707131789 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Jul 89 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by correspondent Yu. Kovalenko: "Cambodia: Talks Broken Off"]

[Text] Paris—The four-sided talks with the participation of Hun Sen, chairman of the Council of Ministers and foreign minister of the State of Cambodia, and three opposition groupings—Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Son Sann, and the "Khmers Rouges"—have ended without results. These talks, held in the La Celle-Saint-Cloud castle, did not succeed in reaching agreement on a single one of the questions discussed. They were broken off and no decision has yet been taken on further meetings.

Everything on which accord had been reached at previous bilateral and multilateral meetings (including the "linkup" between the withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops, the ending of foreign aid to the participants in the conflict, and the prevention of the restoration of Pol Pot's genocide regime) has been cancelled out, Hun Sen said. That is the result of the actions of the "Khmers Rouges," he added.

According to press reports the meeting in La Celle-Saint-Cloud castle discussed several questions: international monitoring of the withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops which, Hun Sen stated, will end 26 September, a ceasefire, and, finally, the composition of the delegation which will represent the State of Cambodia at the international conference on Cambodia which opens in Paris 30 July. The most acute differences arose on this last point. Hun Sen stated that there should be two delegations from the State of Cambodia, one representing Phnom Penh and the other the opposition, should be at this forum. But the opposition is demanding that all four sides taking part in the conflict form a single delegation.

Differences on all questions, the newspaper LIBERATION emphasizes, are linked mainly with the "Khmers Rouges'" participation in the settlement of the conflict and in the country's future fate. Hun Sen believes that any possibility of their return to power must be ruled out. For his part Norodom Sihanouk asserts that civil war will inevitably break out in Cambodia without the "Khmers Rouges'" participation in the management of the state.

The fruitless outcome of the four-sided meeting held with the participation of French Foreign Minister R. Dumas in no way means that the international conference on Cambodia is doomed to failure. Of course, it will take place under complex conditions but nonetheless it could be a decisive stage in the settlement of the Cambodian conflict.

The conference is opening on the threshold of the withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops from the State of Cambodia. It is designed to ensure it the status of an independent, neutral, and nonaligned country and to prevent the restoration of Pol Pot's genocide regime. The Paris forum will pay special attention to external aspects of the Cambodian problem for whose solution many prerequisites exist today while the Khmers themselves must independently resolve internal questions.

The international community is attaching special importance to the conference which is opening, linking great hopes with it. Delgations from about 20 countries are coming to the French capital. It has been announced here that the Soviet delegation will be headed by E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and foreign minister, and the U.S. delegation, which has over 100 members, by Secretary of State J. Baker.

"We hope," State Department spokeswoman M.Tutwiler said, "that our collective efforts with regard to Cambodia will become one more example of how we, the Soviet Union, and other countries can work together to resolve regional conflicts. After the withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops under international control we hope to see the beginning of the end of the tragedy from which the Cambodian people have suffered for many years."

Khmer Rouge Said To Foil Cambodian Peace
BK2807145589 Moscow in Cambodian to Cambodia 1230 GMT 28 Jul 89

[Station commentary by Geliy Shakov]

[Text] Armed groups of the Khmer Rouge have become very active in the Thai-Cambodian border region over the past few days. News reports from Bangkok said that the Khmer Rouge army now is being filled up with new recruits taken from the Cambodian refugees living in the camps inside Thai territory. Our commentator, Geliy Shakov, writes:

According to statistics provided by the United Nations, there are more than 200,000 such refugees. Some of these people arrived in Thailand during the times of the U.S. intervention in Cambodia beginning in 1970: They left their own country in the flames of war with the hope of finding a peaceful haven in a foreign land. But most of them took refuge abroad to save themselves from the terror fanned up by the blood-sucking and bone-crushing Pol Pot gang. Also, there are those civilians who were herded along by the Khmer Rouge forces following the collapse of the Pol Pot regime.

It is unfortunate that a portion of the refugee population in Thailand has fallen under the thumb of the same Polpotists who drove them from home. According to available data, in some refugee camps Pol Pot's paws have restored the bloody orders existing in Cambodia during the rule of the Khmer Rouge. According to the testimonies collected by (David Hock), an American researcher, the Polpotists have revived the vestige of their terrorist massacre in these refugee camps.

In his observation, the correspondent of U.S. newspaper THE BOSTON GLOBE said that these camps are made up of clusters of pitiful shanties under the ruthless control of the Polpotists. Any slight show of disobedience would bring upon the refugees pitiless beatings, interrogations, and incarcerations in underground cells. It is the victims of such tortures that the Polpotists have used to fill up the ranks of their roving bands of bandits.

The activities of the Khmer Rouge constitute a permanent source of tension in Southeast Asia. Samdech Sihanouk, leader of the Khmer opposition groups, has on many occasions strongly criticized the Pol Pot gang. Spokesmen of the U.S. Department of State have once and again stated that there is no place for the Polpotists in any civilized society. Nonetheless, the Khmer Rouge forces remain unchanged and continue to impose their rule on many refugee camps, to forcibly conscript new people into their army ranks, and to spread provocations in the Thai-Cambodian border regions. As always, they continue to receive from foreign countries the latest models of arms and ammunition.

The recent upsurge of military activities of the Pol Pot gang in the border zone is quite dangerous. After a closer look, one is certain that their activities are aimed at marring all the efforts to find a political solution for the Cambodian problem.

Rogachev, SRV's Tran Quang Co Hold Talks
BK2807152089 Hanoi VNA in English 1456 GMT 28 Jul 89

[Text] Hanoi VNA July 28—Tran Quang Co, deputy foreign minister, held talks with his Soviet counterpart, Igor Rogachev, during his stop-over in Moscow on July 27 on his way for the International Conference on Cambodia to be opened in Paris on July 30.

The two sides exchanged views on the Cambodia issue and on the forthcoming conference. They unanimously held that the conference is a very great chance that can bring peace and stability back to Cambodia and Southeast Asia, making an important contribution to peace over the world. They declared that Vietnam and the Soviet Union will actively take part in the conference, and are convinced that if all the sides concerned have good will in cooperation and really care about the Cambodian people's legitimate interests and peace in Southeast Asia, the Paris International Conference on Cambodia could obtain expected results.

Commentator Views Cambodia's Neutrality
OW3107051189 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 25 Jul 89

[Valentinov commentary]

[Text] The People's Congress of Cambodia recently announced the decision to make Cambodia neutral in perpetuity. The world has been discussing this issue ever since. Some countries supported this decision, while others termed it as a trick of the Phnom Penh authorities; but the latter failed to point out the trickiness of this decision. Station commentator Valentinov offers his views in this regard. He analyzes the issue of Cambodia's neutrality from the historical perspective.

Criticism on the adoption of the resolution by the Cambodian Parliament includes the accusation that Phnom Penh is launching a political sortie to strengthen its position at the forthcoming Paris International Conference. To this criticism, we should point out the fact that the Kingdom of Cambodia, which gained independence in October 1953, declared a perpetual neutrality policy from the very day it gained independence. I would like to remind those who have a bad memory: Neutrality

had earned Cambodia very high international prestige. Prince Sihanouk, the then head of state of Cambodia, became one of the main leaders of the nonaligned movement. Ironically, Sihanouk is now one of those who vehemently criticize the resolution of the People's Congress of Cambodia. In my view, he, more than anyone else, should make a proper evaluation of the gains achieved by Cambodia by remaining a neutral country. This prince formerly assumed the post of the head of state of Cambodia. He guided the country, with full confidence and adroitness, along the path of neutrality. The Western press once termed him a wire-walker, which is by no means a derogatory term. On the contrary, it had a suggestion of respect. One piece of solid evidence: For over 17 years, Cambodia, with its adroit foreign diplomacy, remained an island of peace; while other Southeast Asian countries had been ravaged by war. Once, the Cambodian people were proud of their country being an island of peace. They had every reason to have that sense of pride, because the situation surrounding them was very complicated, while that in Cambodia was peaceful. By the way, those who criticize the resolution of Cambodia now also criticize Vietnam as the enemy of Cambodia's neutrality. But, one must know that good relations with Hanoi once helped Sihanouk to lead his country's march along the road of neutrality. In March 1970, a number of generals and senior army officers under the leadership of Lon Nol, and at the behest of Washington, toppled Sihanouk. The puppet South Vietnam authorities immediately sent troops to occupy most Cambodian territory, Phnom Penh included. The neutral status of Cambodia was thus crushed. A total of 19 years has elapsed since then. The Cambodian people endured big trials during that period; they suffered an unheard of genocidal tragedy launched by the Pol Pot clique; they suffered great losses. But, everything must come to an end. This year, Cambodia is ready to embark on a new, historical developmental stage, as well as the stage of peace and independent existence. In 2 months' time, the last of the Vietnamese volunteers will have left Cambodia. The whole country is preparing to welcome this event. Premier Hun Sen will present a constructive plan to representatives of opposition forces; the plan has to do with the foreign policy of Cambodia. The decision of the Cambodian People's Congress on perpetual neutrality, in my view, is the important characteristic of Cambodian foreign policy pursued in the past several years. In my opinion, if sober-minded people from the ranks of Cambodian opposition forces seriously analyze the Phnom Penh policy, they will accept the policy of neutrality, which is in accord with the fundamental interests of all Cambodian people.

Lukyanov Receives Heng Samrin for Talks

LD2907161489 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1530 GMT 29 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow, 29 Jul (TASS)—Today in the Kremlin a meeting took place between Anatoliy Lukyanov, candidate member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and Heng Samrin, general secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Revolutionary Party of Cambodia [PRPC] and chairman of the State Council of Cambodia, who is in the USSR on vacation.

During the conversation, the participants exchanged information on the processes of restructuring in the Soviet Union and the renewal in Cambodia. A high appraisal was given to the relations of friendship and cooperation which link our parties and countries; the mutual desire to develop and strengthen them was reaffirmed.

The Soviet side confirmed its support for the Cambodian state's principled policy of national reconciliation. The hope was expressed that the international conference opening in Paris will be an important stage in the effort to clear up the conflict around Cambodia. The Soviet Union will constructively promote the achievement of positive results at this important forum.

The interlocutors voiced the hope that all states concerned will display a businesslike and considered approach in this crucial stage with the aim of settling the situation around Cambodia. The leaders of the USSR and Cambodia are convinced that the elimination of this conflict will, in many ways, facilitate an improvement in the situation in Southeast Asia and the development of regional cooperation in the name of peace, stability, and prosperity.

Taking part in the conversation were Valentin Falin, member of the CPSU Central Committee and head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee; Im Chun Lim, candidate member of the PRPC Central Committee and assistant to the general secretary of the PRPC Central Committee; and Leng Peng Long, Cambodian charge d'affaires in the USSR.

Laos's Phoumsavan Outlines New Assembly's Tasks

PM2607111989 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jul 89 Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with Nouhak Phoumsavan, member of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee Politburo and newly elected chairman of Lao parliament, by own correspondent V. Vinogradov in Vientiane under the rubric "IZVESTIYA Interview": "Parliament's First Steps"—date unspecified; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] The first session of the recently elected Lao Supreme People's Assembly has chosen a new parliamentary chairman: Nouhak Phoumsavan, member of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) Central Committee Politburo. Your correspondent had a meeting with him in Vientiane and asked him to talk about the tasks of the supreme legislative body at the present stage in the development of Laos.

"First of all, a few words about the parliament itself," Nouhak Phoumsavan said. "It was elected on the basis of the first general elections in the history of our republic, held in March this year, and now incorporates 79 deputies representing every stratum of society.

"Our previous parliament, formed during the revolution almost 14 years ago, had 45 deputies appointed in accordance with the resolutions of the National Congress of People's Representatives. The recent elections have been held at a time when transformations are being wrought in the socioeconomic structure on a broad front and a new economic policy is evolving on the basis of rejecting outmoded, dogmatic views of the principles of forming a socialist state. The reforms in progress have prompted great interest and activeness among the voters, who have cast their ballots for the present deputies. The elections were a significant contribution to resolving the tasks set by the LPRP to change the political system. The Supreme People's Assembly, which has almost doubled in size, is a guarantee of the further democratization of Lao society.

"Within this context, the beginning of our activity seems particularly important. After all, until now Laos has not had a constitution, so work to draft a constitution is under way in the appropriate commissions. Consequently, deputies devoted a great deal of attention at their first session to procedural and organizational matters. They elected the members of the Supreme People's Assembly Standing Committee and established the structure of the apparatus—the secretariat, and commissions on legislative proposals, the economy, foreign affairs, and social and cultural questions. We defined the functions and tasks of the Supreme People's Assembly and the rights and responsibilities of deputies. Parliamentarians consider the main feature of their activity to be work to implement the decisions of the Fourth LPRP Congress and resolve tasks connected with eradicating bureaucracy and conservative thinking and overcoming those negative phenomena which are preventing us from advancing further along the path of socialist development. An important part of the functions of the deputies now embarking on their responsibilities will be to monitor the activity of the executive branch.

"I must say that Kaysone Phomvihan, general secretary of the LPRP Central Committee, and many other members of the party leadership do not have deputies' mandates in the present Supreme People's Assembly. This does not mean, however, that the leading and guiding role of the party is thereby limited in our country. The decisions taken by party forums are fundamental to deputies' activity. Addressing the session, Kaysone Phomvihan stressed that parliament should consider it a paramount task at the present stage to draft and adopt a constitution, as well as other normative acts, particularly in the sphere of land law and labor, criminal, and civil legislation. These documents must take account of the changes and processes of economic reform taking place in Laos. At present, parliament is not raising the question of the procedure for electing the president of the republic and the head of the Lao government. The procedure of establishing powers and electing people to these high positions will be worked out after the basic law comes into force.

"In conclusion—our plans in the international sphere. We again state our support for the peoples' common struggle for peace, national independence, democracy, and progress.

"Friendship and all-round cooperation with the Soviet Union," Nouhak Phoumsavan said in conclusion, "are regarded by us as the pivot of Laos' international activity. We will also constantly strengthen our traditional fraternal solidarity with the peoples of Vietnam and Cambodia and make every effort to strengthen stability and peace in Southeast Asia."

Ties With Philippines Benefits Mankind

HK2907092289 Moscow in Tagalog to the Philippines 1300 GMT 28 Jul 89

[Text] President Corazon Aquino of the Philippines spoke of improvement in relations with the Soviet Union before newsmen in Manila, adding that this conforms with national interest as well as with a constitutional stipulation on stronger friendly relations with all countries, including the Soviet Union and the United States.

As reported by our correspondents, talks in Moscow between ASEAN representatives and USSR officials do not pose any threat to their close relations with allies and partners, including the United States. The promotion of mutual understanding and bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and ASEAN states conforms with the broad purpose of relieving the Asia-Pacific region of military and political tensions. At the same time, it enhances closer and more productive economic cooperation.

The recent visit to the Soviet Union of the Philippine Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus debunks the notion that Moscow wants to dissociate ASEAN from Japan and the West and make it an ally for its own interest. The visit produced a communique which addressed problems confronting all mankind, foremost of which is its security. The two countries categorically announced their concern over continuing nuclear tests and the possession of destructive weapons by various countries. Both the Soviet Union and the Philippines stressed that vast amount of resources wasted on wars should be used for development purposes.

The visit of Raul Manglapus to the Soviet Union has created a favorable international climate conducive to new agreements affirming positive tendencies in world affairs. The joint communique also proposed the conclusion of an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on medium- and shorter-range missiles

and maintained that such an agreement is not only in the interest of the Soviet Union, the United States and the Philippines but also that of all mankind.

Near East & South Asia

Foreign Ministry Denounces 'Ubayd Abduction

LD3007143989 Moscow TASS in English 1429 GMT 30 Jul 89

["Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman on 'Ubayd's abduction"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow July 30 TASS—According to news agencies' reports, helicopter-borne Israeli commandos captured Shaykh 'Abd-al-Karim 'Ubayd, one of the leaders of the pro-Iranian Lebanese Shiite group, Hizballah, last Friday in south Lebanon and took him to Israel.

The commandos also abducted two more people.

Israel's military command justifed the operation by saying that 'Ubayd was responsible for acts of terror, including those against Israel, news agencies said.

Israel's act of violence, no doubt, is a gross violation of Lebanon's sovereignty and cannot be justified by any motives.

It is an act of international terrorism which has been resolutely denounced by the Soviet Union and the entire international community, no matter in what forms it is manifest.

One cannot rule out that Israelis' unlawful actions may aggravate still further the explosive situation in Lebanon and around it.

All this confirms once more the need for an early termination of the occupation of south Lebanese territories by Israel and interference in Lebanon's internal affairs, which are among the primal causes of the ongoing tradegy of the Lebanese people.

Shevardnadze Begins Visit to Iran 31 Jul

LD3007202389 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2000 GMT 30 Jul 89

[Text] At the invitation of Velayati, minister of foreign affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Comrade Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs, will arrive tomorrow in Tehran on a working visit. In the course of his stay in Tehran he will have meetings with the Iranian leadership.

TASS Reports Initial Iranian Election Results

LD2907102689 Moscow TASS in English 1017 GMT 29 Jul 89

[Text] Tehran July 29 TASS—By TASS correspondent Ravil Musin:

The central headquarters on holding the referendum which took place in Iran on Friday [28 July], announced this morning the first returns of the election of the new president and of the voting on the draft of the new edition of the constitution.

Iranians voted overwhelmingly for Parliamentary Speaker 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani. The overwhelming majority of voters also favoured the new edition of the Iranian Constitution.

Processing of votes continues.

Deputy Defense Minister on Kuwait Ties

LD2907172489 Moscow International Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 29 Jul 89

[Excerpt] A Soviet military delegation led by General Konstantin Kochetov, first deputy defense minister, visited Kuwait recently. Here is a statement made by Gen Kochetov to our correspondent.

[Begin Kochetov recording in Russian, fading into Arabic translation] In my opinion, the objective of our visit to Kuwait was acheived. The main objective was to expand bilateral cooperation in the military field on the basis of available agreements. First, we wanted to exchange views on military cooperation and ways of developing it. Second, we believe this cooperation is one aspect of our relations, which are developing successfully at the government level in the cultural, economic, and trade spheres. [end recording]

The Soviet general pointed out that it was not intended to sign new accords or agreements on military cooperation during the visit.

The Soviet first deputy defense minister said: I would like to point out that our visit took place in a spirit of deep understanding by us and by Kuwaiti military commanders, who praised our military cooperation and called for developing it. [passage omitted]

Sub-Saharan Africa

Foreign Ministry Condemns UNITA 'Banditry'

LD2807114989 Moscow TASS in English 1130 GMT 28 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 28 TASS—Follows a statement made today by a spokesman for the Soviet Foreign Ministry:

"A report about a barbarous crime has come from Angola. A passenger plane of the Angolan Air Company was shot down by a surface-to-air missile. Forty-two people were killed and six injured.

"All data indicate that this is the work of anti-government organisation UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] whose leader Jonas

Savimbi directs his detachments to ignore the agreement on cessation of fire and hostilities, which he signed in Gbadolite in the presence of the leaders of African countries only a month ago.

"There has again emerged a threat that the Gbadolite accords, which opened the way for national reconciliation, peace and stability, will remain unimplemented, and people will continue to lose life in the flames of fratricidal war in Angola.

Savimbi would hardly have bahaved in this way, were it not for continued supply of arms to UNITA by the United States.

"The African formula for an intra-Angolan settlement is not to the liking of some U.S. circles which, playing on Savimbi's ambitious aspirations, would like to impose their own solution to the Angolan people's internal problems.

"UNITA's acts of armed banditry are being firmly condemned in the Soviet Union, and support for the Gbadolite accords which embody the collective wisdom of African leaders is being reaffirmed in this country.

"Angola needs peace, and it is the sacred duty of all those who in deeds, not in words, takes care of people's life, to contribute to establishing it".

East Europe

Resignation of Poland's Jaruzelski Noted

LD2907172389 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1630 GMT 29 Jul 89

[Text] In Warsaw, the 13th Polish United Workers Party Central Committee plenum began considering organizational questions. With one abstention, the Central Committee accepted Wojciech Jaruzelski's resignation from the post of first secretary of the Polish United Workers Party Central Committee.

TASS Notes Officials' Resignations

LD2907205489 Moscow TASS in English 2043 GMT 29 Jul 89

[Text] Warsaw July 30 TASS—A plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party complied with the request of Kazimierz Barcikowski, Alfred Miodowicz, Jozef Czyrek and Stanislaw Ciosek for relieving them of the duties of members of the Political Bureau of the party's Central Committee and the request of Wladislaw Baka, Mirian Orzechowski, Zygmunt Czarzasty, Jozef Czyrek Czyrek and Stanislaw Ciosek from the duties of secretaries of the party's Central Committee.

Baka and Orzechowski remain member of the Political Bureau of the party's Central Committee.

The plenum elected Manfred Gorywoda, Janusz Kubasiewcz and Leszek Miller as members of the Political Bureau of the party Central Committee, and Slawomir Wiatra, Marek Krul, Wlodzimierz Natorf and Marczin Swienczincki as secretaries of the PUWP [Polish United Workers Party] Central Committee.

Further Reportage on Polish Plenum

LD3007070789 Moscow TASS in English 0714 GMT 30 Jul 89

[Text] Warsaw July 30 TASS—The 13th plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party ended here on Saturday [29 July] night. For two days its participants analysed a socio-political situation in the country after the June elections to the Sejm and the Senate, outlined the party's tasks for the coming period and supported the speeding up of the convocation of a regular 11th party congress. Participants in the plenary meeting adopted a number of resolutions.

In connection with the election of Wocjiech Jaruzelski to the post of president of the Polish People's Republic, the plenary meeting satisfied his request to relieve him of the duties of first secretary, member of the Politburo and member of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party. Mieczyslaw Rakowski was elected first secretary of the Central Committee of the party with 171 votes for and 41 against.

The plenary meeting satisfied the request of Kazimierz Bracikowski, Alfred Miodowicz, Jozef Czyrek and Stanislaw Ciosek to relieve them of the duties of members of the Politburo of the party's Central Committee, as well as the request of Wladyslaw Baka, Marian Orzechowski, Zygmunt Czarzasty, Jozef Czyrek and Stanislaw Ciosek to relieve them of the duties of secretaries of the party's Central Committee. Wladyslaw Baka and Marian Orzechowski continue to be members of the Politburo.

Manfred Gorywoda, Janusz Kubasiewicz and Leszek Miller were elected Politburo members, and Slawomir Wiatra, Marek Krul, Wlodzimierz Natorf and Marczin Swienczicki were elected secretaries of the Central Committee.

The plenary meeting was addressed by Wojciech Jaruzelski. A final speech was made by Mieczyslaw Rakowski, newly elected first secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party.

Gorbachev Congratulates Rakowski on Election

LD2907182489 Moscow TASS in English 1812 GMT 29 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 29 TASS—On behalf of the CPSU Central Committee and on his own behalf, Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, today congratulated Mieczyslaw Rakowski on his being elected the first secretary of Central Committee of Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP).

The congratulatory telegram expresses confidence that the CPSU's and the PUWP's cooperation will continue to develop in the spirit of comradeship and mutual understanding for the benefit of the two peoples.

Falin Interviewed in Hungarian Party Journal

LD2807195389 Budapest MTI in English 1755 GMT 28 Jul 89

[Text] Budapest, July 28 (MTI)—An interview with Valentin Falin, head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, is carried in the latest issue of UJ FORUM (NEW FORUM), a political periodical of the HSWP CC [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party Central Committee].

In response to a question as to how the 1956 events of Hungary are evaluated in the Soviet Union, Mr Falin had the following to say:

"In those years decisions had to be taken under essentially different international and internal conditions than today. The available data testify that the forces opposing the system and intending to carry out a 180 degree turn in the course of social development and the international policy of the country were supported neither by the peasants nor the majority of workers and armed forces nor the substantial part of the professional classes. Moscow was aware of this situation when it decided on the measures to take. Those who took up arms against the system numbered 12-14,000 and enjoyed support by tens of thousands of people. But if we were to say that the whole country was plunged into turmoil and events took the form of an uprising embracing the whole population, we would be mistaken in the face of facts."

Speaking about the changes taking place in Hungary, Mr Falin said:

"The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the various generations of the Soviet public follow with great interest the events taking place in the other socialist countries, particularly in Hungary and in Poland. Reform processes are not only taking place at the quickest pace in these countries but are expanding to such areas which we regarded as taboos not long ago.

"These processes are evaluated by us in a similar way as Hungary does. Conservative, centrist and radical views also exist in the Soviet Union. The opinion is widely shared that what is happening in Hungary is primarily the affair of the Hungarian people, being the only ones in a position to decide the manner according to which they want to live and the best course they want to follow. Regarding the multi-party system for example, our history, and partly that of Hungary, shows that neither the single-party, nor the multi-party system provides a guarantee for preventing difficulties and finding the indisputable truth. I do not wish to enter into prophecies on whether the Hungarians will be able to find this truth in the near future, when multi-party system is introduced in parliament. In my view, it is not the number of the parties but their quality and the qualification of their leaders that decide how their policy can meet the challenge of times.

"We in the Soviet Union have already had a period of multi-party system, just after the revolution, riddled with conflicts. In the course of events, only our party was left on the political stage. This had no relation either to the principles of Marxism-Leninism or party organization, but only with specific conditions. Regrettably, there were some people who distorted practice and thereby discredited the idea and the prestige of socialism. Nothing in the teaching of Marxism-Leninism forecasted the unlawful acts and distortions that occurred later, which were also in sharp contradiction to the principles of socialism and especially that of the people's power achieved through such immense sacrifices during the October revolution. Unfortunately, these distortions have also spread to the fraternal and allied socialist countries. We are determined to purify our party, state and social life of all that are incompatible with the concepts of the October revolution, and the teachings of Marxism-Leninism."

West Europe

Defense Minister Yazov Concludes UK Visit

LD2807175189 Moscow TASS in English 1704 GMT 28 Jul 89

[Text] London July 28 TASS—Soviet Defence Minister, Army General Dmitriy Yazov ends his official visit to Britain today.

This morning, the Soviet defense minister laid a wreath to the Unknown Soldier's Tomb at the Westminster Abbey and then he held the concluding talk with outgoing Defense Secretary George Younger at the British Ministry of Defence.

Yazov addressed experts on military-political problems at the Royal Institute of International Affairs later today.

[Moscow TASS International Service in Russian at 1721 GMT on 28 July in a similar report adds the following: "This evening the USSR defense minister left for home. He was accompanied to Heathrow Airport by A. Hamilton, British minister of state for the armed forces, and by L.M. Zamyatin, USSR ambassador to Great Britain."]

Visit Promotes 'Mutual Understanding'

LD2807230189 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 28 Jul 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] The official visit of Comrade Yazov to Britain ended today.

[Correspondent V. Shishkovskiy] On the final day of the Soviet delegation's stay in Britain, Comrade Yazov had a final conversation with British Secretary of State for Defense Younger. They discussed various problems, including matters relating to bilateral military cooperation. [video shows Yazov meeting Younger outside Defense Ministry building]

From the British Defense Ministry the Soviet delegation went to the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Comrade Yazov delivered a lengthy speech to the staff-members of the institute. The speech detailed the specific steps being undertaken by the Soviet Union to ease international tension and to strengthen East-West trust. He informed those assembled about the progress of the talks on arms reductions at Vienna and Geneva. [Video shows Yazov arriving at institute and addressing those assembled inside.

The Soviet Defense minister shared his impressions of the visit to Britain during which he visited various military bases in Scotland and England, went aboard the aircraft-carrier Invincible, was acquainted with the last-est British military equipment, and spoke with British officers and servicemen. [video shows Yazov viewing aircraft on the ground, then footage of helicopters flying overhead, an aerial view of an aircraft-carrier, Yazov aboard the Invincible meeting servicemen and then aircraft flying by in close formation. Video next shows interview with Yazov]

[Yazov] I think our visit has, to a certain extent, promoted greater mutual understanding. The meeting just held here at the institute speaks of the fact that many issues of concern to us are also of concern to the British people, especially those issues pertaining to war and peace. A number of questions are simply being tackled by both sides in the same way. I think the entire meeting has, on the whole been useful.

Yazov on Perestroyka, Disarmament

LD2807182989 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1635 GMT 28 Jul 89

[Text] London, 28 July—TASS correspondents Andrey Biryukov and Aleksandr Sisnev report:

Army General Dmitriy Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of defense, who is here on an official visit, spoke at the Royal Institute of International Affairs today.

The minister stressed that the perestroyka taking place in the Soviet Union is linked in the closest way with rendering relations between states more healthy and more humanizing. He noted that the preconditions for the progress and survival of humanity can be ensured only on one basis: disarmament.

The process of practical nuclear disarmament has now begun. Today it is important to consolidate it, to give it an irreversible character, to extend it to other types of weapons, he said. Having spoken about the specific steps taken by the USSR in the sphere of disarmament and the reduction of armed forces and weapons, Yazov emphasized that Soviet military doctrine had been given an exclusively defensive character. He declared that the core of this doctrine, expressing the supreme aim of the soviet state and its armed forces, is the prevention of war.

Speaking about the prospects for solving the problems of reducing weapons, the USSR minister of defense noted that positive changes had taken shape at all of the talks now taking place. We believe, he said, that there is a real possibility to reach agreement on a 50-percent reduction in the strategic armed forces of the USSR and the United States, on the elimination of chemical weapons, on a radical reduction in the dangerous military confrontation in Europe, and on a stage-by-stage ban on tests of nuclear weapons. To transform this possibility into a reality, however, obviously requires serious work. Its success depends on mutual understanding and on the readiness to meet one another half way. We are deeply convinved that counting on strength, deterrence, and on nuclear weapons is irrational to the core, as it leads objectively to a catastrophe.

The army general called the mutual reduction of naval forces one of the most important disarmament problems. The Soviet Union, he noted, sees the extending of measures for strengthening trust to naval activities as an integral part of the common European process.

Concerning the problem of space weapons, Yazov emphasized that the USSR is coming out categorically against the creation of any of these kinds of weapons. The Soviet Union has declared several times that it will not be the first to step into space with weapons. This is our firm obligation, he pointed out.

The USSR, the minister of defense noted, is coming out in favor of the full withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territories of other countries, the elimination of military blocs in Europe, the simultaneous disbandment of both alliances, and as a first step, the elimination of their military organization.

Speaks on 'Option' of SS-23 Production

LD2807222689 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 1900 GMT 28 Jul 89

[Text] The Soviet defense minister, Dmitriy Yazov, has warned the West that Moscow could resume producing a missile it has scrapped following the INF Treaty if the United States upgrades its short-range Lance missile. Nikolay Gorshkov has the details:

[Begin Gorshkov recording] Winding up a 4-day visit to Britain, General Yazov criticized the American plans to produce the new longer range missile to replace the

short-range Lance. This move, according to the Soviet defense minister, would violate the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. That treaty banned all Soviet and American ground-launched nuclear missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 km. In a gesture of goodwill the Soviet Union had agreed to include in this category its SS-23 missile with a range of less than 500 km. Now the Lance replacement is expected to have roughly the same range, so it would effectively fall into the same category as the SS-23. We consider that the Americans, in accordance with the INF Treaty, have no right to build such a missile, General Yazov told the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London. If the United States did manufacture a new Lance, he said, the Soviet Union would have to restart production of the SS-23. All stocks of this missile are at present being destroyed under the INF Treaty. The process is likely to be completed but the option to resume manufacture of the SS-23 later may be retained if the United States goes ahead with Lance modernization. [end recording]

Further on Yazov Address

PM3107104989 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Jul 89 First Edition pp 1, 3

[Report by Colonel V. Markushin: "Proceeding Further Along Path of Disarmament"]

[Text] The official visit of the Soviet military delegation headed by Army General D.T. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister, to Britain has ended. On 29 July the delegation returned to Moscow. At the airport it was met by Army General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of general staff of the USSR Armed Forces and USSR first deputy defense minister, Army General K.A. Kochetov, USSR first deputy defense minister, and other officials.

On the last day of his stay in Britain, Army General D.T. Yazov addressed the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The institute's conference hall was filled to overflowing when the Soviet minister, accompanied by Admiral Sir J. Eberle, the leader of this very important research center, took the stage. The interest was understandable: Those present would receive first-hand information on the Soviet Union's position on disarmament questions.

Having dwelled briefly on the progress of perestroyka in the Soviet Union and its close link with the process of the normalization of international relations, Army General D.T. Yazov then imparted to the institute's staffers and to journalists his opinions on security questions.

First of all he focused the attention of those present on the fact that the movement that has appeared in recent years on the path of military detente will continue to have some point only if everyone takes part in it. If the process of practical nuclear disarmament is made irreversible. If practical steps are taken to reduce conventional arms.

How is the Soviet Union acting in the present situation? It is unilaterally reducing its Armed Forces, thus implementing the materialization of a radically revised military doctrine. It is changing the structure of the army, eliminating maneuver forces [udarnyye manevrennyye gruppy] and the so-called "armored concentrated attack forces" ["tankovyye kulaki"], and reducing the number of districts, armies, and divisions.

Such bold decisions are dictated by the logic of the new political thinking. And is it not this same logic that explains steps like the commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, the ending of the production of chemical weapons and highly enriched uranium for military purposes, and the sharp reduction of the military budget?

Unfortunately we can sense no readiness to come to meet us halfway, D.T. Yazov said. On the other hand, we do feel that people are trying to talk with us from a position of strength. Why, for instance, should the United States, France, and Britain, not tell the whole world that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons? After all, a mutual commitment with the USSR would in no way weaken the power of the nuclear deterrent but would strengthen trust.

The USSR defense minister dwelled in particular on problems of reducing strategic offensive weapons. In Geneva, he said, a good reserve has been created for concluding agreements. But so far we have not succeeded in finding a mutually acceptable solution on a number of fundamental issues. Primarily issues like the interconnection of nuclear and space armaments, air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles, and others.

The aims of the Vienna talks on conventional arms in Europe are entirely feasible. The initiatives put forward by M.S. Gorbachev and the rapid response to them from U.S. President G. Bush have lent new political impetuses to these talks. But there are also fundamental differences—on aircraft and the numerical strength of troops.

One more important element. NATO has begun to link the start of talks on tactical nuclear weapons with the attainment and practical implementation of an accord on conventional armaments. But in that case tactical nuclear weapons are in fact excluded from the overall disarmament process. Yet their role is enormous. It was from this premise that the USSR proceeded when it agreed to include its "Oka" missile (the SS-23, with a range of up to 500 km) in the treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, considering that neither side would deploy such missiles.

And now the United states intends to produce Lance-2 missiles similar to the Soviet "Oka." The question arises: Is it worth continuing to destroy the "Oka?"

In conclusion, the USSR defense minister touched on questions of chemical armaments, nuclear tests, space, foreign military bases on other countries' territories, and the need to disband military blocs.

Answers were given to questions from journalists and the institute's staffers.

Yazov Seeks Pledge From West

LD2807131989 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1310 GMT 28 Jul 89

[By Charles Miller, PRESS ASSOCIATION defense correspondent]

[Text] Soviet Defence Minister General Dmitriy Yazov today called on Britain, France and the United States to issue a common pledge rejecting the first use of nuclear weapons.

In an address to the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, he warned a nuclear war would end in catastrophe without winners. And he criticised the U.S. for not wishing to outlaw nuclear weapons or even give a commitment to no first use.

"Why cannot the United States, Great Britain and France, in the new conditions which prevail, follow the Soviet example of a common pledge against first use?" he asked. Such a step would not weaken the role of nuclear weapons and would reinforce trust on all sides. "It would be good for peace to have this pledge not to use nuclear weapons first in war," he said.

When it was pointed out to Gen Yazov that the West had to retain its policy of flexible response in the face of Soviet superiority in conventional arms, he replied: "You ask this question only to put me in a difficult position."

He said the numbers of armed forces and armaments were broadly equal in NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Yazov Returns 29 Jul

LD2907080989 Moscow TASS in English 0801 GMT 29 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 29 TASS—Army General Dmitriy Yazov, Soviet defence minister, who stayed in Britain on an official visit, returned to Moscow today.

Biryukova Delegation Concludes Visit to UK

Results of Trip Highlighted

LD2807235489 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1325 GMT 28 Jul 89

[Text] London, 28 Jul (TASS)—TASS correspondent Yuriy Levchenko reports:

By the end of the year, 1.7 million pairs of women's autumn and winter boots, about 50 million pairs of women's and children's stockings, razor blades, coffee, and medicine valued at almost 100 million pounds sterling will be supplied by Great Britain to the Soviet Union in accordance with contracts signed during the visit here by the Soviet delegation headed by A.P. Biryukova, candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. This was announced today at a news confernce here.

Biryukova called the visit "useful and effective." "This reflects the current state of relations between the USSR and Great Britain, which thanks to regular meetings of the leaders of our two countries have been raised to a qualitatively new level," she said. "I had the honor of meeting Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Our conversation took place in a frank, friendly, and open atmosphere and was conducted in a very amicable and constructive spirit. Positive results in Soviet-British economic cooperation were noted. We are coming closer to the aim set at the summit meetings, taking the overall goods exchange in Soviet-British trade to 2.5 billion pounds by 1990. There are grounds for hoping that this mark will be reached this year."

"The meetings with Nicholas Ridley, secretary of state for trade and industry, and with the leaders of the Confederation of British Industry [CBI] were very useful. Agreements were reached on setting up a number of joint ventures. We also visited more than 20 British firms and enterprises throughout the country. The most favorable conditions were created for us. I have formed the impression that the British business world is ready to search for levers for expanding mutually beneficial cooperation between British firms and the Soviet Union.

CBI chairman Trevor Holdsworth, who invited A.P. Biryukova to Great Britain, described the Soviet delegation's visit as "very positive and constructive." He noted that some "very intensive work" had been done and that it will after the Soviet delegation's departure.

Replying to journalists' questions, Biryukova said that the purchase of British goods is an integral part of the program of urgent measures to improve the Soviet economy, one of the most important components of which is saturation of the Soviet market with consumer goods. She noted that there is the intention to purchase a large consignment of soap and toothpaste soon. "We could purchase even more, but this is being held up by the production capacities of British companies," the Soviet side noted at the news conference. The leader of the Soviet delegation also emphasized that the main efforts to eliminate the shortage of goods in everyday demand in the USSR envision reliance on domestic potential and on a significant increase in the production of consumer goods in the Soviet Union. "We have such potential," she said.

Biryukova set out the Soviet standpoint on matters of organizing joint enterprises with foreign partners.

Further on Biryukova Visit

LD2907234189 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 29 Jul 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] As we have already reported, a Soviet delegation led by Comrade Biryukova is in Great Britain.

[V. Shishkovskiy, identified by caption] Each day the Soviet delegation has spent in Great Britain has been filled from early morning to late at night with numerous important meetings and talks with heads of leading British Ministries, and the Confederation of British Industry. Specific ways of expanding trade and economic cooperation between our countries were discussed at them. The Soviet delegation visited eight towns in England and Scotland and saw the activity of the biggest enterprises of the light, food, chemical, and medical industries. [video shows meetings, views of London, interior of factory]

In London, for example, it visited the well-known firm Marks and Spencer, whose goods and services are used by the overwhelming majority of British people. In the near future the goods of this firm will also appear on the shelves of our shops. [video shows Marks and Spencer store with a sale on; hordes of photographers, cuts to unidentified office, where Biryukova speaks to Shishkovskiy]

[Begin Biryukova recording] We had talks on trade and economic cooperation in three main areas. First, involving British firms in the modernization of our enterprises of the light and textile industries, of the defense complex, of the medical industry for production of consumer goods, for production of medicines and medical hardware.

The second aim of our delegation was to involve large firms like Courtaulds in the modernization of our chemical enterprises producing chemical fibres and threads.

Finally, there were talks on the participation of British firms in converting our enterprises in the defense complex to the production of equipment for the light amd food industry and of medical hardware and to the production of consumer goods.

Along with these questions, we conducted talks and signed contracts on the supply of various medicines worth about 30 million pounds sterling and consumer goods worth about 70-90 million pounds sterling to our country, and this work is still going on. [end recording]

Biryukova Ends Visit

LD3007104789 Moscow TASS in English 1040 GMT 30 Jul 89

[Text] London July 30 TASS—A visit to Britain of Aleksandra Biryukova, alternate member of the Politbureau of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee and deputy prime minister, ended today. She was invited to Britain by Sir Trevor Holdsworth, president of the Confederation of British Industry.

Biryukova was seen off at the Heathrow Airport by Trevor Holdsworth and Leonid Zamyatin, Soviet ambassador to Britain.

Shevardnadze Meets France's Dumas in Paris

LD3007103189 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0937 GMT 30 Jul 89

[Text] Paris, 30 Jul (TASS)—Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Politburo Central Committee and USSR minister of foreign affairs, who is here for the international conference on a Cambodian settlement, today continued meetings with those taking part in it.

During his conversation with Roland Dumas, French minister of state for foreign affairs, held in a businesslike and friendly atmosphere characteristic of Soviet-French political dialogue, attention was focused on the search for approaches to resolving the tasks set before the conference. It was noted that while a solution seems achievable on the main external aspects of the settlement, significant difficulties in internal aspects, where the arranging of an inter-Khmer dialogue is particularly important, are already visible. The ministers noted the importance of finding a formula which would involve the United Nations in the settlement. The United Nations could give valuable assistance, particularly with an international verification mechanism.

Roland Dumas expressed gratitude for the decision of the USSR minister of foreign affairs to participate in the conference. The decision gives particular weight to this international forum and increases the chances of achieving tangible results.

The ministers expressed concern with the worsening situation in Lebanon. The view was expressed that it was necessary to bring the UN Security Council more actively into play and to step up work with the groupings in Lebanon.

While considering bilateral Soviet-French relations, the importance of actively putting into practice the accords achieved at the recent summit meeting was stressed. Eduard Shevardnadze and Roland Dumas agreed to discuss this matter during their traditional conversation in New York during the UN General Assembly this September.

USSR Ambassador on Bulgaria-Turkey Dialogue

TA2607162489 Ankara ANATOLIA in Turkish 1550 GMT 26 Jul 89

[Text] Istanbul (A.A.)—Soviet ambassador to Ankara Albert Chernyshev has said that both Bulgaria and Turkey agree to a dialogue, but some problems still exist.

Chernyshev, who has completed his fourth round of talks between Ankara, Moscow, and Sofia, returned to Istanbul today from Moscow. In response to questions by journalists at Ataturk Airport, the ambassador said the problem of immigration can be solved only through a dialogue, and added: We are continuing our efforts to achieve the process of a dialogue; however, the two interested parties must also contribute to these efforts. The solution exists and all that is needed is to make some more effort.

We are also doing our best on this issue. Our role is to support the two parties and assist them. What is most important is to start a dialogue. There is no other way that will lead to a solution.

Pointing out that some small problems still exist in achieving this goal, Chernyshev said: Both sides agree to a dialogue, but there are some problems to be solved. This solution does not depend on us. Both sides must make efforts to approach the other. Some distance has already been covered, but there is a distance left to go.

Chernyshev said there were no problems with the Turkish side and added: The other side also says there are no problems. However, as you can see, there are still some problems. A dialogue will allow a better understanding of the problems.

He concluded by saying that he brought a verbal message to the Foreign Ministry on this issue.

Political & Social

Supreme Soviet 31 Jul Morning Session Opens

LD3107064389 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0622 GMT 31 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow, 31 Jul (TASS)—A TASS parliamentary correspondent reports from the Kremlin:

The Soviet parliament's last week of work began today with the confirmation of a number of decrees of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. The morning session is being chaired by Anatoliy Lukyanov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Among other things, the members of the USSR Supreme Soviet still have to examine and confirm the draft decree on income tax on cooperatives. This document was presented for discussion by them as far back as last Friday [28 July], but it was rejected because of the deputies' conflicting approaches to it.

According to preliminary data, discussion and adoption of a law on the procedure for publication and for the coming into effect of laws and other acts adopted by the Congress of People's Deputies, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and other bodies lie ahead today.

Besides this, a study of the issue of appointing a deputy chairman of the USSR People's Control Committee is included on the agenda.

27 Jul Supreme Soviet Proceedings Broadcast

Baltic Financial Autonomy Draft Read

LD2707171389

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1400 GMT on 27 July begins to broadcast a recorded relay from the joint morning session of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet held in the Kremlin 27 July.

At 1400 Anatoliy Lukyanov reads out the draft decision on financial autonomy for the Baltic republics and asks if it should be put to the vote. One or two speakers make comments. He puts it to the vote: 15 were against; 15 abstained. The rest were for. Lukaynov then moves on to the question of economic independence for the Baltic republics.

At 1411 Deputy Romanenko asks if the two documents are connected. Lukyanov says that they are separate documents. He goes on to explain that the session is to approve the fundamentals of the proposed legislation, which will then proceed to the committee stage. Deputy Yudin asks a brief question. Lukyanov says that modifications will be possible at later stages. Other republics are thinking of financial autonomy.

At 1415 a female deputy asks about the fundamentals of the proposals: Are we not getting ahead of ourselves? Lukyanov puts to the vote the proposal on economic independence for the Baltic republics. Thirty five voted against; 23 abstained. Total number of deputies is 412. The proposal is accepted.

At 1420 a male deputy says that he for one was totally unprepared to vote on such a complex issue. He is not an economist, and for that reason abstained. Lukyanov admits that there has been some haste.

At 1425 Deputy Antanaytis says that all chairmen of committees should be allowed to speak in session on the topic they are concerned with. This was not the case with ecology. Unidentified deputies speak. Burlatskiy proposes that all republican administrations should be recommended to prepare drafts on a transfer to financial autonomy as soon as possible.

At 1428 a male deputy says that those who voted against should have their names recorded. Another male deputy talks about public ownership of assets. A committee must look into this. Lukyanov intervenes briefly.

At 1432 Deputy Tikhonov inquires about the distinction between financial autonomy and economic independence. He relates this to the actual production of goods. Lukyanov refers the questioner to documents previously considered. There follows an exchange with Tikhanov.

At 1437 a (?Moldavian) deputy makes a brief contribution. Another deputy calls for publication of the drafts in advance of the debate. He says that the session's agenda should be fixed in advance. He calls for less detailed discussion of each decree. Lukyanov invites the next speaker. An unidentified male deputy says that people generally criticize the Supreme Soviet for dealing with issues remote from the people.

At 1442 an Estonian deputy talks about a political strike currently going on in Estonia.

At 1443 another deputy speaks briefly. Lukyanov asks if there is any need to vote on the issues again so that the names of those voting against can be recorded. The deputies are not in favor of this. As for the publication of drafts, all deputies have advance copies. He then speaks on the question of how the session should deal with decrees: vote for them, reject them, or refer them to committees. The matter is complicated by the need for expert knowledge on the subjects under discussion. He suggests that unopposed decrees should be dealt with today, then four other decrees. Finally, personnel matters will be looked at. Tomorrow will be given over to commission work. He then points out an error in publishing legislation affecting the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. Shalayev's attention has been drawn to this.

At 1453 Lukyanov holds a vote on the matter. The amendment is passed with no votes against and no abstentions.

Lukyanov then says: "A decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 21 March 1989 on reductions in the Armed Forces and defense spending for the period 1989-90 is being submitted for approval by the Supreme Soviet. The Committee for Questions of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order matters has come out in favor of approving the decree with an amplification giving more specific form to the USSR Council of Ministers instructions on matters dealing with material provision for servicemen discharged from the Army. You have received these comments; they are brief, but they specify that the Council of Ministers should examine this issue. May I put the decree, together with this amendment, for a vote, for approval? May I?

After a barely audible comment from a deputy, Lukyanov suggests that the draft should be put to the vote in its present form. Amendments can be made later.

Armed Forces Reductions Decree Passed
LD2707180189

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1458 GMT on 27 July continues to broadcast a recorded relay from the 27 July joint morning session of the Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin.

Deputy Sokolova (Soviet Women's Committee) talks about the need for measures to find work for soldiers' wives—those released from the Armed Forces—to be recorded in the decree.

At 1500 Lukyanov puts the decree to the vote. There are no votes against and no abstentions from the Soviet of the Union. From the Soviet of Nationalities there is one abstention. Lukyanov then calls for a vote on the next decree, which is about housing. The Soviet of the Union passes it with one abstention. Lukyanov then reads out the next draft decree, which is about joint enterprises.

At 1505 Deputy Filshin shouts something inaudible. Lukyanov puts the decree to the vote. The Soviet of the Union votes; it is carried unanimously. Then the Soviet of Nationalities votes; there is one vote against and one abstention. The decree is passed.

At 1508 the next decree is raised. It concerns more money for prisoners so they can pay alimony, for example, a female deputy suggests that someone from the specialized commission should speak on each of the decrees, to make matters clearer. Lukyanov replies. he calls for someone to come forward to elucidate.

At 1512 Deputy Sharipov comes forward and speaks on the wrong issue.

At 1513 the vote is taken, the decree is passed unanimously by both chambers.

At 1514 Lukyanov passes on to the next decree, which is about workers' control of trade unions. A deputy says that amendments are required. What about the informal organizations? They should be included. He says look how feebly the trade unions have operated over the recent miners' strikes.

At 1516 Deputy Babchenko proposes a reworded version of the decree. Worker control must be strengthened by all available means.

At 1520 another deputy says that workers' control in the trade unions does not work. Other views are put forward. One deputy says that there is no need for workers' control. This will lead to duplication. Bodies like the procuracy, already supervise society. He suggests that the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions [AUCCTU] should summarize the experience that already exists.

At 1525 Deputy Kolbin brings up some technicalities.

At 1527 Deputy Kozyrev says that the miners strikes showed that the USSR has no workers' control. Another male deputy says that the decree conflicts with the Law on Cooperatives.

At 1529 Deputy Adylov says that workers' control needs stronger legal backing. A female deputy says that the controllers must be adequately paid for their work, otherwise they will just steal.

At 1530 lukyanov sums up. He says that the USSR People's Control Committee could be asked to examine the question. He then proceeds to the vote. Soviet of the Union: 9 against, 4 abstained. Total voting: 211. Soviet of Nationalities: 25 against, 10 abstained. Total voting 201. A break is announced.

Decree on Leasing Relations Adopted
LD2707193889

[Editorial Report] Moscow Televison Service in Russian 1535 GMT on 27 July broadcasts a recorded relay from the afternoon session of the Supreme Soviet held in the Kremlin 27 July.

Lukyanov proceeds to the next decree, which is on leasing.

At 1537 a male deputy reads a long prepared statement about the rights and obligations of lessees. At 1540 Deputy Seleznev says that we already have a decree, but it does not work. The decree under discussion must be passed so as to underpin the current situation.

At 1543 a male deputy speaks in favor of the decree. It has been prepared by expert economists like Abalkin. Only elderly people are left on the land at present. Suitable taxation arrangements must also be made.

At 1552 a male deputy from Belgorod Oblast says that the land should be given to those who want to farm it; then let us look at the results. Why are we so afraid to distribute land to individuals? People must be given an economic interest in their work, otherwise our economy will go nowhere. Our economists are really just paper economists, divorced from productive work. Deputies should go and see how the lessees are working!

At 1559 Deputy Tikhonov speaks about disputes and tables amendment in this connection.

At 1600 Deputy Desyatov makes a point on ecology with regard to forest leasing and proposes amendment.

At 1603 Lukyanov admonishes deputies to stick to the decree only.

At 1604 Deputy Bagritskiy speaks on shops being leased. What happens if the director of a works is blocking this?

At 1605 Deputy Gubarev, Krasnoyarsk Kray, makes a proposal to alleviate work of the deputies. He highlights some inaccuries in the law and proposes amendments with regard to inheritance of leased plots.

At 1607 Deputy Shcherbak, quoting his voters and experts on shortcomings in law: regarding who can be a lessor, what majority is required in collective to go over to leasing. He proposes two amendments.

At 1610 a male deputy quotes figures for land abandoned last year, so there is land for leasing. He quotes from a Finnish example and proposes an amendment.

At 1612 Deputy Khmura proposes that all questions connected with land should be handed to rural soviet and proposes a amendment.

At 1615 Deputy Stepanova calls on deputies to approve the decree despite its flaws leaving amendments and addenda to be included in fundamental law later.

At 1616 Lukyanov says that 12 deputies have spoken. He says that the local soviet should be the lessor, referring to previous speakers. Only one amendment is worth including in the decree. It is to be examined before the 1 November session. The amendment could be included and the decree approved now. The Soviet of Nationalities votes on the amendment being included. The vote is in favor. The Soviet of the Union is also in favor. The decree on leasing relations is adopted.

At 1620 Lukyanov brings up the decree on income taxes from cooperatives.

Income Tax on Cooperatives Discussed

LD2707201189

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1623 GMT on 27 July continues its recorded relay of the afternoon session of the Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin.

Finance Minister Pavlov takes the floor on behalf of the government. He sets out what the previous legislation in this sphere has been and how it has evolved. He explains what the ideas were behind the legislation and the need to introduce changes because of contradictions occurring. The aim of setting up cooperatives is flooding the market with goods but union republics should decide what cooperations should be set up. Social justice measures in the decree are outlined. Eleven union republics have already adopted decrees on this matter. The average level of taxation is in the 20-30 percent region. Social cooperatives are taxed at 1-10 percent. Cooperatives engaged in mediation and reselling have a 50-60 percent tax level.

The work by the union republics as regards these decrees is regarded as correct and just. The decree has not covered all areas and recommendations on individual points are welcome from deputies. As an economist he regards the taxation system in force now as unjust. He makes a comparison between tax contributions by cooperatives and state enterprises. He asks deputies to vote in favor of the decree and refers to similar legislation in socialist countries where in certain cases tax is doubled.

At 1636 Lukyanov announces the next speakers and answers a question by a deputy.

At 1637 a deputy in the audience quotes Abalkin on what is included in income, and asks Pavlov about the differences between income and profit. Pavlov explains the difference between income and profit. He gives figures for the union for last year, giving the figure for net profit and then for the tax raised. He gives figures for correlation.

At 1642 the same deputy asks further questions and Pavlov answers.

At 1644 deputy asks question about tax inspectors. Pavlov says that a tax inspectorate has to be set up anew. The tax inspectorate has to be restructured. Pavlov started out his career as a tax inspector.

At 1646 Deputy engver asks a question on privileges for youth cooperatives. as the chairman of the all-union economic society Pavlov says the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth Leaque [Komsomol] should not be given privileges.

At 1647 Engver asks additional questions about privileges for Afghan invalids. Pavlov says this category of people already has tax privileges. At 1649 a young

Estonian deputy asks questions about tax percentage. Pavlov has trouble finding the passage concerned and is given the deputy's text. Pavlov reads out the passage. It concerns maintaining 30 percent tax for consumer cooperatives.

At 1652 a deputy asks a question about cooperatives engaged in giving services. Pavlov says they are put on an equal footing with production cooperatives.

At 1653 a male deputy asks about medical cooperatives being covered by social insurance. Pavlov says this does not strictly apply to the decree. Such medical cooperatives are considered an extention of paying polyclinics.

At 1655 Tsypleyev asks two questions on point five. Pavlov explains what is done with concealed income and income that is declared too low. If it is done deliberate and systematic, it is confiscated.

At 1657 Korshunov reads a letter on previous gangsters and speculators being legalized in Gorbachev's cooperatives. He proposes a tax of 90 pecent on such operators. He is applauded. He asks what cooperatives should be closed now and never returned to.

At 1703 Lukyanov gives the floor to Deputy Zaslavskiy, who makes a statement on behalf of an interregional deputies' group regarding venues of the group, giving time and place, and invites all deputies to attend

At 1705 Lukyanov makes two procedural announcements and announces a break.

Further on Income Tax on Cooperatives

LD2707203389

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1700 GMT begins to broadcast a recorded relay from the 27 July joint evening session of the Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin. The evening session is chaired by Yevgeniy Primakov.

Primakov proposes that the debate on the taxation of cooperatives be continued on Monday [31 July], since many deputies wish to speak. But now, he says, we will deal with the confirmation of ministers.

At 1703 Primakov gives the floor to Nikolay Ryzhkov to speak about filling ministerial posts that still remain vacant.

At 1703 Ryzhkov says that today two candidacies are being submitted for ministerial vacancies. The first is for the post of first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, who will also be chairman of the State Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers on Food and Purchases. The second post is that of chairman of the State Committee on Prices.

Ryzhkov says he will ask the deputies to confirm Nikitin in the first post. He says that there are a great number of problems in the agro-industrial sphere. In Ryzhkov's view agriculture is the country's number one priority and the main cause of the country's troubles and the social tension existing in society.

Ryzhkov then speaks on regional financial autonomy. He says some questions will still have to be decided in the center. The State Commission of the Council of Ministers for Food and Purchases has been set up. Nikitin is a worthy candidate to head it.

At 1714 Primakov sums up what Ryzhkov has said on Nikitin.

At 1715 Nikitin starts explaining his program. He speaks about the need for parity of prices between industry and agriculture. Rural workers do not want to be passengers. He gives figures for rural repair facilties in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR]. He says there is a need to set up enterprises to produce things that are now being imported. Funds have to be earned to resolve social questions. He gives figures regarding poor housing, hospitals, and bad roads in the countryside, which explains why people continue to flee to the towns.

At 1730 Nikitin proceeds to answer some questions from deputies. He speaks of the question of profit in agriculture and the work of the Agrobank. He speaks about ecology. Herbicides must not be used by unqualified people. He speaks of the importance of keeping agricultural produce well preserved during transit. He is against centralized bureaucratic control of the agrarian sector. He speaks of developing gasification in southern Daghestan, which is backward in this repect.

Nikitin speaks on preserving fish stocks and the purity of water. He stresses the qualifications needed for the production of cheese and dairy produce in the countryside and the training of young people. He speaks of the experience in Kalinin Oblast in leasing unutilized land for a 50 year period. He answers a question about incentives for people to go and work in the countryside.. He thinks there are sufficient incentives already.

At 1746 Nikitin says that in his view no agricultural produce can be produced on radiation-polluted land. A questioner asks about housing in the far north. Why is the promised amount being reduced this year? Nikitin says that some of the housing has been allocated this year to disaster areas.

Council of Ministers Deputy Confirmed

LD2707205889

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1750 GMT continues the recorded relay of the joint evening session of the Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin.

Deputy Kasyanov stresses that Soviet agriculture is insufficiently provided with power and effective equipment. A realistic view is that collective farms will continue to be the main providers of meat. He says better equipment is needed. Conditions should be created so that some agricultural produce can be exported and other measures taken to save importing produce for hard currency

At 1757 GMT Primakov calls on deputies to keep to their time allowed.

Deputy Umerenkov then begins speaking, he stresses the need for special attention to be paid to the problems of the agrarian sector. Social conditions need to be improved in rural areas to stop migration to towns. Resources must be found.

At 1804 GMT Deputy Ivanov takes the floor. Nikitin's nomination is democratic, he says. Nikitin knows agriculture inside out and is a strong supporter of restructuring. Decisions made by the center are not being fulfilled by the local apparatus. Ivanov appeals to Nikitin to pay particular attention to land improvement in the north

At 1810 GMT Deputy (Losev) takes the microphone to complain that cotton prices are too low and that living standards are growing very slowly in Uzbekistan. Despite all the difficulties, prices must be set immediately. This will bring the shadow market under control.

At 1814 GMT Deputy Allayarov from Turkmenia expresses support for Nikitin's nomination. Unemployment is a big problem in rural Turkmenia: Land use is limited due to water shortages. The processing industries have not been developed in the region. The ecological situation is in "crisis," especially around the Aral Sea. Allayarov demands that measures be taken and that the cotton procurement price be doubled. He concludes by repeating his support for Nikitin.

At 1820 GMT Deputy Yetylen talks about the development of traditional industries in the north. Comprehensive processing of products should be introduced there, rather than using the region as a source of raw materials. Land use must be put in order: punishments for abuse, etc. At 1824 GMT Primakov turns over to Deputy Pokhodnya, asking speakers to be brief. Pokhodnya says agricultural programs must be tailored to each region; closer ties are required with industry; the processing industry must be modernized. Machinery deliveries and insurance funds are criticized.

At 1831 GMT Deputy Dubko says he favors electing Nikitin. Dubko denounces Abalkin's claim that agricultural investment is inefficient. This does not mean it is not needed. More organic fertilizer is required to improve grain production. Forests and lakes should be entrusted to agricultural organizations to ensure better utilization.

At 1837 GMT Deputy Dorokhov speaks. Morale and prestige are low in the rural economy; people prefer to flee to the cities. Dorokhov urges deputies to vote for Nikitin.

At 1842 GMT Primakov says it is time to vote. Nikitin is voted in as first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, with 4 against and 18 abstentions.

At 1845 GMT an unidentified deputy says that the majority of deputies present know little about Nikitin. In fact, he complains, today's debate has been on the role of agriculture in the economy rather than on Nikitin's nomination.

At 1847 GMT Primakov moves on to the next point on the agenda and puts forward Senchagov's nomination as chairman of the State Committee for Prices.

At 1848 GMT Senchagov says that prices fail to reflect market reality and resource imputs. State grants complicate the price picture. Wages are now rising faster than good production. There is a need for more expenditure on light industry and consumer goods manufacturing. Snechagov says wholesale trade principles must be altered, while ensuring a balance between retail supply and demand. In answer to a question on new tariffs for wholesale prices, Senchagov says the committee has drawn up tariffs already, but they still have to be adopted.

At 1858 GMT Deputy Filshin complains that Senchagov's nomination was not properly discussed in his commission. Primakov urges him to participate more actively next time.

At 1900 GMT the vote is taken on Senchagov: There are not votes against; eight abstentions.

Nishanov takes the floor to announce proposed additions to the commission on privileges, listing those concerned.

'Interregional' Group Debated

LD2707211189

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1903 GMT continues to broadcast a recorded relay of the joint evening session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin.

Deputy Gubarev proposes that each deputy have the right to take part in the commission's activities within his constituency. He says Brezhnev's summer house in Krasnodar Kray should be converted into an orphanage.

At 1905 GMT Deputy Lushnikov complains that there is no procedure for the Supreme Soviet to keep tabs on what the commissions are doing. The commission should be composed with greater care.

At 1908 GMT Deputy Yarin, one of the proposed additional members, withdraws his nomination as he is too busy.

At 1910 GMT Primakov puts the new list of commission members to a vote. There is one vote against and one abstention. The commission is confirmed.

At 1911 GMT Deputy Kiselev takes the floor. Most commissions, he says, are short of time. There is therefore no need for parallel structures such as the proposed interregional deputies' group. This would tend to suggest mistrust in the Supreme Soviet structures just created. Consolidation and unity are required.

At 1914 GMT Deputy Sobalov objects to Kiselev's remarks. The new group will defend the rights of the minority.

At 1915 GMT Deputy Ogarok says that groups can be formed to tackle major problems, but this should be done openly and properly. Yeltsin's categorization of deputies as right- and left-wingers was improper and uncalled for. He challenges Zaslavskaya's claims that regional deputies are receiving assistance with accomodation, transport etc. Who is giving them this help and why?

At 1920 GMT Deputy Azarov says that if the interregional group deputies are well intentioned why don't they speak in the Supreme Soviet instead of convening separate meetings?

At 1922 GMT Deputy Chelyshev explains that there is nothing wrong with the interregional group. It provides more time for debating urgent issues. Anyone with doubts should go to the meeting and take part.

At 1925 GMT Deputy Sobchak says the interregional group is only a bad thing if it sets itself up in opposition to other bodies.

At 1927 GMT Primakov declares the session closed.

Supreme Soviet 4 Jul Session Highlighted

PM1007141589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Jul 89 Morning Edition pp 1-2

[Special correspondents V. Dolganov, I. Korolkov, V. Kurasov, M. Kushtapin, R. Lynev, A. Plutnik, and V. Shchepotkin report: "Fewer and Fewer Vacant Seats"]

[Excerpt] The latest joint session of the USSR Supreme Soviet of the Union and Soviet of Nationalities began 4 July at 1000. The formation of the country's government was continued.

A.I. Lukyanov, in the chair, reported that I.S. Silayev was being nominated as a candidate for the post of deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the Machine Building Bureau.

The contender for the high office mounted the rostrum. He set out his program for the development of the machine building complex, the state of which today will largely determine the country's economic and social renewal. The years of stagnation have been reflected in many national economic sectors. The machine building complex is no exception. Today we produce seven times fewer cars and three times fewer trucks than the United States. And we only produce 40 percent of the equipment we need for the production of polymers.

The speaker considers the changing of the structure of management to be one of the conditions for improving the work of the complex. We need a high level of enterprise independence, he said. Unfortunately, we have not yet managed to achieve this.

In this respect the speaker dwelt in detail on the problems of developing the wholesale trade and the relationship between client enterprises and their suppliers.

An important element in building up machine building output and improving its technical level and quality, the speaker believes, is active integration both with the socialist countries and with advanced firms and enterprises in the West. We must introduce more extensively into this area the principles of foreign-exchange self-financing as of 1990.

Answering deputies' numerous questions, I.S. Silayev said that now, in his opinion, we should finance not individual sectors or even complexes, but targeted programs. He said that the warplane production capacities released as a result of conversion could be used, in particular, to create modern subway cars.

The candidate government member expressed his attitude to state acceptance. It has played a definite role in improving discipline and instilling elementary order in production. However, in the process of creating high-quality output it does not resolve the entire range of tasks and in many cases is an impediment. State acceptance is an emergency measure akin to a curfew. It can and should be introduced for a certain period if requested by customers or an association of customers. And, in implementing state acceptance, there are grounds for making the enterprise at which it is introduced pay for it.

A number of questions concerned improving the provision of equipment to farming. On this score I.S. Silayev said that agricultural machine building should also be considered a priority sector, and particular attention should be devoted to the prospects for producing engine blocks and minitractors.

Deputies V.V. Kasyan, N.S. Sazonov, K.V. Frolov, and others took part in the discussion of I.S. Silayev's candidacy.

I.S. Silayev was appointed deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the Machine Building Bureau by a majority vote.

Then, at the chair's suggestion, the USSR Supreme Soviet returned to the question of ratifying V.M. Kamentsev in the post of deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the State Commission for Foreign Economic Relations. As is well known, last time 246 deputies voted for his candidacy. This was not enough for ratification. Therefore it was decided by a majority vote to continue the discussion.

Deputies A.A. Sobchak and A.G. Zhuravlev sharply criticized the candidate. At the same time, V.M. Kamentsev's candidacy was supported by Deputy A.S. Dzasokhov on behalf of the Committees for International Affairs and Economic Reform Questions and the Planning, Budget, and Financial Commission. His opinion was shared by Deputy S.N. Khadzhiyev. After a scathing and principled polemic, another vote was taken. This time 200 deputies voted for V.M. Kamentsev, 172 voted against, and 47 abstained. As a result the Supreme Soviet did not ratify V.M. Kamentsev in the post of deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

Before the recess the session appointed the following ministers: A.S. Systsov, minister of the aviation industry; N.A. Pugin, minister of automotive and agricultural machine building; and V.F. Konovalov, minister of nuclear power generation and the nuclear industry.

...But let us return to the 3 July evening session chaired by A.I. Lukyanov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

It started with an examination of the question of the appointment of Valentin Sergeyevich Pavlov as USSR finance minister. His candidacy had previously been discussed at a joint session of several commissions and committees, and he was unanimously recommended (a rather rare occurrence nowadays) for the job, on which the success of investment policy and the economic reform will largely depend.

The candidate minister's speech was exceedingly brief—around 5 minutes—and for this he was later reproached during the discussion by certain deputies. V.S. Pavlov described the financial situation in the country as not just complex but alarming. We can all see the empty store shelves and the shortcomings in the sphere of supplies to people. We will have to resolve both tactical tasks, in order to halt the accelerating inflationary spiral, and strategic tasks—in restructuring the entire credit and financing system.

By cutting unnecessary spending in the first stage, we must reorganize the movement of money in the national economy, ensure an efficient thrift regime, develop economic accountability, and improve people's living standards as a result.

The candidate government member answered questions on the formation of the country's budget, ways of combatting inflationary processes, taxation, and the salaries of various categories of people. The news that the need for new issues of money in the second quarter had necessitated the printing of R1.7 billion in addition to the R3 billion previously printed was alarming. All of us, of course, are interested in what will be used as "backing" for this enormous amount of money. And this, one may suppose, will result in the questions of increasing consumer goods output, accelerating housing construction rates, and developing the services sphere being put even more acutely during the discussion of subsequent candidacies.

V.S. Pavlov put forward his attitude to the problem of an inheritance tax, and taxes on unmarried and childless people. Whereas the former still deserves to exist provided it is brought into line with specific everyday situations, the latter, in the speaker's opinion, should be abolished.

V.S. Pavlov devoted particular attention to the search for resources for stabilizing the country's economy, and put forward his attitude to the problem of implementing the monetary reform proposed by certain economists. Science and practice, he said, show that such reforms can only be implemented when a country's economy is doing well. Under our circumstances this will not produce any positive results for the time being.

It must be said that V.S. Pavlov was asked far more serious and complex questions this time than during the discussion of his candidacy at the joint session of USSR Supreme Soviet chambers' commissions and committees. The candidate minister answered them clearly and professionally. And when he did not know something or did not as yet have sufficient information, he honestly admitted that he was not ready to answer the question today. On most of the questions he was not afraid to put forward his own personal views, which quite often ran counter to prevailing financial practice and policy.

[Question] Does the Ministry of Finance plan to write off long-term loans to collective and state farms?

[Pavlov] Personally I am against wholesale write-offs.

[Question] How do you explain the sharp rise in prices of industrial output? What is the solution?

[Pavlov] Price dynamics do exist. In machine building average wholesale price growth, according to our figures, is running at 11.7 percent. This can be explained, on the one hand, by sector monopolies, and, on the other, by imbalances in the market for means of production. [Pavlov ends]

One question was asked about the mechanism for drawing up local and all-union budgets. "We are currently using the old administrative and command principle for drawing them up," V.S. Pavlov said.

The last question for the minister was the following:

[Question] Many enterprises have switched to economic accountability and self-financing, but they cannot spend their funds independently. What kind of independence is that?

[Pavlov] I think enterprises should have just two funds: an accumulations fund and a consumption fund. And nobody should dare to interfere with them. [Pavlov ends]

A.I. Lukyanov in the chair proposed moving on to discuss V.S. Pavlov's candidacy. Deputy A.I. Khomyakov put forward serious complaints about recent USSR Council of Ministers resolutions linked with financing and deductions in agriculture. Deputy V.A. Tikhonov admitted that he had initially had his doubts about whether this man was destined to be finance minister, but now, after consulting with major specialists and listening to V.S. Pavlov's program, he had confidence in the candidate. The speaker sharply criticized tax policy with regard to cooperatives—a policy which has already been introduced by certain republics. In his opinion, it will lead to some cooperatives' being forced to shut up shop, while others will be forced into the shadow economy. In this regard V.A. Tikhonov read out an appeal to the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted at the recent All-Union Congress of United Cooperative Members. The number of ill-considered taxes that have recently been rapidly multiplying was also mentioned by Deputy A.F. Kasyanov. Doubts that industrial enterprises would readily pay their own funds into local budgets were also raised by Deputy K.D. Lubenchenko.

Deputy N.V. Bosenko called on the members of the USSR Supreme Soviet not to end the session without setting a timetable (in the very near future) for increasing pensions to veterans. We are capable, he said, of resolving the question of removing any restrictions on the total earnings of working pensioners before the second Congress.

A.I. Lukyanov in the chair put the matter to a vote. V.S. Pavlov was appointed USSR finance minister with 40 deputies voting against and 14 abstaining.

The next one to mount the rostrum was Lev Dmitriyevich Ryabev, candidate deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

The subject matter of the questions put to L.D. Ryabev was determined mainly by the fact that the candidate currently heads the Ministry of Medium Machine Building—a department which, if its name is translated into understandable language, has handled defense problems, including nuclear weapons. Now L.D. Ryabev will have to solve the problems of the fuel and energy complex, in which nuclear power stations [AES] play a prominent role. Deputies were worried about the quality of the plans for new AES'es and the strategy for siting them. Deputy Yu.N. Shcherbak, a writer from the Ukraine, talked about the Crimean AES, which is being built in a highly seismic region, and about the Khmelnitskiy AES, the plans for which violate sanitation norms.

Attention to the Chernobyl accident has regrettably started to diminish, Deputy G.I. Revenko noted in his speech. Although there are still many problems and negative effects associated with that station.

Several years ago the newspapers and television broadcast exultant reports of the construction of a gas condensate complex near Astrakhan. They reported that an industrial colossus was growing out of the sands, and they tried to say as little as possible about the fact that it was being built not so much on the sands as on the shore of the Caspian Sea. Timid voices warned that the harmful production facility and the sea were dangerously close together. They were not heeded. And now—Deputy I.N. Dyakov, a candidate for high state office and first secretary of Astrakhan party oblast committee, has drawn attention to this—the complex is producing extremely harmful discharges. It is dangerous. Having spent R3 billion on its construction, the country has not obtained the expected returns. The complex is working at 15 percent of its rated capacity. Moreover, it is already having a major overhaul, barely after starting operations.

So much has been said from various rostrums and written about mistakes and ecological shortcomings, and there have been so many calls for lessons to be learned—for substantiated, well-conceived, and well-calculated projects to be developed. But each time everything is repeated.

The deputies' concern is understandable, and their demands on the candidate who will have to seriously change policy in this sphere are natural. A buildup of mistakes can ultimately reach crisis point.

It must be said that the alarm in deputies' speeches was also accompanied by hope for the forthcoming changes. Because the post of deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers has been entrusted to someone who thinks on a large scale, has a concept of restructuring the sector, and—the deputies noted that this is very important—is a committed person.

L.D. Ryabev was appointed deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers by a majority vote. [passage omitted]

'Interregional' Group Formed, Meetings Held

First Meeting Held 29 Jul

LD2907094589 Moscow TASS in English 0938 GMT 29 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 29 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent:

A meeting of a group of Soviet people's deputies who, as announced, will represent the opinion of left-radical layers of society" in the supreme bodies of state authority opened in Moscow today. [quotation marks as received]

The meeting's organizers include Boris Yeltsin, considered by the press as the most likely leader of the group, prominent economist Gavriil Popov and deputies representing the Film-Makers Union whose professional club is the venue of the meeting.

Lately notable expansion has become obvious in Soviet society of lawyers which found themselves strongly influenced by left-radical aspirations. They favour enforcement of transformations. At a recent conference of party leaders at the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev noted that there exist practical grounds for such aspirations: Perestroyka is not proceeding smoothly everywhere. He stressed that a plurality of opinions and approaches and the advancement of alternative variants of dealing with pressing problems on a socialist basis are natural things, and it would be a mistake to try and "excommunicate" left radicals from the general involvement in the process of perestroyka.

Along with this, when Boris Yeltsin announced in the Supreme Soviet his intention to formally organize an inter-regional deputy group, many parliamentarians were wary. Without submitting to doubt the right of every deputy to his own point of view, some parliamentarians voiced apprehension at the prospect of turning the left radical group into a kind of opposition at a very hard time for the country.

The session of the inter-regional group is expected to last two days.

Yeltsin Addresses Meeting

LD2907145289 Moscow TASS in English 1448 GMT 29 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 29 TASS—By TASS parliamentary corresondent:

A political meeting which is regarded by some analysts as the amergence of a 'Soviet opposition' is taking place in Moscow today: More than 200 people's deputies of the USSR have gathered to discuss the question of formalising organisationally 'Deputies' Interregional Group' which, as was stated earlier, will reflect the interests of 'left-wing radical sections of the population (there are a total of 2,250 people's deputies in the country). [quotation marks as received]

Deputy Gavrill Popov, a prominent economist, who declared the meeting open, said the purpose of the group was not to counterpose itself to the Supreme Soviet but to impel it to do fully what is demanded by the electorate. The actions of the group, he pointed out, fully fit into the notion of socialist pluralism.

The very idea of formalising the Deputies' Interregional Group organisationally, the purpose and tasks of its activities are understood differently by the participants in the meeting.

Deputy Sergey Ryabchenko of Kiev cautioned against being too keen organisational isolationism.

The interregional group's proposals, he is convinced, should be formulated only as the opinion of a certain number of deputies.

Vladislav Shapovalenko from Orenburg adheres to a different point of view. He believes that the group's platform should be clearly worded and only the one who shares all theses of the groups's platofrm may be its member.

Every deputy should clearly define his or her attitude towards affiliation with the group, Boris Yeltsin said in his speech.

An indistinct composition of the group will not give an opportunity collectively to uphold our point of view, our draft law or our amendments to documents in parliament or at the Congress of People's Deputies, he said. But this, he emphasised, does not rule out the participation of other deputies in the group's meetings or an opportunity for them to speak on all issues.

The interregional group of people's deputies, Yeltsin said, has published the first issue of its newspaper. The group has its own fund which has been formed and will be replenished through voluntary donations from constituents, deputies, and organisations and will be used for the deputies' needs by a decision of a specially established board of the fund.

Yeltsin set out his position on some topical phenomena of political life.

Some pronouncements by Yeltsin were supported by deputies while some others were viewed from a critical point of view. Among his supporters is historian Yuriy Afanasiyev who said that the task of the Deputies' Interregional Group was to promote the pursuance of a state policy which would get ahead of crisis developments and not trail behind them as, according to him, is now the case.

Setting out a kind of theoretical platform, Afanasiyev contended that, without renouncing the socialist idea, one should nowadays take a broader view of it than was done before and proceed, as he put it, 'from Jesus Christ, through Lenin's death-agony to contemporary social democracy'.

Yevgeniy Primakov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Council of the Union, one of the chambers of Soviet Parliament, emphasized in his speech at the meeting an utter need for alternative proposals in parliament activities.

However, his conviction is that the form of a deputies' club, and not of an exclusive group, would be more appropriate for this purpose. An organisational cell opposing the supreme Soviet should not be set up, he stated and urged deputies to take an active part in the work in permanent bodies of parliament.

The chairman of the parliament's chamber rejected accusations that the "parliament has done nothing". The country's government has been formed during the first session on the strength of a thorough person-by-person discussion of nominations. The parliament took a major decision on pre-term discharge of all students from the Army, as had been demanded by broad sections of the public. A law on raising the size of pensions for the low-income brackets of the population has been prepared, he said.

The meeting of the deputies' group is going on.

Yeltsin Cited

LD3007100189 London SUNDAY TELEGRAPH in English 30 Jul 89 p 13

[Text] Radical Soviet MPs [members of parliament], meeting yesterday to establish a formal group to press for faster changes in the ailing system, urged President Gorbachev to decide which side of the fence he was on—for genuine reform or for the status quo.

Cheered on by an enthusiastic crowd outside, several hundred of the country's most popular politicians began the inaugural conference of the "inter-regional group", breaking with decades of official unity in the Communist Party hierarchy.

Mr Boris Yelstin, the former Politburo member and Moscow party chief who was expected to become leader of the caucus, said the public had been disappointed by the performance of the Congress of Peoples' Deputies and the Supreme Soviet.

Despite their overwhelming success in the March elections, the radicals are in the minority in both bodies.

However, recent debates in the Supreme Soviet have shown that many politicians, who it was thought would toe the line, have plucked up courage to join the torrent of criticism against the party.

"The people feel themselves deceived," Mr Yeltsin said. Their demands had not been met, and politicians and officials had discredited themselves. The miners' strike showed in contrast how organised and determined the workers had become.

Mr Yeltsin, whose attacks on the privilege, atrophy and remoteness of the party leadership have won him a huge public following, was outshone on the first day of the meeting by the historian, Mr Yuriy Afanasyev.

Winning a noisy ovation, he declared that the Kremlin leadership was paralysed by fear of taking bold steps.

"Gorbachev is justifiably regarded as the man who launched reform," Mr Afanasyev said. "But the time has passed when he can successfully remain the leader of perestroyka and the leader of the nomenklatura (the privileged ruling elite of communist party officials). He has to make a clear choice."

"I think that Gorbachev finds it hard to understand that he is no longer the only leader of perestroyka, and that whole sections of our society are producing new leaders of reform."

Mr Afanasyev's comments reflect a growing popular feeling that Mr Gorbachev's cautious injection of reforms is not enough, either politically or economically. The success of the miners in taking matters into their own hands has set a precedent that others are beginning to follow.

Mr Yeltsin received more subdued applause from the MPs and invited observers. These included Mr Yevgeniy Prymakov, chairman of one chamber of the Supreme Soviet and an aide to Mr Gorbachev. He had apparently been sent to give the meeting the stamp of presidential approval.

Many conservative MPs have denounced the meeting as an effort to split Parliament. Some delegates heeded the criticism, pressing colleagues not to establish the group formally, but to limit it to a lobbying body.

One delegate criticised Mr Yeltsin for announcing the meeting in advance. "Any attempt to arm ourselves with some kind of flag would be detrimental."

Outside the House of Film, headquarters of the official cinematographers' union, about 100 Muscovites cheered delegates as they arrived.

About half a dozen policemen looked on as a few individual protesters unfurled banners, but the mood was very relaxed.

Group Meets for 2d Day

LD3007135789 Moscow TASS in English 1335 GMT 30 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 30 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent: The two-day meeting of the inter-regional deputy group held its second session in Moscow today. Not all its members agreed to be described as left-radical, but all of them shared one of the principal provisions of the group programme which came under

discussion today—they all favored expanding and deepening perestroika in the Soviet Union. "Radicalism of the deputies assembled here is nothing other but realism," writer Aleksandr Gelman said in his address to the meeting. "There are deputies here today who have not yet determined their own attitude to the group and its programme. But every deputy has the right to voice his opinion on matters under discussion."

Most speakers agreed that the situation in the country called for cardinal decisions and changes and made it imperative that the group of delegates should identify itself organizationally. This was stressed, characteristically, in the address of academician Oleg Bogomolov.

"My appearance here is motivated by anxiety for the country's destiny," he said. According to him, not only the earlier upper echelons of power but also the Congress of the People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet elected at the Congress have failed so far to meet the expectations vested in them. He pointed out that no way out of the social and economic crises has been found so far. The academician explained the failure of the policy pursued through the decades by lack of national consensus. "In order to evade recurring errors," he stated, "care should be taken of reaching national consensus, taking account of the will of the people and ensuring free expression of this will".

Bogomolov said conditions must be created under which differing views and interests may not only be voiced freely, without apprehension but organizational forms may be provided for promoting these views and interests. "In this respect," Bogomolov insisted, "the interregional deputy group has a reason to exist and a mission of its own."

A variety of viewpoints, including on the group's organisational structure, functions and objectives, was brought to light in the course of discussion. Deputy Vladimir Kirillov of Voronezh stated that he saw no divergence between the program of the inter-regional deputy group and that of the Congress of People's Deputies. Their objectives coincided and they differed only in methods of attaining them, he said. Deputy Viktor Goncharov of Donbass pointed out that strikes and strike committees emerged after the congress. He said he himself was a member of a strike committee. "Miners have shown us that the spirit of radicalism is not sufficient, one must fight to defend the interests of the people," he told the gathering.

Proposals were put forward at the meeting for convening a session of the Congress of People's Deputies in September to adopt amendments to the law on elections which would enable the consolidation and further development of democratic principles during the elections to republican and local bodies of power.

The meeting is continuing its work.

Interregional Group Elects Leaders

LD3007174789 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1700 GMT 30 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow, 30 Jul [TASS]—A TASS parliamentary correspondent reports:

The interregional group formed by USSR people's deputies who are in favor of radicalism and decisiveness in conducting perestroyka has given form to its organization. Its coordinating committee, consisting of 25 people and 5 cochairmen, was elected at the 2-day general meeting of the group which ended today.

The cochairmen—the former chief of the Moscow party organization Boris Yeltsin, historian Professor Yuriy Afanasyev, economic scientist Gavriil Popov, Academician Viktor Palm from the Baltic republic of Estonia, and Academician Andrey Sakharov—will carry out their duties according to the principle of collective work and functional responsibility. The option which was originally proposed of their performing the duties of chairman in turn on a rotational basis was rejected by the majority of deputies. "We must rally the parliamentary group on a platform, not around a personality," was the main argument against this proposal.

The deputies discussed the platform proposed to them and in the main approved it; however, it was decided to adopt it at the group's next session with the introduction of the amendments which had been put forward.

Group's Program Described

LD3007211389 Moscow TASS in English 2056 GMT 30 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 31 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent:

The inter-regional deputies' group, uniting Soviet parliamentary deputies who advocate radicalism and determination in carrying out perestroyka in the country, has formed into an organisation.

At a two-day meeting, which ended on Sunday [30 July], the group elected its 25-member coordination committee and five co-chairmen.

They include Boris Yeltsin, former chief of the Moscow communist party organisation, historian Professor Yuriy Afanasyev, economist Gavriil Popov, Estonian Academician Viktor Palm, and Academician Andrey Sakharov.

They will perform their duties on the principle of collective work and functional responsibility.

The initial proposal on their rotation was rejected by a majority of deputies whose main argument against the proposal was that "we should rally the parliamentary group on a platform, rather than around a personality."

The meeting was attended by 316 parliamentary deputies, including 90 Supreme Soviet members. 269 deputies confirmed their participation in the inter-regional group.

Another 119 deputies, who could not attend the meeting for various reasons, had earlier declared their wish to join the group.

The deputies discussed their program and approved it on the whole. However, deputies proposed many amendments to it during the discussion, so the meeting decided to amend the program and adopt it at the group's next meeting.

The main provisions of the program caused no objections from group members. The program calls on deputies to insist on establishing in a special decree that all institutions of the political system and their representatives participate in the execution of power solely through soviets.

The program says that the principle of genuine federalism, which guarantees state sovereignty for constituent republics, should be implemented in a new constitution.

The program demands that means of production belong to those who work, that a producer be fully independent and that administration bodies lose their command nature.

It sets the task of demonopolising the economy and demands that society ensure large-scale social security aid to the needy.

Apart from strategic goals, the group set its immediate tasks. It is going to call for convocating an extraordinary session of the Congress of People's Deputies to amend the election system in the Soviet Union.

The meeting adopted an appeal to the USSR Supreme Soviet, requesting setting up a commission to investigate events in Alma- Ata, capital of Soviet Kazakhstan, in the winter of 1986.

The deputies decided to address standing committees and commissions of parliament with the proposal to discuss amendments to some laws and governmental decrees which, in the deputies' opinion, are holding back a radical economic reform.

The group also decided to press the Council of Ministers, through the Supreme Soviet, to toughen the drive against black-marketeering and organised economic crime.

Yeltsin told reporters that the inter-regional group was formed largely to protect the minority in the supreme body of power.

He said that the group is going to establish regular contacts with electors and that the group has already set up a Moscow electors' association and electors' clubs, in which group members will work.

The group will also invite electors to its meetings to know their opinion on issues discussed.

Yeltsin, Primakov Cited

LD2907184889 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 29 Jul 89

[Excerpt] [Announcer] A meeting of the Interregional Group of USSR People's Deputies began today in Moscow's House of Cinema. Our special correspondent Lyudmila Semina has just returned from there to our editorial office. She is now in the studio. Well, how were things there?

[Semina] It is interesting there. Many people were gathered there. I was delighted to exchange greetings with deputies whom I had not seen for a long time, since the Congress. Many of them had come specially to Moscow and brought the hopes and aspirations of their electorate with them.

However, at the beginning the talk proved to be rather vague, it seemed, and some people even started to leave the hall. Then after the first break, the work became more constructive. The deputies started to seek and find answers to the question of what is bringing them together. It is, of course, a thirst for more effective work by the deputies. It has already been said frequently that the Supreme Soviet is sometimes being forced to act like a fire brigade and, what is most important and this was mentioned by Deputy Afanasyev, to set policy priorities, to determine difficulties and conflicts and prevent them, and to look far ahead.

Listen to this fragment from the speech of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, one of the active initiators of the setting up of the Interregional Group.

[Begin Yeltsin recording] The dramatic nature of the situation that has developed requires more decisive and radical acts of perestroyka. The flare-up of strikes in recent weeks has registered the very grave social tension in the country. It can be said that the strike committees have proven to be the embryos of real people's power. The demand for holding local elections before November, that is, before the work of the Second Congress of People's Deputies, is a political slogan, which in the longer term might unite the people's masses around genuinely restructuring forces, if this demand is not implemented.

Here is a further thought. The demands that have been made for guarantees at the highest level need to be used in every way to strengthen the prestige and influence of the country's legislative authorities—the Supreme Soviet

and the Congress of People's Deputies—to turn them into a real butress of perestroyka in the country and a guarantee of beneficial changes for the people as a whole. [applause]

Comrades, you have been presented with the theses of the platform of the Interregional Group of USSR People's Deputies, or rather proposals, not platform, which will in the future probably grow into some kind of platform when it is enriched by your proposals. Its main positions are: in legislative activity, guided by the interests of the people, to prepare new or alternative draft laws on problems of vital importance for society. One of the paramount tasks is to prepare the draft of a new USSR Constitution. Possibly, either the amendments or the draft as a whole should be proposed on behalf of the Interregional group and it should reflect the changes that have occurred in society and the concept of the new state government in the country. The new draft constitution must be a guarantee against society's return to the personality cult and stagnation.

In this regard it seems urgently essential to prepare draft laws on changing the electoral system with a view to its maximum democratization. Any postponement of the dates for the elections to republican and local soviets will only exacerbate the situation in the country, since the question of completely transferring power to the soviets needs to be resolved now without any delays. [end recording]

[Semina] Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov, chairman of the Soviet of the Union of the Supreme Soviet, has a slightly different point of view.

[Begin Primakov recording] The first question I would like to raise is this: Do we need amendments? Do we need concentrated mental work to help the Supreme Soviet, or the Congress of People's Deputies, to do something? Yes, certainly. I consider that it might have been possible to conduct our congress even better if we had, perhaps, taken a more attentive attitude to the documents which were prepared by the Moscow group. That is quite clear. Another question stems from this: Do we need to have some kind of special forum for this? I consider that it is necessary, in the form of a club, in the form of an open club for everyone, to discuss these alternative proposals, to bring them to the notice of deputies, and so on. Does this group have to be closed? I consider that this would be wrong.

In other words, the matter stands like this: Is it worth making some sort of organized cell that would be in opposition, I would like to stress this, to the Supreme Soviet? Comrades, if you think about it, we have been able for the first time to bring offices out of the appointment style and place them on the rostrum of the Supreme Soviet, and for the first time in all our history the government has been elected by democratic means, for the first time, this is a tremendous school for deputies, and for members of the government, and for the country as a whole. We have been able, in spite of the opinion of very many, to implement a decision that students should now be recalled from active service, and this week, I am sure, we will make a decision on raising pensions for our low-paid people, and so on. All of this is being done; it is often done with difficulty. There is enthusiasm however; there is a desire to do all of this, so let us contribute to this work, and if we invite, I think, outstanding economists, such as Popov and Shmelev, for example, and they refuse, what then? You see, comrades, you have to call a spade a spade. We all have an interest in pulling the country out of the critical state in which it finds itself. But let us do this with our eyes open, let us do it properly, and let us not complicate, but expedite this work. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Group Deputies Discuss Talks

LD2907201589 Moscow TASS in English 1947 GMT 29 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 29 TASS—"I at first hesitated as to whether to join the deputies' Interregional Group or not. But when I returned to my constituents following the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, I came to feel their dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs in the country, and their desire for cardinal changes, my hesitations ended and, so, I am here", Anatoliy Markovich, a deputy from the Jewish autonomous region, said at a general meeting of the deputies' Interregional Group on Saturday. This is an example of how people's deputies of the USSR look for ways to actively participate in the work of parliament.

The Interregional Group, as the initiators of establishing it repeatedly emphasised at the meeting, is a parliamentary group with a special platform aimed at accelerating and deepening perestroyka in the country.

There are deputies who are prepared to evaluate the group's tasks more radically. Konstantin Kharchenko, an officer from the city of Kalinin, said one should not fear the word 'oppositionist'. A tinge of personal subjectivist attitude is also felt in this respect. Kharchenko said attempts are being made to give him 'circulars' in his military unit as to what he should or should not say when associating with deputies. Political bodies did not advise him to participate in this meeting either. But he interrupted his annual leave on the Black Sea coast and flew to Moscow to attend the meeting. He ardently urged deputies to take measures which would expedite perestroyka in the army.

Each deputy (there were 32 speakers) had his own urgent problems which they would like to bring to the notice of their colleagues so as to try to solve them through parliament.

However, deputies visualise differently forms for bringing their ideas to the attention of Supreme Soviet members and ways for influencing the parliament's permanent bodies.

Therefore different is also their attitudes to the interregional parliamentary group. Vitaliy Chelyshev, a deputy from Zaporozhye Region (Ukraine), said one should not fear consolidation of deputies on a common platform—this, in his view, is an ordinary parliamentary practice.

Kim Yong Ung, a deputy from Omsk (Siberia), disagreed with him. He said the group should not impose a rigid discipline upon its members.

There was also polemic as to legitimacy of the existence of the group itself and the character of its activities. At the same time many deputies came forward with proposals to give a boost to parliamentary activities to resolve important problems of social life.

Academician Vladimir Tikhonov suggested on behalf of the group that that question of urging the government to take resolute measures to put a stop to trade profiteering, which had assumed monstrous proportions, be immediately put as an item on the agenda of the current session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. His proposal met with unanimous support of the audience.

Tomorrow the general assembly of the interregional parliamentary group will continue its work.

Deputy Views Reason for Group

LD2907170589 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1448 GMT 29 Jul 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] A meeting of the interregional group of deputies took place today at the House of the Cinema in Moscow.

[Begin recording] Correspondent Sergey Medvedev] The decision to set up the group has aroused heightened interest among foreign correspondents: An opposition is being set up in the Soviet parliament! Is this so? Let us find out.

Everyone wanting to become a member of the group and to take part in its work came to register here. There are 240 people, although many people's deputies, I was told at the organizing committee, are still on their way. Who are they? They are representatives of almost all regions of our country. Before the meeting, the deputies received documents containing the group's draft resolutions. These are amendments to existing legislative acts and texts of new ones. They are the result of major preliminary work. Discussion of these resolutions began today at the session, which was opened by Gavriil Khayratonovich Popov. I will mention just two documents: A draft decision of the Supreme Soviet on the abrogation of the decrees by its presidium on depriving of USSR citizenship scientific and cultural figures which were adopted between 1967-1986, as well as amendments to the law on state enterprises. At the same time, the group confirmed in action their intentions to work out alternative legislative decisions and to submit them to the Supreme Soviet for discussion. The group's coordinating council has already been set up as well as its bureau which, it was stated, carries out no leading functions and does not claim the role of an ideological focus. It was decided that the organizational formation of the interregional group of deputies will be completed at tomorrow's session. [video shows registration of deputies; Popov addressing meeting; Yeltsin seen in auditorium; other speakers. Video then shifts to interview in House of Cinema foyer with USSR People's Deputy S.B. Stankevich]

Sergey Borisovich, why do we need groups in the parliament?

[Stankevich] You know, we still have fears and stereotypes left over from the past. Frequently when the word group is heard, associations automatically arise such as fraction, opposition, etc., with all the political conclusions which ensue from this. I would like to say that the presence of groups in parliament is neither the whim, the invention, nor the conspiracy of some group of extremists. The presence of groups in the parliament is the only possible method of existence for a real, working parliament. No parliament will ever speak with 500 individual voices. Imagine a debate with 500 speakers who are not listening to one another. Imagine an attempt to coordinate 500 variants of one and the same draft law.

[Medvedev] It is impossible.

[Stankevich] On the other hand, this can be done by five or six groups that are united according to the principle of similiarity of views. First, they will resolve their issues in groups because they will soon find a common language from the similiarity of their views, then representatives of the five or six groups will come forward and find a sensible compromise. In other words, it is the same machinery for working out a sensible compromise, which is essential to any parliament. I hope that it is being set up now here, too.

[Medvedev] Why not transfer this work to the committees and commissions, for example?

[Stankevich] The committees and commissions, by adopting majority decisions, may eliminate some decisions that might appear to the majority of the committee, shall we say, as excessively radical. So, this point of view would no longer reach the plenary session. But here, since we are uniting on the basis of similarity of views, we can represent precisely our own point of view, our variant of solutions. It will, of course, reach the general discussion and some grain of reasoning will perhaps also reach the general solution. Thus, the field of possible choice before the parliament is widened and the sensible compromise will appear far more balanced, far more

viable, something which our previous decisions lacked. [video shows speaker to camera; Yeltsin seen in background with group] [end recording]

Siberian Deputy Quoted

LD3007194189 Moscow World Service in English 1800 GMT 30 Jul 89

[Text] After the interregional deputies group concluded a 2-day meeting in Moscow on Sunday [30 July], People's Deputy Gennadiy Filshin of Irkutsk, Siberia, told a TASS correspondent the creation of a group of this kind did not signal the emergence of any opposition. He said the group intended to work out alternative suggestions which would be fully in line with the performance of the Congress of People's Deputies and the national parliament. The interregional group unites those deputies who favor more radical and resolute approaches in the work of coping with the current difficulties. The general political discussion at the latest meeting yielded a political platform for the group as well as amendments to the 13th Chapter of the Constitution which has to do with the election procedure, the Law on State Enterprise, and a number of other documents. All of these suggestions are to be considered by the ongoing parliamentary session.

Supreme Soviet Committees' Work Detailed

LD2807212889 Moscow TASS in English 2107 GMT 29 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 28 TASS—A commission on preparing the draft law on constitutional compliance held its regular meeting on Friday. It discussed the law's original variant prepared by a special working group set up by the commission. The commission admitted it necessary to continue work on the project and determine more clearly the competence of the USSR Committee on Constitutional compliance and its activities.

The Committee on the Work of Soviets of People's Deputies, Development of Management and Self-Government heard a report of Gennadiy Kolbin, head of the People's Control Committee. He said that the committee's main task was to strengthen discipline of its staff. It is an open secret that cuts in managerial staff announced nationwide turned out to be ficticious in a number of cases: The staff of former ministries simply switched over to administrative work at specially-created production and scientific-production associations.

Some deputies said that in conditions of acute shortages it was necessary to establish a tough control over trade enterprises and cooperatives selling their goods at higher and sometimes speculative prices.

The committee on the work of Soviets of People's Deputies, the development of management and self-government continued discussing a draft law on resolving collective labour disputes. Its first variant had been turned down by the committee because its formulations were rather vague.

"We need a legislation which would not shade conflict situations, but, on the contrary, will create a clear-cut mechanism of resolving labour disputes at all levels of their consideration," the committee's chairman Nikolay Pivovarov said.

Representatives of the USSR Council of Ministers and the USSR State Planning Committee, and also a number of ministries and departments were invited to a meeting of the standing commissions on consumer goods, trade, community and other services of the council of the nationalities.

"Our aim is to analyse the state of consumer goods shortages, bring out the causes of the disbalance and attract the attention of planning and distribution bodies," the commission's chairman Gennadiy Kiselev told TASS.

In their speeches the deputies touched upon different categories of trade deficit. They demanded concrete answers to the question: What is the cause and who is to blame? Many deputies believe that one of the primary shortcomings is a lack of proper demand from those who are responsible for the manufacture of consumer goods. Some deputies pointed out economic causes. One of them is that enterprises, at least many of them, are not interested in implementing intensive plans. The deputies made proposals on how to involve all capacities in production and set the reserve in motion.

The commission set up by the USSR Supreme Soviet to consider the privileges enjoyed by some categories of Soviet people held an organisational meeting Friday.

Supreme Soviet Committees, Commissions Meet

LD2807174689 Moscow TASS in English 1732 GMT 28 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 28 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent:

Under the established procedure, Friday at the first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet is allotted to the work of the committees and commissions of the two chambers of the Soviet parliament.

At its first session today the parliamentary Committee on the Ecology and Rational Utilisation of the Natural Resources made the decision to prepare for the next Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR (it will, evidently, take place late this year) a draft document on ways to solve urgent ecological problems faced by the country. Among the proposed measures it suggests freezing large projects in the mining industry, power engineering and petrochemistry.

The planning, budgetary and financial commission of the Council of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet today set to itself the task to sort out in the complex situation that has formed in capital construction.

Projects have been built in the country for a long time and by outdated methods. This is proved by the size of incomplete construction: It amounted to 150 billion rubles in 1988. Deputies emphasised the importance of the correct choice of priorities in capital distribution, the need to avoid strategic mistakes which will make themselves felt in two to three years on the development of the country's critical economic complexes.

Cheap justice costs dearly—this aphorism keynoted the discussion of the draft law on judges' status and also proposals for improving the material status of the employees of courts, Procurator's Office and justice at the joint session of two parliamentary committees—on questions of legislation, law and order, and on questions of openness for citizens' rights and appeals.

Speakers during the debate pointed out that low salaries of judges, justice and Procurator's Office employees spark off the outflow of personnel, lowering law enforcement bodies' competence and capacity for work. The committees hold that the government should find funds to improve the material status of justice employees. They see one way to achieve this in raising judicial duties which in the USSR are significantly lower than in many other countries.

Further on Supreme Soviet Committee Work
LD2807224889

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service at 1700 GMT on 28 July in its "Vremya" newscast carries a 7-minute video report from special correspondent Sergey Medvedev on the work being conducted 28 July in various USSR Supreme Soviet committeess and commissions.

In the committee dealing with the work of the local soviets and with the development of government and self-government, Comrade Kolbin presented for consideration the candidacy of Toktogul Bekbolotovich Chilebayev as deputy chairman of the People's Control Committee. The deputies unanimously voted to recommend him for the post, but there was a keen discussion in the committee over the character of the People's Control Committee. Video shows Kolbin addressing the committee.

Medvedev interviews Deputy G.E. Burbulis from Sverdlovsk who says that the People's Control Committee has traditionally been a defender of the command and administrative system of government. This needs changing, he says.

Medvedev goes on to report that today the Commission on Labor, Prices, and Social Policy discussed a deputy's proposal that work collectives be granted the right to establish a 40-hour work week and a minimum 24-day holiday. In an interview V.A. Shubin, a deputy from Chita, praises the proposal but says that the Ministry of Finance is against the proposal, displaying the old thinking in this regard.

The Commission on Consumer Goods, Trade, Municipal, and Other Services analyzed the reasons for the very serious lag behind the plans in the first 6 months for consumer goods output. It was decided to set about work on new legislative acts to find a way out of this position of impasse. Video shows deputies at work.

Commssion Notes 'Secret Protocols' of 1939 Pact
LD2907131989 Moscow World Service in English 0310 GMT 29 Jul 89

[Text] Among the commissions the First Congress of People's Deputies set up to solve a number of important social problems was one to study the 1939 Soviet-German nonaggression pact in political and legal terms. The commission was instructed to find out whether any secret protocols had been signed together with the pact—a point that has been subject to heated debates both in this country and elsewhere in Europe lately.

Vycheslav Terekhov of our staff has asked commission member Maryu Lauristin to decribe the commission's performance:

[Begin recording, in Russian with superimposed English translation] [Lauristin] The work of our commission is drawing to a close. We have studied heaps of documents offered us by the Communist Party's Central Committee, the Foreign Ministry and a number of research institutes and have made a preliminary conclusion. The overwhelming majority of commission members concluded that the Soviet-German treaty of 1939 violated the principles of Soviet foreign policy spelt out by the founder of the Soviet state Lenin. The treaty breached the sovereignty of third countries. More than that, the commission has no doubts whatsoever that secret protocols to it did exist for sure, so we decided it was necessary to familiarize the Soviet people with the protocols' copies. Considering the unlawful nature of the documents, we believe they need to be declared invalid.

[Terekhov] The commission did not find the authentic texts of the secret protocols and yet what fact makes it admit that the protocols had existed?

[Lauristin] The copies of the protocols and all the available authentic documents related to them were analyzed, and this played an important role. Besides, evidence of their existence was discovered in the archives of the former German Embassy in Moscow. These protocols are mentioned even in the Nuremburg trial materials and in many other archive papers beyond our reach. On the strength of this, the commission members and experts do not doubt their existence. We

are now to draw up an official document on the commission's decision and forward it to experts for scrutiny, and then all these materials are to be submitted at the second Congress of People's Deputies. [end recording]

And I'd like to add here that the second Congress of People's Deputies will be held in the autumn.

Committee Chairman Interviewed on Security Issues
LD3007011389 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1930 GMT 29 Jul 89

[Interview with Vladimir Lavrentyevich Lapygin, chairman of the Committee for Defense and State Security Questions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, by Vladimir Molchanov; date and place of interview not given; first two paragraphs are an introduction; from the "Before and After Midnight" program presented by Vladimir Molchanov]

[Text] [Molchanov] The problems of state security both worry and interest many people. Until recently we satisfied our interest mainly through detective stories, but times are changing. On our last program, the chairman of the Committee for State Security appeared on television for the first time. Today we continue this topic with a person who was recently elected chairman of the Committee for Defense and State Security Questions of the USSR Supreme Soviet. He is Vladimir Lavrentyevich Lapygin.

Let me begin by introducing you in greater detail. You are a doctor of technical sciences, a professor, and an expert in the guidance of intercontinental ballistic missiles and space equipment. The honors you hold—if I may name them—are the Lenin prize, state prize, and hero of socialist labor. I think I have named them all.

[Lapygin] Yes, that is all of them.

[Molchanov] In connection with your election as chairman of the committee, have you had to abandon your scientific work, or are you continuing with it?

[Lapygin] I am continuing for the time being, bearing in mind that the period of time that I have at my disposal before the start of a session and after the end of a session is limited, and assuming that actual sessions of the committee itself permit it.

[Molchanov] Don't you think that in the defense area today we have far more unjustified secrets and secrecy than genuinely justified state secrets?

[Lapygin] I think that is so, because it was only comparatively recently that we tackled this matter in earnest and in a businesslike way, and it has to be noted that today is the era of glasnost, and glasnost means that there should be no secrets, within reasonable limits. Glasnost is in considerable measure making all leaders careful from the point of view of these ideals.

[Molchanov] Here is just one example. I don't know if this is a secret, but to this day we do not know the number of generals who serve in the Soviet Army, and there is even talk that in the past year alone more generals retired from our Army than there are in the whole U.S. Army.

[Lapygin] I must say that I have not taken a specific interest in this matter. We have not gotten to that yet, so to speak. But when we are considering our Army's budget, the maintenance of our Army, we are going to have to pay particular attention to this matter because I have heard it said that we have more generals now than there were in the great fatherland war.

[Molchanov] What is your position on the involvement of the Army in resolving conflicts inside the country.

[Lapygin] Our attitude at the congress and in the Supreme Soviet was fairly precisely formulated, all in all: the Army should not be used to resolve interethnic conflicts, or any other conflicts associated with our domestic affairs.

[Molchanov] I would like to ask you in slightly greater detail about your capacities in your new function as chairman of the committee. Do you have the right to summon, say, the KGB chairman or the minister of defense, and require him to give an account of himself to you?

[Lapygin] As chairman?

[Molchanov] As chairman.

[Lapygin] Yes, as chairman, I consider that I have the right to invite any head of a ministry or industry relating to matters under the jurisdiction of the Committee for Defense and State Security Questions to see me to talk things over or to attend the committee. This is all the more so because we considered these candidacies in our committee and in our decision we gave appropriate assessments and we recommended the Supreme Soviet to confirm them in the relevant posts. I think that we have no friction or misunderstandings on anything else on that score. We have ordinary, normal, businesslike relations.

[Molchanov] What impression did the speech by the defense minister at the Supreme Soviet session make on you? What I mean is, did you not feel that he was less frank and self-critical than, say, the KGB chairman, who also addressed the session?

[Lapygin] No doubt that is so, but in his speech I would say that he delineated a fairly detailed picture of the Army, particularly the structure of the Army and the transition to a defensive initiative, so to speak, to

defense sufficiency, and reductions in the Armed Forces. He set all this out in quite a detailed way. I would say that I and the members of the committee had no complaints about this.

With regard to his replies to the questions, I think that the main question to which Dmitriy Timofeyevich replied, and most importantly, took measures unsuccessfully was on cutting the Army by 175,000, meaning the former students of higher educational establishments. Here, evidently, he was, shall we say sparing, bearing in mind that in the Army this is naturally a serious measure, this departure of the skilled members, of soldiers and sergeants. I would say that here he did not demonstrate the appropriate flexibility he should have.

[Molchanov] A problem worrying millions of people in our country and of extreme concern to our program is access to archives. Our program has repeatedly run features relating to people's deaths in the years of the Stalinist terror. What can you tell us? When will we finally be given access to these archives.

[Lapygin] I cannot give an informed reply to that quetsion. We have simply not yet gotten to the archives.

[Molchanov] Then let me ask a final question. You are the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Questions. Does it not seem to you that the special services of countries with different social systems could today sometimes, by acting together, do very much that is useful both for improving relations between states, and generally speaking, for creating a more stable situation in the world?

[Lapygin] As far as the KGB is concerned, this question was, in fact, put to Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov when he was addressing the Supreme Soviet session to be confirmed in the post of chairman of the KGB. He expressed the point of view—and I agree with and support it, and the committee supports it—that today we have to embark on this sort of international cooperation. He is currently involved in this matter and his committee is involved in it as well. This, all told, is very promising from the point of view of direct work and the results of work, and naturally, on the other hand, this also serves a rapprochment and mutual understanding among peoples, not just our friends, but also countries where there is another form of ownership. I believe that this cooperation of all nations will assist things.

[Molchanov] Many thanks for talking to us.

Chairman of Legal Committee Interviewed

PM1107112589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Jul 89 Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with S.S. Alekseyev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order, by L. Shinkarev under the rubric "In the USSR Supreme Soviet": "Living by the Law"—first paragraph is introduction; place, date of interview not given]

[Text] Sergey Sergeyevich Alekseyev, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Urals Department Institute of Philosophy and Law, has been elected chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order. He is 65 years old, took part in the Patriotic War, and has a wife, two daughters, and five grandchildren. While he is working in Moscow he will continue on a voluntary basis (unpaid) as director of the institute which he set up, where he has many students and to which he intends to return every time he gets an opportunity.

[Shinkarev] I must admit that I doubt the ability of the 40 deputies who make up the committee, half of whom are not lawyers, to sort out at a stroke such neglected spheres of statehood as legislation, legality, and law and order...

[Alekseyev] The words which you have uttered are not the harshest assessment of the actual situation. I would put it more bluntly: We must begin making laws virtually from scratch. Forgive me, but there were no civilized laws in the country's history. Perhaps with the exception of the 1922 Civil Code, which dated back to prerevolutionary times. We have to assess the situation soberly, determining for ourselves the main factor. We see this as precisely legislation based on world legal culture and Soviet practice.

We shall solve nothing until we have modern civilized legislation. Working groups formed as part of the subcommittees on the main areas—political reform, economic reform, legal reform, and legality and order—will deal directly with it. Here we intend to involve prominent lawyers, economists, and sociologists... Previously participation by scholars in formulating laws was quite unusual. We were told to make rough drafts, which then disappeared without trace. Then we were asked for findings on the draft laws. Scholars sweated away, but in 99 cases out of 100 their proposals were ignored. We watched with amazement and helplessness while the all-powerful apparatus paved the way for its own feeble legal acts.

Today legal scholars are participating for the first time in the work of the supreme representative organs. In the committee we have three corresponding members of the USSR Academy of Sciences, two doctors of juridical sciences, professors who head major higher educational institution departments, and other experienced lawyers, including young ones. They would never have come here if they had not sensed the opportunity for genuine professional work resulting in important practical decisions. Our motto is "All hands on deck," to involve people with a constructive turn of mind in formulating the laws. There are many lawyers in the country with degrees, titles, and positions. But we know who's who.

[Shinkarev] And if you succeed in this, when, for a start, could we have a fundamental law setting out once and for all equal responsibility between the individual and the state?

[Alekseyev] At the Congress I said that the Constitution is seen as a high-class legal document which ensures society's free development and each person's rights. Even if it is very short, its bright, clear provisions must be calculated not for 10 years, not for 50 years, but for centuries. Principles should be formulated in such a way that no one even thinks of changing them. Laws can change—but not the fundamental law. I think that 1 year or 18 months will be required for serious work on it.

The law, I want to repeat, like an invention, like any achievement of the human mind, must be created by talented people. There are few major acts in law's history, and all of them are associated with a specific person—The Code of Hammurabi, the Code of Napoleon... Both were created by small groups of lawyers. Proper laws cannot be created by large collectives. Because if many people participate, each person will introduce his own contribution and we will pack the draft law with everything that anyone wants. And now that we are so unfettered and want to enshrine our opinion without fail, even the most superb document can be turned into something formless...

[Shinkarev] IZVESTIYA readers ask whether there aren't fears that the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Questions of Legal Policy led by V.M. Chebrikov may to some degree fetter the committee's work?

[Alekseyev] Our relations are determined by the directives of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union Party Conference, which provide for the party's vanguard role in society. The Central Committee Commission deals with formulating legal policy and political concepts of the most important legislative acts. The actual legislation, which must be the job of professionals, is the function of the parliamentary committee. We are sure that there must be the closest cooperation between the Central Committee Commission and the Supreme Soviet Committee. The Committee must take into account the strategic directions formulated by the Central Committee Commission, and the Central Committee Commission will rely on existing realities, including the laws adopted by parliament.

[Shinkarev] Incidentally, many laws, even the best, are gutted by often "secret" departmental acts, which are essentially uncontrolled and do not allow society to rise above the state...

[Alekseyev] Of course, a law must be an act which has direct application and must specifically resolve life's situations so that they do not require additions in the form of departmental ordinances. But, in getting carried away by condemning instructions, we create the illusion that all we have to do is sweep them away and everything will be fine. While the monopoly-centralized economy and the administrative-edict system of management consonant with it exist, instructions are inevitable. They may be concealed, as the State Bank once tried to do when it started to distribute the same old instructions under the name of "regulations." The stream of instructions will really dwindle with the implementation of the economic reform, restructuring of socialist ownership relations, and decentralization of the management of economic structures.

The other side of the coin is that the series of disasters, which have increased in frequency recently and reduce us all to a state of shock, always involves a breach of an instruction. There are prescriptions which should be observed to the very last detail. Otherwise pipelines will burst as at Ufa and ships collide as at Novorossiysk.

[Shinkarev] Readers also ask whether it is proposed to have subdivisions in the committee which will keep their finger on the pulse of events such as those which occurred at Novyy Uzen?

[Alekseyev] The supreme organ of power lays down the ideas and principles which law enforcement organs must follow. We are not in a position to interfere in their operational work. Is the committee yet another monitoring institution? I think that this is not a parliamentary function. I have to explain the committee's function to many people who call me or who wait at the entrance to the "Moskva" Hotel with complaints about law enforcement organs' work.

Our task, we in the committee think, is to formulate a nationwide program to combat crime and to ratify it as a parliamentary one. It must be comprehensive—it must embrace not only the law enforcement organs but also cultural, educational and economic departments.

[Shinkarev] At the Congress you advocated the creation of system which would accord with the standards of a rule-of-law state. In your view, which of these standards is capable of preventing our nascent democracy from degenerating into someone's or some kind of dictatorship once again?

[Alekseyev] I do not think that the laws in themselves can prevent the emergence of the Stalinist phenomena which we experienced: the consolidation of authoritarian power, the repressive apparatus' lack of control, and people's complete defenselessness before the totalitarian state... In general, the 1936 Constitution was not bad, all kinds of rights were enshrined in it—inviolability of the person, cases to be heard by courts, and so on—but so what?

Whether the country has a democratic or authoritarian power depends entirely on the economy, however odd it may seem to you. A rule-of-law state is impossible with a bureaucratic centralized economy. That economy requires centralized power and takes no notice of barriers in the form of laws. Our generation has had plenty of bitter opportunities to realize this.

Of course, the political and moral atmosphere in society also means a lot. Why was it so easy for Stalin to make the switch to personal dictatorship in the late twenties? Society still lived by the ideas of the civil war and forcible methods of implementing tasks, and the switch to authoritarian methods of running the country was in some degree logical at that time.

I think that the main concern now is to make the economy a decentralized, mixed, self-regulating economy that does not require a great authoritarian power. And then, of course, to work out laws which incorporate the idea of the separation of power and prevent the possibility of an excessive concentration of it. As indicated at the Congress, it was not for this that the party and people began the difficult work of democratization, glasnost, and our society's renewal. I hope that we will be able to incorporate these principles in the draft laws on which we are about to begin work. If we are talking about my personal position... My 92-year-old father, who participated in the civil war, is still alive, he spent 10 years in the camps at Kolyma. So I have my own family scores to settle with the totalitarian regime.

Supreme Soviet Member on Economic Reforms

AU1007135689 Vienna DER STANDARD in German 10 Jul 89 p 19

[Speech given by Pavel Bunich, chairman of the Reform Committee of the Supreme Soviet, member of the Academy of Sciences, and member of the Congress of People's Deputies, at Dialogue Congress in Alpbach, entitled "Western Europe—Soviet Union: Those Who Run Faster Should Live Better;" date not given]

[Text] In areas where perestroyka was vigorously launched we have achieved significant results. First of all, I would like to mention foreign policy. In this sphere, success is most obvious. Second, quite a lot has been achieved in the democratization of public life, where we have already completed the first phase. It is difficult to say how many more phases lie ahead of us. However, in areas where perestroyka was impeded from the beginning, we are facing a crisis. This applies to our economy in particular.

Beautiful Words Do Not Help

The old economic mechanisms, which no longer work, and the new ones which are purely cosmetic and consist only of beautiful words, do not lead us out of the crisis; they only make it worse.

The only measure we have adopted so far to accelerate our economy has been to speed up the bank note printing machines. A mere 25 percent of every ruble is covered by goods.

The rest might slumber peacefully in bank accounts if people were not afraid of price increases which were originally planned and finally postponed, and of rumors which have repeatedly surfaced in our country about an imminent monetary reform.

As a result, we have lost control over money. People take and buy everything, no matter whether they need it or not.

This has led to an emergency situation which must be eliminated now. For this reason the Congress of People's Deputies finally decided to accelerate the drafting of a package of laws, three of which will probably be adopted by the end of this year: Legislation on leases, a tax law—so far our enterprises have not been subject to taxation, but taxes will be imposed in the future—and finally a law on profit-oriented management.

This whole package must be adopted at the same time. The laws must be designed to promote the working people's interest in work and to develop an accounting system that ensures cost recovery.

The introduction of an accounting system that ensures full recovery of the costs is the dictate of the hour. We have already wasted a lot of time.

To make up for this, it is necessary for us to achieve more than is usually required. The extraordinary measures resulting from the radical economic reforms are to be understood in this spirit. In this way, we cannot only treat the disease, but we can even heal it over the long term.

At the same time we need extraordinary measures that have an immediate impact. We must cut our programs considerably, because our budget deficit has reached the astronomic figure of 19 percent.

As a result of the improvement of our economy—let me emphasize this idea—the centripetal forces between the individual republics of our country will increase, and the economic basis of nationalism will disappear, nationalism whose development I consider to be the worst manifestation of the crisis in our country.

If we introduce a modern economic policy in our country, we may succeed in achieving a living standard that will certainly not be as high as that of Sweden, the United States, or of Austria, but which will feed our people and provide housing and clothes. What is even more important, we might be able to offer the population prospects for the future, as a result of which the centrifugal forces will turn into centripetal forces.

Our path is clear, there is no alternative, we cannot return to the command economy. We must discover the United States anew, discover the Western economic system, which is tailor-made for us in many respects

because all human experiences have been realized in this system, and where progress and—let me add this—a tendency toward socialism can be observed.

I believe that all countries and all systems are headed toward socialism, but nobody knows who will arrive first: civilized capitalism or uncivilized socialism.

Civilized Socialism

I think that chances for civilized socialism would be great to reach the goal that mankind has set itself within a relatively short period. This socialism is sometimes called democratic socialism, sometimes market socialism. True socialism can only be democratic and market-oriented. Therefore, it is not necessary to add the words "democratic" or "market." Nobody uses the term "market capitalism."

The revival of the state sector will be the main instrument of our perestroyka. The Supreme Soviet has started to draft a uniform law for enterprises which will be valid both for state and cooperative enterprises.

This law must replace all previous relatively inefficient laws on which our state enterprises are based. The basic difference is that cooperatives generally rely on capital from the population, whereas state enterprises live on the means they receive from the state. This state capital must be let on lease.

Thus, all state enterprises will first become enterprises that are held on lease. Over the long term, they will be converted into state stock corporations, into state cooperative enterprises. If an enterprise takes capital on lease, if it increases this capital through its work, the profit will belong to the employees. If the enterprises purchase what has been leased to them, ownership will pass to the employees.

The Congress of People's Deputies has also adopted another decision. According to the old regulations, the land belongs to the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, and peasants who want to lease such land must beg the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, and will still not receive it.

The entire land will now be given to the local authorities, and they will lease the land, both to kolkhozes and to individual persons. The term of indefinite lease will be introduced for the first time. Various forms of ownership will exist side by side in our country:

—"property of the union" which will definitely be let on lease;

—"property of the republics" (the three Baltic Republics have already submitted this proposal);

—"property of the community" which will also be leased and which can be purchased;

—"property of cooperatives"—a form that already exists, but whose existence is constantly in danger; and

—"individual ownership."

I personally do not exclude the introduction of a certain extent of paid labor as well as ownership by socialist and capitalist partners, and ultimately also purely foreign ownership, particularly in the field of the economy.

Stress Is Useful

We often hear that such a system will lead to stress for the people or even to bankruptcies. I would like to point out that, according to Silyev, stress is man's natural condition.

Stagnant water dies more quickly than flowing water. Man's natural condition is stress.

What will happen if bankruptcies occur? People do bad work if they are given life belts by the state. However, if nobody provides help, only a few will drown.

Man has the natural ability to swim. For this reason, he must swim, otherwise he will even forget how to walk. So if somebody drowns, let him drown. This will only make us stronger. The most important thing is to create conditions whereby those who run faster will live better than those who do not move.

This means that important functions cannot be fulfilled by the market, or are only insufficiently fulfilled by the market. We need the state to correct these shortcomings. What is important is that the state takes care only of the deficiencies, and that this is being done by applying economical methods.

Oktyabrskaya Railroad Leaders on Strike Threat

PM3007170089 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Jul 89 Second Edition p 6

[PRAVDA correspondent N. Volynskiy report: "It Is Dangerous To Argue on the Rails: Briefing Held by Leaders of the Oktyabrskaya Railroad"]

[Text] Leningrad—The briefing by the Oktyabrskaya Railroad administration ended unexpectedly. "Let this conversation remain, so to speak, for official use," some people proposed. They were vigorously supported by administration chief A. Zaytsev.

What secrets were imparted to the journalists? The secrets of the debates that have been in progress for several days now about the Oktyabrskaya Railroad. The calls that have been made for a strike by railmen.

A. Zaytsev was telling us what measures are being taken to somehow prevent this exceptionally dangerous action, which is fraught with the risk of real disaster for the Northwestern Economic Region. Suffice it to say, as the

railmen's newspaper OKTYABRSKAYA MAGISTRAL writes, that a strike by engineers means stopping plants and causing chaos in our everyday life. "It will instantly affect every inhabitant..."

It cannot be denied that it is necessary to appeal to people's minds and hearts. But one wonders whether the leaders have understood what is actually prompting the railmen to think about a strike. Points from the demands of various collectives were read at the briefing. Engineers, controllers, and operators do not even have the opportunity to eat properly during the shift. There are unjustified differences in the remuneration of workers at different stations. And where is the trade union in all this? Why was it not the trade union but unknown activists who submitted these demands to the administration?

Worldwide experience shows that on the railroad, relations and order should be almost military. After all, railmen have the fate of practically the whole country in their hands. If we look at world experience, we see: In many civilized countries transport strikes are strictly prohibited by law.

So, as we can see, the two sides have something to talk about. Only not on the rails, but at the side of the tracks. It is dangerous to argue on the rails, it is not the place for it....

Official on Railroad Problems

PM3007182289 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Jul 89 Morning Edition p 6

[Interview with V.N. Ginko, USSR first deputy minister of railways, by R. Lynev following Moscow conference of railroad collectives: "Good Will, Common Sense"—date of interview not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] A 2-day conference of representatives of the labor collective councils of all 32 of the country's railroads, held at the USSR Ministry of Railways in Moscow, ended on 28 July. The participants discussed questions of the railmen's work and living conditions.

[Lynev] And were there many such questions?

[Ginko] Hundreds. And of all kinds: From housing maintenance to pensions. And they came within the jurisdiction of various departments: local soviets, the ministry, the government. We recorded all these requests and wishes, sorted out who must do what, and reached general agreement on that.

[Lynev] What must be done locally is clear. But what is up to the government?

[Ginko] We are asking the government to review questions of pensions and remuneration for a number of categories of our workers, first and foremost engineers and workers who work on the tracks, among whom, to our general shame, there are many women, because men will not do it on account of the low pay.

[Lynev] Our editorial office has received reports from our correspondents that in recent days on the Donetsk Railroad and at Orsha Station near Vitebsk railmen were called on to strike. What do you know about that?

[Ginko] There were indeed such attempts. But it was not our people who tried this, it was members of the so-called Democratic Union who arrived from Moscow. As far as I know, the workers sent them packing. Because what does it mean to stop the railroad? Even when virtually the whole of Poland was on strike, the railmen went on working, realizing that a stoppage would mean general disaster.

[Lynev] But all the same, are there any hitches in the railmen's work today?

[Ginko] There are, distressing as it is. These hitches include conflicts on the basis of nationality. I will tell you frankly that because of these, the line between Abkhaziya and Georgia is still operating at far from its full capacity. Trains travel under guard. In recent days the rail link between Baku and Yerevan was again broken, as in the fall...

[Lynev] And what final conclusions did the participants in the conference at the Ministry of Railways reach?

[Ginko] After setting forth their justified complaints and receiving guarantees of their satisfaction, they adopted an appeal to all workers in the sector, the purpose of which is simple: The railroad must work reliably. Especially during these busy days, when the most important and crucial freight is on the move—grain. And in general, all of us today, I believe, must understand more clearly than ever: You can only distribute, and only transport, what has been produced.

Further on Unrest, Violence in Abkhaziya Region

27 Jul Situation Detailed

LD2807123489 Moscow TASS in English 1208 GMT 28 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 28 TASS—By TASS correspondent Nikita Demidov:

Factories in the Autonomous Republic of Abkhaziya are returning to normal work, according to the Soviet Interior Ministry.

Eighty-seven of the 101 enterprises worked on Thursday, while the rest were idle mostly due to shortages of raw materials and erratic fuel supplies.

Twenty-two trains, including eleven passenger trains, left Sukhumi station on the same day, while Aeroflot airlines made as many outbound flights with 1,535 passengers.

But the situation in a number of areas remains tense. A total of 47 people were detained on Thursday for curfew and other special regulation violations.

A patrol consisting of cadets from the Interior Ministry's Higher School in Novosibirsk came under fire at night in the village of Vladimirovka in Gulripshi district. The assailant, who was armed with a hunting rifle, was apprehended.

Forty-five minutes later a military patrol was ambushed in the same village. As the gunman ignored verbal warnings, demands to surrender and shots in the air, an attempt was made to capture him. In the ensuing struggle the man was killed.

R. Kalaidzhan, 27, who escaped from a detention centre in the town of Zugdidi on July 16, turned himself in voluntarily in the same district on Thursday.

Militia operatives tracked down and arrested an inhabitant of the village of Chlou, Ochamchiri district, in Gudauta district on Wednesday. He confessed that on July 21 he killed two cadets of the Interior Ministry's Leningrad Higher Political School. A hunting rifle and spent cartridges were confiscated from the man.

An unauthorised rally, organised by the so-called "National Democratic Party of Georgia", was held in front of the Trade Union Palace in Tbilisi on Wednesday evening to discuss events in Abkhaziya. Speakers called for a "Georgian disobedience" campaign starting from August 15.

Unauthorised rallies took place on Thursday evening in other parts of the city, including plazas in front of the cinema house and the Tbilisi City Communist Party Committee, to discuss the so-called "Abkhazian issue". The rally outside the cinema house was addressed by Georgian Interior Minister Shota Gorgadze.

An attempt was made on Wednesday night to penetrate a guarded area enclosing military warehouses, during which a shot was fired at a sentry. The case is being investigated.

TASS Notes 'Tension' in Region

LD2807180689 Moscow TASS in English 1754 GMT 28 Jul 89

[Text] Sukhumi July 28 Gruzinform-TASS—There have appeared signs of normalisation in the Autonomous Republic of Akbkhaziya as the railway station and airport in its capital Sukhumi restore their operations to usual levels.

But tension still persists, with only 63 of 101 Abkhazian factories back at work fully and another 24 partially.

The militia are continuing to explain the situation to the people and persuade them to turn in weapons. In the past 24 hours 81 firearms and 33 kilograms of explosives were confiscated from the populace.

The Georgian public Prosecutor's Office and Interior Ministry are conducting investigations into 217 criminal cases registered over these days.

Situation Said 'Stabilizing'

LD2907073689 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0645 GMT 29 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow, 29 July (TASS)—According to data from the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, the situation in Abkhaziya—the autonomous republic that is part of Georgia—is stabilizing. Meetings of working people took place in a number of the republic's towns and villages on Friday, at which there were demands for persons who have taken part in instigating hostility between the Azkhazian and Georgian peoples to be brought to justice.

The bodies of law and order detained one person who had earlier escaped from a prison in Zugdidi, and another person voluntarily turned himself in at the internal affairs agency. Eighty-five people were detained in the course of 24 hours for violations of the special regime. The most serious incident in Abkhaziya took place yesterday in Gantiadi, where unknown persons detonated a home-made bomb in the street. Nobody was injured.

About 500 people gathered in the evening in Tbilisi at the House of Cinema and conducted an unsanctioned meeting that discussed the question of withdrawal of troops from Georgian territory and the creation of national troop formations. There were proposals that the republic leave the USSR.

Givi Gumbaridze, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party, met and held a conversation with Tsereteli and Gamsakhurdiya, members of the People's Front of Georgia, who were present at the meeting.

'Normalization' of Situation Noted

PM2907171089 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jul 89 Second Edition p 4

[GRUZINFORM-TASS report: "Too Soon for Complacency"]

[Text] Sukhumi, 28 Jul—Signs of a normalization of the situation have appeared in the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The Sukhumi City railroad station and airport are returning to their everyday work

pace. In the last 24 hours, 22 trains were dispatched, half of which were passenger trains, as well as 3 local electric trains. There were also 22 flights.

All the same, tension persists. Of Abkhaziya's 101 industrial enterprises, only 63 are fully operating, and 24 partially.

As a result of measures to investigate the killing of Senior Lieutenant V. Novikov and Cadet V. Akopov in Otap village, a resident of the village of Chlou in Ochamchirskiy Rayon was arrested under suspicion of this crime.

Law enforcement organs are working to locate and confiscate weapons from the population. In the last 24 hours, 3 submachine guns, 4 pistols, 2 rifles, 72 hunting rifles, and 33 kg of explosives were confiscated in Abkhaziya.

The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic Prosecutor's Office and internal affairs organs have instituted criminal proceedings in 217 cases of robbery, gangster attacks, acts of hooliganism, murder, unlawful possession of firearms, and other cases.

Handing in of Guns Slows

LD2907230389 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 29 Jul 89

[Text] [Announcer] And now for the situation in Abkhaziya, where special conditions governing the behavior of citizens have been introduced because of the aggravation of interethnic relations. But before we hear the report by our special correspondent, I would like to quote Valentin Rasputin, the well-known Soviet-Russian writer: Mankind is given color and enriched by nations in order to learn from one another, to feast one's eyes upon another, and to stretch out to one another with a thirst for beauty and discovery. I would like to use those words as a preface to the report from Leonid Lazarevich, our special correspondent from Sukhumi. We know that lately the thirst for beauty and discovery has alas been dulled in that region. Let us hear the report please:

[Lazarevich] Life in Abkhaziya is slowly returning to normal. There are many people walking along the front this Saturday in Sukhumi. Once again excursions are coming here from Sochi and other resorts in Russia. It is difficult for those coming here to understand why there are patrols carrying submachineguns and armored transport vehicles patrol these outwardly calm streets. They do not understand that the equilibrium and peace that have been achieved are extremely fragile and insecure. And they do not know that out of the 5,500 firearms that have been seized by the people, about 1,500 guns have been handed over. Here is a recording I made on one of my trips:

[Begin recording] [Lazarevich] There is a real arms dump in the office of (Tor Nikolayevich) [name indistinct], head of the Gudautskiy rayon militia department. Here there are Shpagin submachineguns, Degtyarev submachineguns, and carbines. Over there I see some Tokarev Tula pistols. (Tor Nikolayevich), where do these weapons come from?

[Militia chief] All of these weapons were returned by the people after a meeting of the rayon's party aktiv.

[Lazarevich] During the sad events of 15-16 [July] they were seized from the militarized guards.

[Militia chief] As of today, 172 weapons have been handed in, including 148 shotguns and 24 combat weapons.

[Lazarevich] As I understand it, weapons have been handed over on a primarily voluntary basis. Only four items were confiscated by militia personnel.

[Militia chief] Quite right. But there are also rifles that were taken from the population during the first days following the well-known events. Those cases are being investigated and the people from whom they were taken will be brought to justice.

[Lazarevich] According to the documents that have been drawn up, I see that the last weapons were handed in yesterday. So far you have not received anything today.

[Militia chief] Unfortunately not one weapon has been handed in today.

[Lazarevich] A very alarming sign, fewer weapons are handed in now than a week ago. During the past 24 hours, just 60 guns have been handed in. Let me remind you: More than 4,000 firearms remain in the hands of the population. Many people believe that they are holding on to them for self-defense. But recent events show what this can lead to. Fear and mutual distrust can lead to new tragedy and that must not happen. [end recording]

Interior Ministry: Situation 'Tense'

LD3007091689 Moscow TASS in English 0857 GMT 30 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 30 TASS—The situation in the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic (the Black Sea coast of the Republic of Georgia) continues to be tense, the Soviet Interior Ministry Press Centre reported today. Forty one people were detained for the violation of a special regime.

As a result of measures taken by Interior Ministry bodies, people are returning to the detention centre of the city of Zugdidi who were released from there by extremists.

Various informal organisations have become more active of late. A leaflet was found on July 29 in the city of Ochamchiri which set forth a statement of the so-called "People's Democratic Party" of Georgia

addressed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the Republic. It contains demands of a nationalistic and anti-Soviet character, threats and a provocative appeal to the population to hoard food and other essentials.

Official Discusses Investigation

LD3007214589 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 30 Jul 89

[Text] The tragic events of 15-16 July have left a very deep wound in the souls of all the inhabitants of Abkhaziya. This wound hurts and is creating a tense situation in the republic. The Procuracy of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] is conducting an investigation into these sad events. The specially created team is headed by (Konstantin Glebovich Maslov), procurator of its investigation department. Our correspondent Leonid Lazarevich interviewed him.

[Begin recording] [Lazarevich] Konstantin Glebovich, the different strata of the public here in Abkhaziya have different versions of the development of events. The different sides—and here, unfortunately, there are now sides—agree on only one thing: All the culprits in these tragic events must be punished. Can we count on this?

[(Maslov)] I would like to reply to this difficult question unequivocally. The procuracy of the Georgian SSR has set up an investigation group. The group is internationalist and includes investigators both from the Procuracy and from the Ministry of Internal Affairs from different regions of our country, and from the Procuracy of the Georgian SSR, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Georgian SSR, the Procuracy of the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR], and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Abkhaz ASSR. Every effort is being made, we are doing everything possible, to carry out a comprehensive and complete investigation of everything that has occurred in Abkhaziya.

[Lazarevich] A very great many people, virtually everyone, are saying that what happened here in Abkhaziya was not a coincidence. They say it was prepared and planned, and this means that there were specific organizers of some kind.

[(Maslov)] One should not jump to conclusions. As a professional, I have no right to do this. This is a very complex matter. The volume of the work we are conducting is enormous and I can say only one thing, that all the culprits must be punished. As for an evaluation, a political and legal evaluation of these events, we will make that later.

[Lazarevich] But work is, nonetheless, being conducted in this area too?

[(Maslov)] Undoubtedly, undoubtedly.

[Lazarevich] The similar cases that occurred in Sumgait, Stepanakert, Yerevan, and Baku were dealt with by the Procuracy of the Union. Now, this case is being dealt with by the Procuracy of the Georgian SSR,. As a result, part of the population of Abkhaziya is concerned that some of those under investigation will be treated in a biased manner.

[(Maslov)] It is probably no coincidence that I was entrusted with leading the investigation team. I was born in Tbilisi, but I am a Russian by nationality. I am an internationalist. And the composition of the team, which is divided into ten groups, includes persons of Abkhazian nationality. There are also Georgians, and about 40 representatives from the Russian Federation. And I believe that our fair attitude to everyone should not arouse any doubt in anyone. We will be objective, because in this complex matter we need to get right to the bottom, and all guilty parties must be punished, regardless of nationality, regardless of the post occupied.

Film Director Shengalaya on Tbilisi Demonstrations

AU3107094289 Vienna PROFIL in German 31 Jul 89 p 37

[Interview with Georgian film director Eldar Shengalaya by Alfred Schwarz in Tbilisi: "We Need More Parties"—date not given]

[Text] PROFIL: Mr Shengalaya, almost every day Georgians are now demonstrating in Tbilisi for their independence. They want to get away from Moscow. On the other hand, Abkhazians want to get away from Georgia because they feel oppressed. What do you propose as a solution?

Shengalaya: The Abkhazians should receive cultural and social autonomy. After all, Stalin created the conflict by forcing the peoples into these impossible state structures. The expression "our common home" is still being used for the Soviet Union. This reminds us of the times of lack of housing, when the homeless were crammed into common houses, common apartments. I think that each of our peoples should have its own name, where it can live according to its rules and its religions.

PROFIL: At a demonstration in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi on 9 April, 20 people were killed by the military with spades and poison gas. You are a member of a Supreme Soviet commission that investigates these events. What have you found out?

Shengalaya: In a military operation 200,000 people were removed from the city center within half an hour. In this process, lethal poison gas with long-lasting effects was used. Contrary to our Constitution, the government of the Republic of Georgia did not ask the USSR Supreme Soviet for a decision on the imposition of the state of emergency; such a decision was not made. Everything was done behind the scenes, as in Stalin's time.

PROFIL: What would have done so that something like this cannot happen again?

Shengalaya: At the moment, we do not yet have democratization but liberalization. This means that the structures remain the same and that only the scope of tolerance increases. What we really need is a multiparty system like in Europe.

PROFIL: But Mikhail Gorbachev is against this. Not even party rebel Boris Yeltsin dares to demand this openly.

Shengalaya: A multiparty system must come sooner or later. Otherwise, we will waste away here.

Stepanakert Rally Calls for Armenian Unification

NC3007105789 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1530 GMT 28 Jul 89

[Text] The ARMENPRES correspondent reports from Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] that thousands of people attended a rally that was held, with permission, in Stepanakert. The speakers expressed deep concern with the deferment of a political solution of the NKAO problem. They condemned the attempts of certain quarters to resolve the ethnic problems through terror and oppression. At the same time, the speakers pointed out that the destiny of a small nation aspiring to self-determination cannot be obstructed by constitutional contradictions. The right of national self-determination should override all other sentiments. The Armenian people of NKAO have already made their choice, which is the reunification of Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh] with Soviet Armenia; there can be no other alternative. The participants in the rally expressed the hope that the Supreme Soviet's commission will bring the day of the realization of the Artsakh people's dreams closer.

At the rally, criticism was leveled against the NKAO Special Administration Committee and the office of the commandant of the Special District, which so far have not been able to clear the stumbling blocks in the autonomous oblast.

A meeting took place in Stepanakert recently between Arkadi Volskiy, chairman of the NKAO Special Administration Committee, and Tigran Zhamkochyan, director of the American New Age trading company. A preliminary agreement has been reached on the establishment of a joint enterprise in the oblast.

Strike Committees End Estonian 'Political' Strikes

LD2807235189 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 28 Jul 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [V. Flyarkovskiy] [Video shows interior of Dvigatel works in Tallinn, followed by shots of group of people in the street] On 27 July, strikes continued at these enterprises in the city of Tallinn. By the middle of the day, some of them were declared warnings and were stopped. Even where the strikes continued, the sections of production that determine the viability of the enterprises themselves, and above all the life of the city and the republic, were in constant operation. The Dvigatel works, for example, continued producing oxygen designed for hospitals and agriculture. At practically all striking enterprises, the strike committees and the labor collectives adopted the following decision by the middle of the day: to begin work if representatives of the republic's leadership, leading bodies of strike committees and some public and political organizations—internationalist movement, (?labor collectives' councils) and others—sat down to negotiate. The Estonian Communist Party Central Committee bureau considered this decision and on the evening of 27 July this meeting took place. [Video shows people seated around a table.]

The strike committee made the following statement:

[Begin recording] [M.I. Lysenko, chairman of the republican strike committee, identified by caption] The republican council of the strike committee of enterprises has decided to suspend the political strike at the enterprises, I repeat to suspend, and to start working from 0600 on 28 July 1989 onward, and to follow the course of the negotiations. The strike committee is continuing its work. Once again we are calling labor collectives and all the working people to observe discipline and organization. Only by means of cohesive actions and by strengthening workers' solidarity will we be able to attain results in the battle for our rights. [Video shows a small group of people; woman holds a slogan printed in black letters, which says: We are demanding a democratic law on elections. Video then shows Lysenko reading out demands.] [end recording]

Strikers Positions Detailed

PM2807153789 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Jul 89 Morning Edition p 7

[Own correspondent L. Levitskiy report: "From Confrontation to Dialogue"]

[Text] IZVESTIYA has already written about the strike at a number of Tallinn's major enterprises. The excuse for the strike was provided by the [Estonian Supreme Soviet] session's discussion of the draft law on local soviet elections which, in many people's opinion, infringes on the rights of the nonindigenous population. But its roots lie in the buildup of insults and the lack of confidence in the future.

On Wednesday republic television gave the floor to M. Titma and N. Ganyushov, secretaries of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee. They also remarked: The nonindigenous population is insufficiently represented in the republic's political life.

Major plants are at a standstill. The stoppage of freight transport has affected the city's pace. Airmen from the Estonian Civil Aviation Administration have found a way of expressing their protest without making passengers suffer. Flights to all destinations are on schedule. Representatives of strike committees have not allowed uncontrolled elements to spill over into the city's streets and squares. Restraint has also been exercised by social movements and organizations representing the Estonian population. There have been no outbursts of interethnic conflicts. But isolated incidents have not been avoided altogether. Someone slashed the tires of bread trucks during the night. But the drivers did everything possible to deliver bread to stores and dining rooms, even though delays occurred.

The strike committees are raising with the republic's government questions about the methods used in lawmaking and the actual enforcement of the laws being adopted. On Thursday evening V. Vyalyas, first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, I. Toome, chairman of the Council of Ministers, and A. Almann, secretary of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, met representatives of the strike committees, the United Council of Labor Collectives, the International Movement, and the War Veterans and Internationalist Soldiers Section. These organizations held a rally in Tallinn 21 July (IZVESTIYA issue No 204). Unfortunately, I cannot give an eyewitness account of that meeting. Only representatives of the republic television and ETA were admitted to it. None of our colleagues from union publications was invited. Those who arrived there on their own initiative were advised to wait in the lobby until the talks ended. It must be noted that, on the previous day, the republic council of strike committees also ordered that correspondents not be admitted to striking enterprises. As if glasnost had also gone on strike.

M. Lysenko, deputy chairman of the republic council of strike committees, gave me the following explanation of the prevailing situation:

"Let me make it clear right away that the strike is not over, it has only been suspended until the end of the talks. I am very pleased that talks are under way. Make this clear as well: Attempts are now being made to depict our strike as an attack on the republic economic accountability program. This is a deliberate untruth, we support most of the Estonian self-management proposals. The aim of the strike is to achieve equality and protect the interests of the Russian-speaking population."

And here is the opinion of M. Titma, secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee:

"I am worried not so much by the economic damage resulting from the strike but by its consequences. Fortunately, it appears as if everyone has realized: Political strikes are not a method for conducting a political argument. We shall use more appropriate methods to conduct it."

And a report on the agreement reached at a meeting at the Central Committee: "A conference with the organizers of the 21 July 1989 rally was held at the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee 27 July. There was an exchange of opinions. As a result, it was decided to instruct A. Ryuytel, member of the Communist Party Central Committee Bureau and chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, to set up a commission to examine demands put forward at the rally and by the strike committees. The commission will begin its work 28 July."

Causes of Strike Viewed

PM2907200689 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jul 89 Second Edition p 4

["PRAVDA Ideology Department" article under the rubric "Fact and Commentary": "Seeking Compromise"]

[Text] They called us from Tallinn: "We have a strike here. The collectives of many enterprises are on strike. There are pickets at the factory gates..."

A strike is a two-edged weapon. It is only "unsheathed" at moments of despair, of a sense of futility and helplessness. Should people be condemned for that? We journalists cannot bring ourselves to do so... After all, people like People's Deputy V. Leonchev realize that a strike "is a two-edged sword. On the one hand, it helps us, on the other it strikes at us." Those who abandon their cutters and machine tools know that they and their families will have to tighten their belts—they are the very people who live from one pay envelope to the next. Nonetheless they leave their work. It means they have had enough, reached their limit...

We contacted M. Lysenko, deputy chief of the council of strike committees. He confirmed it: Yes, 32 enterprises, not all of them under union jurisdiction, have stopped completely or partially. That means tens of thousands of strikers. Talks are in progress with enterprises in other areas of the republic, we hope they will support us. He said this about the reasons for the strike:

"The strike committees have demanded that the draft Law on Elections to Local Soviets of People's Deputies, which discriminates against the Russian-speaking population, be removed from discussion at the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet session, and that it be radically revised, brought into line with the USSR Constitution, and only then resubmitted for wide discussion by the people.

"Furthermore, we demand the disbandment of the so-called 'Committees of Citizens of Estonia,' formed at the initiative of certain extremist organizations. We demand that proceedings be taken against the ideological inspirers and organizers of these unconstitutional formations.

"It is also necessary, in our view, to give a principled and lawful assessment of the demand of the council of representatives of the Estonian People's Front for the annulment of the 22 July 1940 Declaration, which amounts to an open call for the nonrecognition of Soviet power and the separation of Estonia from the USSR..."

And that is far from a full list of the strikers' demands. They categorically insist on the suspension of the Estonian SSR Law on Language until the resolution and implementation at government level of questions of finance, the training of teaching cadres, the preparation of methodological aids and textbooks, and the formation of a ramified network of state centers and courses for the study of the Estonian language. They propose the obligatory and equal participation in the formulation and coordination of draft laws of representatives of social organizations and movements reflecting the interests of the broadest strata of the population, including the United Council of Labor Collectives, Interdvizheniye [International Movement of Working People of the Estonian SSR], the Council of Veterans of the Great Patriotic War and Internationalist Servicemen, and the strike committees.

They express a lack of confidence in a number of local leaders because of their "inability and unwillingness to head socialist perestroyka in the republic and to seek and find ways of resolving urgent problems, including those in the sphere of interethnic relations."

At first the strikers disagreed on only one thing—whether to carry out a 24-hour warning strike, or an unlimited strike until all their demands are met. But in the end the strike committee decided: "To carry on to the end."

To carry on to the end... Certainly an unconditional position. But an ETA report was published indicating that the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet session has postponed the examination of the draft Law on Elections to Local Soviets of People's Deputies, with a view to returning to it in 2 weeks' time, giving deputies the opportunity once again to consult with voters and allowing the editorial commission to summarize the proposals and observations put forward at the session. That is, a quest for compromise is under way...

"We do not believe in anything any more. It is another tactical move," M. Lysenko broke in decisively. "The republican authorities, it seems to us, have simply decided to play for time and wait for the adoption of a Law on Strikes at the USSR Supreme Soviet session, so that then they can reject our demands on supposedly legal grounds and subsequently use the 'voting machine' to push through after all the draft they want, which discriminates against non-Estonians. There have been similar maneuvers before: First a patently unacceptable draft is published and discussed, such as the Law on Language, and then they supposedly make concessions to us at the session, introduce insignificant amendments, and vote by a majority—and in the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet, the majority is Estonian-speaking—for its ratification. But the essence of the discriminatory law remains..."

And so, the strike. As far as we know, no economic demands were made. This phenomenon is comparatively new to our country, especially a strike on the grounds of interethnic disagreements. However, whatever anyone may say, the roots of this political protest still lie in the material sphere. The political locomotive is firmly hitched to the economic train. The decline in living standards, unrestrained immigration to the republic, pressure from the union ministries and departments of the "era of stagnation"... All this prompted a wave of political and economic demands from the indigenous population, formulated in different ways by various social movements—from the People's Front to the ultraradical National Independence Party. These demands began to be translated rapidly into legislative acts: The Law on Language was adopted, draft laws on immigration and citizenship are in preparation.

The desire of every Estonian to be the master in his own historical homeland is natural and comprehensible. That is the legitimate right of every people, every nation. However, the 600,000-strong Russian-speaking population can hardly be called guests today—their hands created a significant proportion of the republic's national wealth, many of them have raised children and even grandchildren here. They belong to Estonia now, and this must be reckoned with. The points in certain draft laws that they regard as dubious arouse suspicion and distrust on their part. Are people trying to push them out of the land that they too now regard as their homeland? Does this not mask a desire to organize the "quiet" repatriation of certain inhabitants?

"Unfortunately, there are grounds for this anxiety," S. Petinov, deputy chairman of the United Council of Labor Collectives Executive Committee said. "The Law on Language, which set unrealistic time limits for mastering the Estonian language and does not have sufficient material backing at state level, is nonetheless coming into force. At a recent rally 'In Defense of the Rights of USSR Citizens,' USSR People's Deputy V. Yarovoy, director of the 'Dvigatel' plant and chairman of the United Council of Labor Collectives Presidium, explained that a 31 May 1989 resolution of the Estonian SSR State Committee for Labor and Social Questions and the Estonian Trade Unions Council stipulates the right to dismiss individual categories of workers who do not know Estonian to the required extent as being unsuited to their posts. And it would be all very well if this only applied to leadership workers. But even seamstresses (!) are only being taken on at a joint Estonian-Finnish enterprise on the condition that they know Estonian."

The draft Law on Elections to Local Soviets, he continued, stipulates a residence qualification not only for

candidate deputies, but also... for voters, and the formation of the electoral okrugs and nomination of candidates also violates the rights of the Russian-speaking population and labor collectives. The election campaign will exclude tens of thousands of nonindigenous inhabitants, servicemen... They will thereby be deprived of their civil and politcial rights.

The increasingly deep divisions on national lines and the confrontation have begun to take on extreme forms in the republic. National fundamentalists have begun to set up "committees of citizens of Estonia" with the aim, in the near future, of creating power structures as alternatives to the soviets and convening an All-Estonian Congress of 'pure' Estonians, so as to proclaim an independent Estonia and demand secession from the USSR.

In response, the most "inflexible" wing of Interdvizheniye demanded that the status quo that has lasted for many years be maintained, or even that there be a return to the formulas of the days of stagnation in nationalities policy.

And labels flew from one camp to another like superheated nuclei: "Stalinists," "international Nazis," "great-power internationalists," and in reply—"nationalists," "extremists," "heirs of the 'forest brothers'" [reference to prerevolutionary outlaw gangs], and so forth. The radicals from one camp started raising the specter of "separation," and in the other camp, in reply, they issued a pamphlet in which they exclaimed tragically: "Comrades! Every day it is becoming clearer that you are not wanted in the republic. The slogan 'Estonia for the Estonians' has become state policy in the republic. They do everything to flout your human dignity, instilling the idea that you are an immigrant, an occupier, a person without kin or tribe, a second-class being. Today you are only cheap manpower, and tomorrow what lies in store for you is the position of a slave on a plantation, deprived of elementary human rights."

Mutual distrust reached a crisis point, and flared up in the form of a strike...

The bitterness in society and the confrontation between two forces cannot go on forever. Naturally, a relaxation of tension is necessary. But the interethnic high tension "accumulator" must be discharged without a lightning flash. And there is only one solution here—to sit at the conference table and seek (however agonizing this quest may be for some people) compromises that do not damage anyone's interests and that "save face" for all the participants in the political conflict.

"But with whom do we hold talks?" S. Petinov asked, perplexed. "Just as the strike started, the whole of the republic leadership left for the USSR Supreme Soviet session to discuss the draft law on republican economic accountability..."

Well, the transition to republican economic accountability is indeed important today. It is the key to the economy's salvation. True, it must not be forgotten that without the active, committed participation of the Russian-speaking population in the implementation of the concept of republican economic accountability on which Estonian economists and scientists have worked selflessly for more than a year, the realization of this idea could be jeopardized—it is Russian-speaking collectives that provide a significant share of industrial output.

In the present situation, it is no use hoping for help from a "deus ex machina." You can only count on yourself, and on finding, if not a common language, at least some points of contiguity and initial contacts with your political opponent, whatever difficulties there may be. Whatever decisions, however sensible, may be adopted by the Supreme Soviet session and the forthcoming CPSU Central Committee plenum on interethnic relations, they will have to be put into practice on the spot by the very same—at the moment, unfortunately, opposing—parties. Henceforth no uncontested supreme arbiter is expected to appear, the quest for consensus will have to be carried out, after all, by us mere mortals, on our hard and common earth. And that needs patience and wisdom...

The latest news from Estonia before this item went to press: Common sense has triumphed. The republic leadership returned from Moscow, there was a meeting with representatives of the strike committee. It was decided to set up an Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet commission that will examine the strikers' whole list of demands. The strike committee appealed to the working people to stop the strike. All enterprises are resuming work.

Program Views Problems of Interethnic Relations

LD1207100989

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1751 GMT on 11 July 1989 broadcasts the 84-minute "Repercussions" program, which this week is entitled "Ethnic Relations in the Mirror of World Experience". The program is hosted by Political Observer Farid Seyful-Mulyukov, who introduces the panel of experts who are to answer viewers' questions. They are: Akhmed Akhmedovich Iskenderov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and chief editor of the magazine VOPROSY ISTORII; Dr of Economics Otto Rudolfovich Latsis, first deputy chief editor of the magazine KOMMUNIST; Dr of History Karen Armenovich Khachaturov, chairman of the Soviet Committee of Solidarity with the Peoples of Latin America; Nodari Aleksandrovich Simoniya, Deputy Director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences; Stanislav Nikolayevich Kondrashov, political observer of IZVESTIYA; and Dr of Economics Igor Petrovich Belayayev, political observer of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA.

Initially the participants spend some time tring to determine what the question of relations between nationalities really is. Latsis says that there is no single cause for every interethnic clash in the world. The root cause of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is social, he believes. He says that ethnic problems did not just suddenly surface in the USSR—they had long been there, but people had simply kept quiet about them. Iskenderov agrees that perestroyka is in no way responsible for the interethnic conflicts.

Seyful-Mulyukov presents a viewers' question about what part of Islam had to play in the troubles in Fergana. Belyayev starts his reply by mentioning the problems in Ulster, then says:

"Our viewers now ask about what happened in Fergana, and whether there was an Islamic factor as a decisive factor in everything that took place. Here it makes sense, so far as I can see, to recall certain interesting figures. We very often sum up our discussions by saying that everything that took place is the result of socio-economic tension. But there is an interesting figure here: so far over 600 participants in the disorders and ui rest in Fergana have been detained and are being investigated. Of them, 70 percent are working class—i.e. people who are employed. And if we recall that during the unrest there were weapons used on both sides, and the people who started using the weapons were not the troops or law enforcement or law and order agencies, then a mass of questions arises here. And I will quote another figure here. During the investigations one interesting detail emerged: the participants in all these disorders were paid R1,000 each to create a tense situation in Fergana and Fergana Oblast.

"And here is another detail relating to the question posed: there were green flags, but when I asked the Mufti of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, whom I recently met, Mufti Mukhammad Saddik Muhkammad-Yussuf, I asked him right out what was his attitude to what happened in Fergan. He resolutely condemned the disorders in Fergana, and told me that Islam had no links with the events. But I repeat, that there were, nonetheless, green flags. And here I should like to say a few words about our attitude to Islam as a religion.

"Comrades, we live in an age when it is time to speak out in this sense. Islam, just like any other religion, does not frighten me, for example. For, in the final analysis, believers must have the possibility to be themselves, equal to ciizens who are not believers and people who have not decided their attitude to any religion. And when we speak of Muslims, I think that Muslims are equal citizens, just like non-Muslims and believers of other religions, or nonbelievers and atheists. And it seems to me today that Islam cannot be regarded by us as some sort of monster which is engendering a mass of social and political problems. Islam is part of the history of those peoples, the majority of which in the past professed that religion followed, so to speak, the postulates of the Koran or the Shari'a. "Islam is also part not only of history, but also part of culture. It is also part of the customs which externally are religious, but which for long have been considered national. And, so far as I can see, we should take account of this. But I repeat, in Fergana, nonetheless there were green flags, there were even pictures of Khomeyni. But as to what stimulated the public to act in Fergana, I am waiting for the results of the investigation which is now in progress. But I repeat: the socio-economic factor, of course, operates not only in Fergana Olast, but also in Uzbekistan in general, and, as far as I can see, it is not the only thing which encouraged all that happened in that part of Uzbekistan."

Khachaturov then says that some of the worst conflicts, as in Lebanon, are those between Sunni and Shia Muslims. Simoniya answers a question about what the USSR can learn from conflicts in Asia by by saying that they should bear in mind the regional inequalities in the single Soviet complex. Kondrashov replies to a question about why the United States developed into a single nation from diverse immigrants, whereas there are still many nationalities in the USSR. He expounds on the situation of the negroes in the United States. Iskenderov agrees with a viewer who suggests that class was previously thought to be more important than nationality in determining differences. Latsis denounces cheap jibes and racial stereotypes as being incompatible with internationalism. He says that such phenomena are a social problem. Seyful-Mulyukov then puts this viewer's question to him:

"Here is a question: I would like to know more about what is going on in Moldavia. How are ethnic relations regarded in Moldavia? How should I, as a communist, react to instances where representatives of the National Front here in Kishinev go and rip up red flags during demonstrations and meetings, while the leadership does not react to it?"

Latsis replies: "It is not only the leadership who should react to that, but all communists should react to it. Incidentally, I do not understand a policy whereby in some republics they condemn, ban, expel from the party people for taking part in meetings of the National Front. I think that communists are obliged to take part, and must speak out. It may be frightening to speak to the crowd and frightening to reply for probably someone else's guilt, because that, too, is a consequence of Stalinist policy and Stalinist violence, and now it is sometimes exploding into uncontrolled processes. Of course, such an outbrust of pure nationalism, such extremism where flags are burned, where people speak against the interests of their own people—this undoubtedly happens—of course merits condemnation, and it is very difficult to correct it, and it is clear that it can only be corrected by putting right perhaps mistakes or crimes made 30 or 50 years ago. But this must be done, especially if you are a communist, especially if you call yourself a communist, although in general it is the duty of every citizen."

Iskenderov interjects to condemn the destruction of national traditions when the industrialists come in to develop an area. He also condemns stereotypes views of occupations and chauvinism of any origin. Khachaturov replies to a question about nationality problems in Latin America, saying that there is no analogy there to Soviet problems. Belyayev replies to a question about the exodus of Bulgarian Muslims. He says that the new laws in Bulgaria allowed any citizen to travel abroad and return. He makes an analogy with some Soviet Jews who left the USSR and later returned, and expresses the hope that the same will happen with the Bulgarian Muslims. At no time does he refer to them as Turks.

A conversation then ensues about terminology and the importance of avoiding loaded phrases with connotations of racial inferiority or superiority such as "small peoples", "younger brother" and so on. The theme then moves to the history of the Russian expansion under the tsars. Kondrashov fields a question about whether the U.S. idea of reservations for the Indians would be good thing in USSR. He does not appear to have a very good opinion of them. Latsis answers a question about the EEC and the single market, and whether this can be applied to the USSR. He says that the USSR already has a single market, but that it is functioning very badly. There are things to be learned from the EEC, he thinks. Simoniya recalls that in most of Europe there had been a slow evolution of nations and nationhood. In the USSR things leapfrogged. He thinks that the time is right for a retreat toward a genuine federation.

Latsis then answers a question from a viewer who thought that his previous statement about flag-burning appeared to condone such activities. He rejects the idea. Khachaturov speaks about ethnic problems in general, and concludes that Soviet ethnic problems are specific to the USSR, and that they cannot really learn from the West, but rather must tackle them in their own way.

Finally, Seyful-Mulyukov winds up with hopes for a better future and thanks those taking part in the program.

Strikes Cause Shortfall in Coal Extraction

LD3007142789 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 30 Jul 89

[Text] The situation in the Pechora coal basin: Eight of the 13 pits at Vorkuta did not meet their coal extraction plan for the past 24 hours. As a result, there is a total shortfall of 2,400 tonnes in the fuel extraction of the Vorkutaugol association. The consequences of the strike are the main reason. Many difficulties have arisen in starting the pits' equipment. Things are particularly serious in the sections where there are complex geological conditions for coal mining. Rates of dispatching coal to consumers have dropped. Seventy-three fewer railcars of coal were dispatched on 29 July than in the previous 24 hours. It is expected that the shipment of fuel will decrease again today by the same amount. Work is being conducted in Vorkuta to transform the all-town strike committee into a standing town workers' strike committee. The town executive committee has approved its draft statutes. This draft has been dispatched to Moscow with a proposal that it be considered at the USSR Supreme Soviet.

At Inta the Intaugol association over-fulfilled its 24-hour norm for coal extraction by 900 tonnes. Pits are operating at their normal pace. There has been a small surplus since the beginning of July in concentrate production, around 15,000 tonnes.

Further on RSFSR Supreme Soviet Session

Vorotnikov Speaks on Elections

LD2807112989 Moscow TASS in English 1059 GMT 28 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 28 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent

The critical tone of the second day of debate at the Russian Federation parliament, which discusses increasing the production of consumer goods, was set by Nina Piryazeva, an electric fitter, from Novosibirsk region. A deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation and the country's parliament, Piryazeva broadened the range of issues under discussion and raised cardinal issues of legislative and economic reform, which are currently debated at the country's parliament.

Piryazeva pointed to very slow rates of elaborating the alternative concept of cost-accounting in the republic, to a lagging behind in drafting the republic's new election law.

Vitaliy Vorotnikov, the president of the Russian Federation, proposed that the draft resolution of the current session include instructions to the government, the parliament and local bodies of government on speeding up the development of the concept of transition to republican and regional cost-accounting.

Speaking about adoption of the law on amending constitution and the election law, Vitaliy Vorotnikov said those bills would be submitted for consideration at the next session of the Russian parliament. Prior to that they would be published for nationwide discussion. Speaking about the possibility of early elections to local governing councils, the speaker recalled that their term of office was due to expire this December. However, in places where local councils performed poorly and the heads failed to fulfill the tasks set by perestroika, deputies could be recalled by their voters, the president said.

Ways of democratizing economic relations are the focal point of discussions not only during but also after the sessions. Vladimir Voznesenskiy, a miner from the Krasnoyarsk region, told TASS that all republics in the

country should go over to cost-accounting at once rather than some of them. The current session of the USSR Supreme Soviet should pass a national law on this score, he stressed.

Vorotnikov Calls for 'Financial Autonomy'

LD2807230289 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 28 Jul 89

[Video report by V. Stepanyuk; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpt] A session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet ended today in the Great Kremlin Palace. Comrades Vorotnikov, Ryzhkov, Chebrikov, and Vlasov took part in its work. [Video shows the four seated on the dais.] In their speeches a number of deputies stated that they consider it expedient at this same session to instruct the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium to prepare the directive documents on more independence for Russian in the economic, social, and political spheres.

Replying to questions from deputies, Comrade Vorotnikov noted in particular that he wholly shares the proposals by deputies that it is necessary to draw up a concept regarding the transition to financial autonomy and a concept on enhancing the sovereignty of the Russian Federation and to create a number of political, administrative, economic, and other structures that the republic is lacking. The chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium informed the deputies that such work is now under way. This also applies to the law on changes to the Constitution and the law on elections to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Speaking of matters connected with the Russian Federation's sovereign rights, Comrade Vorotnikov noted that the republic had submitted relevant proposals to the party Central Committee and to the USSR Council of Ministers.

The closing speech at the session was made by Comrade Vlasov.

Then the deputies adopted a resolution of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet on the tasks of the republic's local soviet and economic bodies in increasing the production of consumer goods and improving their quality in accordance with the directives of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies. In particular it approves the proposal by the republic's Ministry of Finance to raise the output of nonfood goods next year to R151 billion—that is to raise it to a level 23 percent higher than was planned earlier. In this respect maximum use must be made in every kray and oblast of local resources and potential in tackling this very acute social problem. [Video shows deputies in hall.] [passage omitted]

Ryzhkov, Others Attend Session

LD2807181589 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 28 Jul 89

[Text] The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet session continues in the Grand Kremlin Palace today. Comrades Vorotnikov, Ryzhkov, Chebrikov, and Vlasov are in the presidium.

The deputies are discussing the tasks of the republic's soviet and economic bodies in increasing output and improving the quality of consumer goods, in accordance with the directives of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies.

Vlasov Recaps Debate

LD2807173189 Moscow TASS in English 1719 GMT 28 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 28 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent:

Republican cost accounting, which will be adopted by Baltic republics under a decision taken by the Soviet parliament on Thursday, was described today by the premier of the Russian Federation, Aleksander Vlasov, as the future for his republic as well.

The need to bring this future closer was stressed also by many other speakers at the current session of the Russian Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin.

As he summed up two days of debate on ways to increase consumer goods production, Vlasov said that transition to a system of profit and loss accounting by Russia will need to be thoroughly prepared as this republic, the biggest in the country, largely determines its economic image.

He reminded deputies that Russia accounts for 60 per cent of gross national output, 62 per cent of electricity, 92 per cent of oil, 76 per cent of timber, 50 per cent of coal and 77 per cent of gas.

Vlasov added that only less than half of the national income produced by Russia is left to it, while other constituent republics retain practically the entire national income they produce.

He stressed the need to even out conditions for the pursuit of economic activity of Russia and other Soviet republics.

Speaking of the necessity of increasing Russia's sovereignty, he disclosed plans to establish a number of ministries and other state agencies which do not as yet exist in this republic, unlike others. He also called for Russian republican social, political and research institutions, including a Russian Academy of Sciences.

Russia is the only Soviet republic without its own television network and this is to be corrected, Vlasov said.

He emphasised that the switchover to Russia's economic cost- accounting and greater sovereignty should be effected in a way contributing to closer unity in the Soviet Union as a whole.

Supreme Soviet Session Ends

LD2807180389 Moscow TASS in English 1754 GMT 28 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 28 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent:

The Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, the biggest of the 15 Soviet republics, ended its two-day session in the Kremlin today. It discussed ways of increasing production and improving the quality of consumer goods.

Pointing out a 17 percent increase in the consumer goods output in the three years of the current five-year-plan period, the deputies said that the consumer market was still unbalanced. They see the way to improve the current situation in new forms of economic management. Many speakers demanded the speeding up of the republic's transition to cost-accounting, on which many deputies pin high hopes.

In his speeches and the closing remark the head of the Russian Government Aleksandr Vlasov stressed the need to strengthen the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. He said that Russia is being deprived of many things which have become an integral part of the life in other Soviet republics, beginning from its own academy of sciences to a special Russian television programme.

The session supported the address of the deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation from rural areas to the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Soviet Government, who express concern over the situation in agriculture. They think that all-union bodies should give more aid to the Russian Federation to strengthen the material basis of its agriculture.

The session approved a number of decrees of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation which now have the force of law. A decree on the size of taxes to be imposed on cooperatives was returned for further revision.

After that the session finished its work.

Moldavian Supreme Soviet Names Snegur Chairman

LD2907162689 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 29 Jul 89

[Text] An extraordinary session of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet today examined an organizational matter. The session released Comrade Mokanu from his duties as chairman of the Presidium of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet in connection with his election as deputy chairman of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Comrade Snegur, who had been working as secretary of the Communist Party of Moldavia Central Committee, was elected chairman of the Presidium of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet. Speaking at the session was Comrade Grossu, first secretary of the Communist Party of Moldavia Central Committee.

Latvian Autonomy, Citizenship Law Discussed

LD2807193189 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 28 Jul 89

[Text] Here is a report on the session of the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] by our Latvia correspondent, Ninel Meshkun.

[Meshkun] Passionate debates developed today around the proposed amendments to the Constitution and the draft republican law on elections of people's deputies of the Latvian SSR and on elections to local soviets. In essence, these are questions of forming bodies of power in the republic, of voting rights, and of the issue of citizenship. The attitude to them in Latvia is not a homogeneous one. Here is what Anatoliy Konstantinovich Belaychuk, member of the Latvian Interfront Presidium and prorector of the Institute of Civil Aviation, has to say:

[Begin Belaychuk recording] If one speaks of citizenship, there is one fact of considerable importance here. Today the republic's inhabitants, the citizens of the Latvian SSR, are concurrently citizens of the USSR. When we start talking about the new law on amending citizenship, it suddenly becomes apparent that once it has been adopted, a significant proportion of the population—about 100,000 people according to an estimate done by Dr (Buers), but certainly no fewer than 200,000—suddenly find themselves noncitizens. What is most important is that whereas in bourgeois Latvia, apart from a law on citizenship, there were citizens, noncitizens, and the so-called Nansen citizens—these were individuals who had not yet become citizens of the republic, but who nevertheless had acquired some citizenship rights—today we do not see even this intermediate stage. In other words, it turns out that the law on citizenship that has been put forward has a number of restrictions that did not exist even in bourgeois Latvia. That is what I do not like.

The first law that should have been adopted, the law on a referendum, is not being discussed. What is saddest of all is that one thing gets written and something else is meant. It suddenly becomes apparent that when they talk about self-determination, a very large proportion of the population means completely different concepts. Some talk about sovereignty of the republic within the framework of the USSR, while others talk about sovereignty of the republic and mean a withdrawal from the USSR. In principle, this point of view has a right to exist, as one of

the viewpoints on self-determination of the nation, but at the same time the people who concern themselves with this must then think about the legal, economic, and other status of those who do not want to be in a republic separate from the USSR. [end recording]

[Meshkun] Here is the opinion of Yanis Peters [Supreme Soviet deputy and chairman of the board of the Latvian SSR Union of Writers]:

[Begin recording] [Peters] In my opinion, a new state in Latvia's history begins today. I think that the whole Soviet Union, too, has arrived at a completely and fundamentally new understanding of the construction of a federation. I view sovereignty—as I have already said at the Congress of People's Deputies—as independence for the republic, as the republic being confirmed by the state because the Soviet Union is an association or union of states, and not simply of, say, some territory or region.

[Meshkun] There is currently a great deal of concern over the draft law on citizenship. How do you view it?

[Peters] I think that the concern is understandable because it, too, is something fundamentally new, but a law on citizenship is clearly necessary in order to develop in people a sense of being the masters of their land. I can love my own Latvia and respect other republics, other states that form part of our federation. I do not want to separate according to nationality at the moment. After all, it will not only be us Latvians who acquire citizenship, but those people who, according to the new law, will have all these prequisites for becoming citizens of Latvia. I think the main point is that everyone should understand us, here in Latvia, in the Soviet Union, and abroad. They should understand that we are not separating citizens according to national category, and that we simply are asserting the legitimate rights of the Latvian nation and of all other people who link their destiny with Latvia forever. [end recording]

'Heated' Discussions Reported

LD2907212189 Moscow TASS in English 2104 GMT 29 Jul 89

[Text] Riga July 30 LATINFORM-TASS—The session of the Supreme Soviet of Latvia has ended with the adoption of a declaration on the republic's state sovereignty. Under the document, laws of the USSR shall enter into force on its territory only after they are ratified by the republic's supreme state power body.

The declaration has it that the regime of Stalinism and administrative-command diktat have been restraining the republic's openness for decades and have been deforming national relations. With an independent exercise of legislative executive and judicial power, the flourishing of both the Lettish nation and all ethnic groups is guaranteed.

The session has substantially renewed the republic's Constitution which, in the opinion of a number of deputies, still remains a transitional one on the way to a new fundamental law.

Pleas for a reasonable compromise on proposals which did not suit everyone at once were issued. The determination of a residence qualification which is set at ten years to be eligible to election to the Latvian Supreme Soviet and five years in elections to the local governing councils turned out to be among contentious issues. The advocates of the limitation contended that it takes out of the game only three per cent of the population in the former case and 1.5 per cent in the latter case.

The opponents of the idea pointed out that many authoritative people who live in Latvia for a short period, such as Viktor Bossert, director of the minibus making factory—one of the soviet Union's first elected factory directors—would be left out.

A no less heated discussion was aroused by a proposal to formulate a concept of the republic's economic independence which will have to be shaped up with the scarcity of raw materials, energy and manpower resources, and in the conditions of inflation and imbalances in the economic pattern.

The deputies also adopted a law on meetings, street processions and demonstrations, and resolutions on improving the ecological situation and on a number of other problems.

A republican commission was instituted for political and legal assessment of the consequences to Latvia of the 1939-1940 Soviet- German agreements.

Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Presidium Meets 28 Jul

LD3007200189 Vilnius in English to North America 2200 GMT 28 Jul 89

[Text] A meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania took place in Vilnius today. The agenda of the forthcoming parliamentary session was discussed. It was decided that the session will begin on 5 September. Three bills are going to be debated: A bill on the self-dependence of Lithuania, a bill on citizenship, and a bill on elections to local soviets and the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania. It was also decided that a draft of the law on citizenship will be published in the press next week. A bill on nationalities was also discussed at today's meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. In fact, it is a bill on the ethnic minorities residing in Lithuania. It will be published next week as well.

Members of the Presidium have decided to take measures against those MP's who ignored the parliamentary session. The names of the absent deputies will be read out next time together with the reasons for their absence.

A decision on the Lithuanian state emblem has been adopted at the meeting of the Presidium of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. The Presidium has decided to work out a draft law on the responsibility for the crimes against the Lithuanian nation. The law on alcohol abuse will be improved as well. A new status of the Lithuanian courts is being worked out. The courts are going to be independent from governmental bodies and the general procurator of Lithuania will be appointed by Lithuania. The Presidium of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet has decided to allow to emigrate all those wishing to leave Lithuania. At present there are about 90 applications for emigration.

Belorussian, Kazakh Supreme Soviets Meet

LD2807164989 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 28 Jul 89

[Text] Sessions of the Supreme Soviets of Belorussia and Kazakhstan were held today in Minsk and Alma-Ata. Deputies from Belorussia approved an extensive list of economic and social measures comprising the state program for eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl accident in the republic. These measures include moving people, a system of constant medical monitoring, halting the use of agricultural land, and many other things. Dementey was elected to the post of chairman of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet Presidium. Dementey had previously worked as secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee.

The session of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet which finished today discussed topical tasks of the Soviets of People's Deputies on deepening the process of perestroyka, intensifying efforts in the struggle against losses from mismanagement, and the utmost strengthening of labor executive discipline. A decision was passed on this issue. The deputies of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet sent a message to the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in connection with the extremely tense situation which had taken shape in the republic due to the systematically insufficient supply of rolling stock by the Ministry of Railways.

Further on Belorussian Meeting

PM1007123989 Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 17 Jun 89 p 1

[Unattributed report: "From the Lobby of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) Supreme Soviet Presidium: The Name 'People's' Can Only Be Conferred by the People"]

[Text] Discussion is continuing in the republic on the reports from the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the commentary on it, published last Sunday. The refusal of the representatives of the People's Front organization committee to submit the necessary documents for registering a new organization provoked a negative reaction among various sections of society in the republic. Resolutions from meetings held in labor collectives, schools, and organizations are continuing to be received in the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and telegrams and letters are coming in from individual citizens.

"Having discussed the article 'Why the secrecy?,' published in the newspaper ZVYAZDA on 11 June 1989, the workers and employees of the rayon communications center noted that they were in complete agreement with the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium resolution regarding the realization of the so-called congress of 'Belorussian People's Front,'" the participants in a meeting of the rayon communications center labor collective in the city of Slavgorod, Mogilev Oblast, write in their resolution.

"If the platform put forward by the members of that association corresponds with the spirit and resolutions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union party conference, this means that its members should get publicly and openly involved in the creative process of developing the economy, improving the people's prosperity, and carrying out this activity through party, soviet, trade union, All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League, and other social organizations in which all sections of the Belorussian people are represented.

"The meeting considers that the soviets of people's deputies have become the basis of real democracy in the country. And since we wholly trust the newly elected USSR Supreme Soviet, we believe that all serious problems of the country's social life connected with acceleration and perestroyka should be resolved through that organ.

"We are not repudiating the necessity for the broadest movement in support of perestroyka, but at the same time we consider it best to campaign for it by means of concrete actions and shock labor.

"In our view, socialist democracy is not anarchy and it is not permissiveness. We openly condemn the representatives of informal unions who follow the path of demagoguery, create mistrust of party and soviet organs and economic leaders among the people, and prevent people from working creatively."

The meeting of the collective called for a high degree of organization, political and moral responsibility, discipline, and well coordinated work from those who want our republic to flourish.

At a rally held at the farm the collective of the "Komintern" collective farm [kolkhoz] in Mogilevskiy Rayon adopted a resolution in which it called on all the inhabitants of the rayon and the republic to put a stop to all activity aimed at undermining socialist state structures, to sensibly resolve the problems which have accumulated, to do so together, without any fine-sounding phrases, and to concentrate every effort on increasing labor activity, and strengthening discipline, order, and

organization. Similar resolutions were adopted at meetings held on the "Gigant" kolkhoz in Bobruyskiy Rayon, on the "Iskra" kolkhoz in Cherikovskiy Rayon, at the "Spartak" experimental base in Shklovskiy Rayon, and in the Goretskiy commercial bakery, the Bobruysk artistic goods factory, and the "Krichevtsementnosnifer" production association—altogether at 39 enterprises, kolkhozes, and state farms, and oblast organizations.

Petr Nikanorovich Tkachenko, a war veteran from Grodno, appealing to the Supreme Soviet Presidium, expressed his anxiety about the consequences which can result from forming organizations like the various Baltic "unions" and "fronts." He also proposed that the initiators of the Belorussian People's Front should get down to work within the new social structures already in operation, which are quite sufficient to resolve the problems that are really urgent for all the people.

"We must not dash from one side to another. The success of perestroyka is guaranteed by the political maturity and responsibility of all the Soviet people, their understanding of present and future tasks, and their ability to make daily progress, eschewing idle talk and working assiduously, along the path of the country's socioeconomic renewal," the workers and employees of the Slavgorod "Rayagropromenergo" organization write in their address, expressing their support for the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium resolution.

A meeting of the Shklov City No 1 Secondary School labor collective points out in its resolution, which expresses the opinion that the formation of a "Belorussian People's Front" is inexpedient, that the activity of social organizations in the republic must be oriented at decisively overcoming such shortcomings as formalism, excessive organization, and diminshed responsibility.

Side by side with a call to activate the struggle against demagogues and those creating hostility between people of different nationalities by spreading rumors, the workers of the Shklov cooperative industry propose that people's deputies and social organizations pay particular attention to work with young people.

Telegrams, resolutions, and letters from labor collectives, cities, and villages are continuing to be received at the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Chebrikov Views Kazakhstan Party's Tasks

PM1007153189 Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 24 Jun 89 pp 1, 2

[KAZTAG report: "Time for Quest, Action, and Renewal. From the 15th Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee Plenum"]

[Text] It was already reported that the 15th Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee Plenum, which examined an organizational question, was held 22 June.

The plenum was opened by M.S. Mendybayev, second secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee. He gave the floor to V.M. Chebrikov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The Central Committee Politburo, V.M. Chebrikov emphasized, comprehensively discussed the question of candidacies for the position of first secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee. Opinions, including those of [Kazakh Communist Party] Central Committee Bureau members, were taken into account in the process. As a result, we arrived at the following conclusion: To recommend your plenum to elect Comrade Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev first secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee.

There is probably no need, the speaker went on, for me to give you details of the proposed candidate's life and work—you know them from your joint work with him. N.A. Nazarbayev was thoroughly schooled here, in the republic, he is perfectly aware of what has been done and what must be done in the future so that perestroyka in the republic is deepened and developed equally as purposefully and consistently. I would ask you to support the Politburo's recommendation on the election of Comrade N.A. Nazarbayev as first secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee.

Warm words of thanks to Gennadiy Vasilyevich Kolbin, who was elected chairman of the USSR People's Control Committee at the Congress of People's Deputies, were expressed by subsequent plenum speakers S.M. Bayzhanov, first secretary of Dzhambul Oblast Kazakh Communist Party Committee [Obkom]; I.B. Yedilbayev, Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic minister of local industry; V.I. Lokotunin, first secretary of Karaganda Kazakh Communist Party Obkom; V.A. Kuzmenko, member of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee Bureau and milkmaid at Alma-Ata Oblast's "Kamenskiy" Breeding Station; N.N. Golovatskiy, chairman of Taldy-Kurgan Oblast's "40 Let Oktyabrya" agrofirm; I.I. Dumanov, director of the Leninogorsk polymetals combine; Yu.A. Meshcheryakov, first secretary of Pavlodar Kazakh Communist Party Obkom; S.V. Drozhzhin, senior rolling-press operator at the Karaganda metallurgical combine sheet-rolling shop; Ye.N. Auyelbekov, first secretary of Kzyl-Orda Kazakh Communist Party Obkom; and N.Ye. Rusnak, student at the Alma-Ata Higher Party School. Gennadiy Vasilyevich, they noted, headed the republic party organization at a time which was by no means easy for Kazakhstan. Thanks to his energy, great industry, and organizational talent, G.V. Kolbin managed to organize effective work by the republic's party staff within the briefest of time periods. And the real and specific positive developments in all spheres of life—be it housing, food supplies, or the general improvement of the moral and psychological climate's health—testify that a correct political line was chosen in a complex period of perestroyka.

The speakers unanimously supported Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev's candidacy for the position of first secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee. It was emphasized that Nursultan Abishevich is one of the chief architects of perestroyka in Kazakhstan. Having attended the serious and abundantly rich school of life, having acquired a strong tempering as worker and politician, he had become a proper leader with firmly held views about the prospects of Kazakhstan's socioeconomic and political development in close and mutually advantageous cooperation with the country's fraternal republics. He outlined these views at the first Congress of USSR People's Deputies, and we participants in the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee plenum fully share and support N.A. Nazarbayev's action program.

Specifically, S.V. Drozhzhin, senior rolling-press operator at the Karaganda metallurgical combine sheet-rolling shop, said: I have known Nursultan Abishevich for 18 years now. During the difficult years when the Karaganda metallurgical combine was getting established, he worked as our party committee secretary. I am a worker, he is a party official, but there never were any barriers between us. The door to the party committee secretary's office was always open to everyone. Even though he was, more often than not, working not in his office but in the heat of the combine's shops. Let me say this simply, like a worker: It is easy and satisfying to work with someone like that.

A secret ballot followed the exchange of opinions, with 158 Central Committee members voting. The votes cast were 154 for and 4 against N.A. Nazarbayev's election as first secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee. The plenum ratified the protocol of the secret ballot. Thus, Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev was elected first secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee.

The floor was then given to G.V. Kolbin, chairman of the USSR People's Control Committee. Having congratulated N.A. Nazarbayev on his election as first secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee, the speaker addressed the plenum participants, and through them all Kazakhs, with words of profound gratitude and thanks for the fruitful joint work. The last 2 and ½ years had seen the successful solution of a substantial number of major and minor problems associated with enhancing the people's prosperity and strengthening Soviet people's international cohesion.

Each and every one of us, G.V. Kolbin said, has his own character. There were times when we argued and criticized one another, but we shared a single goal: to ensure end results. And we all marched toward this goal. An atmosphere of well organized joint work prevailed in our Bureau, there were opportunities to freely express views on any question, and we always arrived at mutual understanding.

I am grateful to the CPSU Central Committee, its Politburo, and you, esteemed members of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee, for the trust that was shown in me. I am and will always remain proud of the fact that, first, I worked in such a major republic and, second, that here I made numerous very good comrades at work, comrades in our common cause. I think, G.V. Kolbin emphasized in conclusion, that these sound traditions will be developed and deepened in the future.

N.A. Nazarbayev, who spoke afterward, warmly thanked the Central Committee members for their lofty trust in electing him first secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee. I have, he noted, worked with many of you for several years now. I have felt your support always and in everything, and today I appreciate this twice as much. I think that we will continue to work smoothly also in the future.

I am fully aware of the responsibility borne by the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee and myself personally at such a complex and crucial time in the history of our country and our republic.

All Soviet people associate with perestroyka the solution of numerous vitally important socioeconomic and sociopolitical problems, including problems in the sphere of interethnic relations which were either played down or passed over in silence during the time of stagnation. Events in the last few years prove how complex they are. But approaches to their solution have already been determined. And now it is necessary to implement more energetically what has been planned.

My stance on this question is known to everyone. It was clearly formulated in my speech to the first Congress of USSR People's Deputies. I would like to assure you that I intend to firmly pursue a policy of implementing this stance. I believe that the interests of the party and the interests of the people must be paramount for the republic's top leader.

Today we need, more than ever before, to consolidate all of society's forces for the sake of perestroyka through democratization and glasnost. Our prosperity is created through the labor of every working person with organization, discipline, and strict observance of laws. It must be borne in mind that inflammation of passions and destabilization are to the advantage of only those who wish to hinder the cause of revolutionary renewal. And they must be resolutely repulsed. At the same time, there must be maximum support for any social initiative aimed at developing socialism's inexhaustible potential.

The party is the initiator of perestroyka. I am convinced that the CPSU is the sole real force capable of rallying the whole people and all social currents. The party is the guarantor of the irreversibility of perestroyka. This is why it is necessary to enhance the party's role and prestige as society's political vanguard. There are numerous complications here. It is, however, incumbent on every party

member and on party organizations and committees to overcome them. From rank-and-file communists to Central Committee members—everyone must be together with the people and must express their will.

I would like to thank the CPSU Central Committee and its Politburo for their trust. Allow me to assure them on your behalf that the republic's communists will undeviatingly pursue the party's general line of renewing socialism. We advocate the unity of the USSR peoples, the integrity of our great motherland, and genuine friendship among peoples. I believe that this conforms with the fundamental interests of the Kazakh people, of all who live in Kazakhstan, and of all Soviet people.

There is no doubt that perestroyka will consolidate the republic's sovereignty, will give legal and practical meaning to this term, will make it possible to boost the economy, will create conditions for the revival and development of the Kazakh people's ancient culture, and will ensure meaningful existence for their native language without, of course, infringing the rights of other languages.

It would seem that everyone realizes: Kazakhstan's economy and culture are an inalienable part of the wealth and values of the country as a whole.

Today it would be only fair to speak the best possible words about G.V. Kolbin and to thank him for his work in our republic's party organization. He labored for perestroyka's sake conscientiously, actively, without sparing his energy.

We wish you good health, Gennadiy Vasilyevich, and may you justify the hopes of people's deputies who elected you to the high-ranking and responsible position of chairman of the country's People's Control Committee.

Today, N.A. Nazarbayev noted in conclusion, we need cohesive and selfless work by party committees at all levels. Moreover, the strengthening of party comradeship is more important than ever before. Joint work is also necessary at republican leadership level. We already have such work. All this constitutes the guarantee for successful fulfillment of the complex tasks facing us.

The plenum was addressed by V.M. Chebrikov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Speech by by V.M. Chebrikov, Member of the Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee

Esteemed Comrades! On instructions from M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and on behalf of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo I congratulate N.A. Nazarbayev on his election to the high and responsible position of first secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee. Allow me to express the hope that Nursultan Abishevich will honorably justify the lofty trust placed in him by members of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee.

The first secretaries of union republic communist party central committees, kray party committees, and party obkoms occupy an eminent position within the CPSU. The role of the party committees they head will be enhanced further still in the conditions of the course on which we are embarked, aimed at expansion of the sovereignty of union republics, consolidation of regional economic accountability, and self-management of socioeconomic development. They must bear the full brunt of responsibility for the implementation of party policy at republic level and must be the party's reliable mainstay in the cause of socialism's revolutionary renewal.

The party is the initiator of perestroyka in Soviet society, it is its organizer and inspirer, and it is unquestionably to the party's credit that our entire country is now vitally committed to the deeds and concerns of perestroyka. This was confirmed by the recent elections to the supreme organ of state power.

The CPSU Central Committee plenum held in April this year proved a mobilizing factor regarding the improvement of the party's activity at the present stage of perestroyka. The plenum comprehensively analyzed the activity of elected party organs and their apparatus. Tasks were set regarding the further democratization of intraparty life and the eradication of stereotypes, regimentation, and supplanting of elected organs by the apparatus. Special attention was given to the quest for new approaches to the solution of problems which acutely perturb communists and all Soviet people. The party must more rapidly gather dynamism in its work and must build its work with due consideration for the political and social processes now under way in the country, processes whose catalyst was the first Congress of USSR People's Deputies. Its political results have yet to be interpreted in depth, but it is certain that, despite all the differences in appraisals of the Congress both in our own country and abroad, that forum can be classed as one of the most important landmark events in the Soviet state's history.

The entire country was an eyewitness to and participant in the ensuing free comparison of ideas and viewpoints regarding the course of social development and the appraisal of the Soviet people's past, present, and future. The Congress provided a realistic picture of the state of affairs in the country, the achievements and shortcomings in our life, and the causes of negative phenomena. All people saw for themselves that real opportunities for taking into account the diverse interests of all strata of Soviet society are emerging at the new stage of democratization and glasnost. From the Congress rostrum, deputies raised major and specific issues, took a critical stance, and expressed dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in regions and in the country as a whole. Party

committees must creatively utilize this invaluable material and apply it to promote perestroyka. It is necessary to learn lessons, to take all this into account when elaborating policies, and to amend previously adopted decisions whenever necessary.

It was emphasized in M.S. Gorbachev's speech at the Congress that the need to effect radical perestroyka of socialist ownership relations was especially acutely felt. As a result of the perestroyka of these relations, man and the labor collective must be really placed in the position of masters of production. Problems of radical economic reform, the national economy's agrarian sector, legislation and law-making, interethnic relations, struggle against crime, and enhancement of living standards for pensioners, disabled people, and other people in the low-income brackets occupied a central position in deputies' speeches. In this sense, the Congress of People's Deputies worked well and fruitfully to the advantage of perestroyka and socialism's renewal. It thus rendered an invaluable service.

Many speakers raised the question of enhancing the party's role in perestroyka and further improving the forms and methods of its work. This is understandable, since our Communist Party is a ruling party. And the Congress marked the beginning of the process of really transferring power to the soviets. Now this process will extend further and deeper, it will reach the republics, krays, oblasts, cities, and villages. Now it is extremely important to do everything necessary to ensure that this process runs painlessly and efficiently.

There is frequent talk about excessive criticism of the party. Yes, this is true. But today's appraisals must be based on the way perestroyka is conducted. There are numerous reports that the situation is changing only slowly at the local level and that the reason is, more often than not, slack cadres who are incapable of solving what are primarily social questions. The party should not be defended just verbally: It can and must defend itself by means of its own deeds. There is lagging along many avenues of party work. There are, for example, instances when a tiny group of so-called informals carries away a mass of people. This means that specific party organs have not been efficient in their work. Unless the situation is taken in hand, elements with extremist and nationalist leanings could gain the upper hand. This will be a serious brake on the processes of socioeconomic development. The criticism of party committees voiced at the Congress must be accepted in the best traditions of the CPSU. Having digested this criticism, the party must concentrate on the elimination of shortcomings and must march more boldly along the path of implementing perestroyka. It must be constantly proved by deeds that the Communist Party can rise to the difficult tasks of the time, that it is capable of continuing to perform the role of the Soviet people's political vanguard. This is why the party must restructure itself, as well as restructuring society as a whole. Moreover, the pace of its own perestroyka must be faster than that of society's.

Serious work must be undertaken right away in preparation for the report and election campaign in party organizations, and this work must be approached in a new fashion. It is necessary to rule out any pressure on communists during the election of leadership organs and secretaries. Wherever necessary, permission could even be given to hold party committee elections ahead of schedule. There is obviously no point in keeping people in party work if they are unwilling to do that work. They ought to be replaced by new people, who must be given conditions and opportunities to prove themselves.

The CPSU Central Committee is receiving suggestions about holding an extraordinary party congress. I think that this is not the point where attention should focus. It is necessary to concentrate efforts on stabilizing the situation and elaborating a political platform for the party's activity on the deepening of perestroyka. But the next CPSU congress could be brought forward so that its decisions could be used to begin implementing the new 5-year plan without losing any time.

If I were to try to briefly describe what society has gained during the 4 years of perestroyka, I could say this: First of all, we have the economy's development being more socially oriented than before. Such an orientation cannot be achieved without difficulties, without breakdowns and miscalculations. But the consumption of products and many goods is rising nonetheless. More housing and more facilities for social, cultural, and consumer service purposes are being constructed. Much more remains to be done, but the people can actually feel the effect of what has already been done.

The CPSU Central Committee March Plenum decisions were an important stage in the Food Program's implementation. That plenum mapped out a politically correct path. It is necessary, on the basis of fundamental perestroyka in economic relations, to remove all fetters from state farms [sovkhoz] and collective farms [kolkhoz] and to give them total autonomy. The task is to concentrate our state's entire might on the earliest possible solution of questions of the countryside's social development. People must feel the effect of real changes in their living conditions and must feel confident that rural life is promising and prestigious.

But the following must be clearly borne in mind: There are no grounds at all for any complacency about the reality. Even a superficial analysis would show that the positive processes lack stability and the necessary dynamism. It is necessary to advance further still, enriching perestroyka with the experience of practical work by labor collectives, sectors, and regions. And every regional party organization must find its proper position here.

Kazakhstan's party organization, whose ranks unite some 850,000 communists, is a major detachment of the CPSU. It has made a noteworthy contribution to the cause of the party, the country, and the struggle for socialism.

In order to gain an even deeper perception of what the republic's communists have managed to achieve along the path of perestroyka, it is obviously necessary to once more look at the beginnings of perestroyka in Kazakhstan. During the 11th 5-Year Plan period it had the country's lowest indicator of annual national income growth (1.3 percent). During the previous 5-year plan period, deliveries of output from Kazakhstan to consumers in other republics fell short by a total of about R3 billion. During those years, the republic's deliveries to all-union stocks fell short by about 20 million tons of grain, more than 260,000 tons of meat products, and about 60 million tons of dairy produce.

The last congress of Kazakhstan's Communists, subsequent plenums of the republic Communist Party Central Committee and of party obkoms, city party committees, and rayon party committees, and primary party organizations soberly assessed the situation as being on the brink of crisis. Deformations resulting from the proliferation of administrative edict methods of management affected not only socioeconomic development but also the state of interethnic relations. The people identified protectionism, the demoralization of some cadres, corruption, and the flouting of the principles of social justice as sources of the well-known events in Alma-Ata in December 1986.

The plenum participants recall that the republic Communist Party Central Committee Bureau was largely renewed at that time. It had to elaborate a normalization program and organize its fulfillment. It must be given credit for suggesting measures and guidelines which people perceived as feasible. They were primarily the programs for the improvement of food supplies and for housing construction. The set tasks could have been accomplished only by intensifying the party's influence in labor collectives, changing the style of work, and coming closer to working people and their requirements and needs.

At this plenum it can be confidently asserted that substantial positive changes have occurred in Kazakhstan regarding the solution of social questions. The reorganization of the political system, which is under way in the country, has had a favorable effect on the results of this work. The program of the republic's party organs was backed by working people in all oblasts. The CPSU Central Committee and the republic's party committees received thousands of letters from communists and working people from Kazakhstan and from other regions in the country, containing positive assessments of the changes occurring in the republic and expressing support for the policy of social priorities. People now come to Kazakhstan to study its experience in housing construction. The planned program is being fulfilled for the 3d year running, and housing is being commissioned steadily at the rate of at least 10 percent of the annual plan per month. Compared to 1985, the volume of housing commissioned has increased by almost one-third. Local party organizations have headed this work. Additional reserves were sought out, people were mobilized, and enormous work was done to develop individual and cooperative construction.

The Food Program is being actively implemented. Per capita consumption increased by almost 10 kg of meat products and by 36 kg of milk in the last 3 years. And even though the level of supplies which has been reached still fails to satisfy the needs, working people in most of the republic's regions have felt the positive effect of the work being done.

In the process of briefly describing Kazakhstan's socioeconomic development during the first 3 years of the current 5-year plan period, the following positive changes can also be mentioned. The average annual growth of produced national income has increased by 15 percent. The production of industrial output has increased by more than 14 percent. The indicators for contract deliveries are improving each year. Consumer goods production has increased by 20 percent. The average annual volume of gross agricultural output has increased by 16 percent.

There has been improvement in the indicators for trade, consumer services, and medical services for the population. The republic has recently opened a series of modern medical-diagnostic centers.

Much attention is now given to the development of the national cultures of all peoples living in Kazakhstan.

All this makes it possible to say that a lot has been done in the republic in the last few years. It is up to a congress or a Communist Party Central Committee plenum to appraise the Bureau's work as a whole. But since the plenum participants today released G.V. Kolbin from his duties as first secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee in connection with his election as chairman of the USSR People's Control Committee, this is obviously an opportunity to express thanks to Gennadiy Vasilyevich for his contribution to the republic's development and the performance of an important and responsible mission assigned by the CPSU Central Committee, and to wish him success in his new work.

At the same time, it must be admitted that many questions concerning the implementation of the package of tasks of accelerating socioeconomic development are still being solved only slowly in the republic. There has been no success in overcoming the extensive factors in the development of Kazakhstan's economy over the first 3 years of the 5-year plan period. The introduction of highly efficient technologies in production was slow, the national economy's financial imbalance increased, and difficulties still remain as regards supplying the population with consumer goods and services. The national income growth set by the plan has not been achieved. Annual deliveries of output to the republic's industry fall short by almost R1 billion owing to existing capacities not being fully utilized or newly commissioned ones

being slowly assimilated. It is an alarming fact that, during the last 2 years, Kazakhstan's machine building complex reduced its output growth by a factor of more than 2.

Measures for the retooling of sectors producing consumer goods are being thwarted. More than one-half of fixed assets in these sectors are worn out and obsolete. All this has a negative effect on the quantity and quality of produced goods. Meanwhile, the republic's per capita manufacture of these goods in 1988 was only one-half the average for the country. Quite often the growth of manufacture of goods for the population was replaced by unjustified price rises.

Despite certain positive developments in stock raising, the republic's agro-industrial complex has a poor growth rate. Its deliveries of output fell short by R380 million in 1988 alone. Targets for the purchases of grain, sugar beet, vegetables, potatoes, fruit, and berries were not met. Over a 3-year period, Kazakhstan as a whole has incurred a debt of 8 million tons of grain to the state.

Last year the profitability level of sovkhozes, kolkhozes, and industrial enterprises stood at just 10.6 percent. Almost one-third of the total number of farms made losses. The total amount of losses reached R440 million.

There are still plenty of instances at the local level of leaders opposing the development of lease relations. This applies not only to the countryside but also to industry, the construction industry, and transport. This was correctly raised at one party Central Committee plenum by N.V. Gellert, member of the CPSU Central Committee and machine operator at Tselinograd Oblast's kolkhoz named for Amangeldy.

The report and election meetings and conferences held in the republic sharply criticized party, soviet, and economic organizations for poor leadership of the social sphere's development. Many of those in the audience know that a considerable number of population centers in Guryev, Aktyubinsk, Uralsk, Dzhambul, and even the capital's Alma-Ata Oblast have drinking water brought in by tankers, and the availability of medical institutions and trade service areas is below union levels. Some 300 villages and auls in Alma-Ata Oblast have no baths, and polyclinics in Alma-Ata City are overloaded with work. There are 10,000 children without places in kindergartens or creches, while one school in five operates in three shifts.

Here is something else I would like to mention in particular. Everyone knows that Kazakhstan is inhabited by industrious working people, who are rallying increasingly closely beneath the banner of perestroyka. Now it is clearly visible how the republic and oblast party organizations are pooling their efforts in a persistent quest for efficient ways to solve the most complex problems.

Kzyl-Orda Oblast is rich in melon crops but is still experiencing shortages of potatoes and feed crops. But this shortage can actually be fully made up by Kokchetav Oblast. And there you have the beginnings of mutually advantageous ties between these two oblasts, just like those between Tselinograd and Chimkent or between Guryev and Uralsk Oblasts... These are not isolated examples. Consequently, even though the growth of food supplies is not identical in all oblasts, food supplies in the republic have improved everywhere.

It is a long-established tradition that people on the Kazakh land have gotten used to helping one another, ardently striving for mutual contacts. It is this noble tradition that today nurtures the desire to pool efforts and helps the successful solution of many complex social questions.

At the same time, we must admit that people in Kazakhstan still lead different lives: Some are better off, others are worse off. For example, the population in southern regions is noticeably lagging in income growth, and much still remains to be done there to improve health care services, public education, and so on. Consequently, serious work needs to be done on equalizing the socioeconomic development of the republic's regions. It is necessary to define specific measures to raise the population's living standards, primarily in Kazakhstan's southern regions. This work has already begun—but it has actually only just begun—and it demands major efforts along all avenues.

Lagging in the social sphere—in parallel with growing shortages in commodity supplies, complications in the ecological situation in some of Kazakhstan's regions, and a number of other factors—has a negative effect on the state of interethnic relations. And even though much has been done in the republic to improve the system of managing international education processes, many tension spots still remain. The development of events in a number of places in Guryev Oblast in the last few days shows that, even after the situation has stabilized, much more persistent work will be needed to consolidate the shaken trust between people.

More attention must be given to the problems of satisfying the sociopolitical and spiritual demands by all nations and ethnic groups living in Kazakhstan.

It is well known that a forthcoming plenum of the CPSU Central Committee is due to examine problems of interethnic relations. Its task is to update the party's nationalities policy and to elaborate political methods for work on its implementation.

The experience of republic party organizations will have to be seriously analyzed. Much will have to be planned and done for the purpose of harmonizing interethnic relations. In this context, and without waiting for the plenum decisions, it is necessary to defuse acute conflict

situations and to step up people's international education everywhere. The international unity of the Soviet people is the guarantee of successful development for each and every one of them. It is especially important to cultivate an awareness of this fact among young people. There is only one way here—to persistently cultivate the standards of interethnic contacts and respect for other peoples' language, traditions, and cultural values from early years, at schools and universities, in labor collectives. This work is painstaking and by no means easy, but it is noble and geared to the future. Everyone must find his position in it.

We have to accelerate the perestroyka of ideological work everywhere. It is lagging behind the demands of the time in a number of party organizations. The ideological cadres and the party aktiv still frequently give in to demagogues, prove unable to conduct a dialogue with people, to persuade people, and to distinguish between constructive criticism and harping, and follow the old habit of acting by means of administrative rule and prohibitions. It is necessary to implement measures to improve the forms and methods of party leadership of the mass media in the new conditions and to enhance demandingness toward communist journalists for upholding party positions.

Most responsible tasks and major goals lie ahead of us. Their implementation will, to a decisive extent, depend on how efficiently the party plays its role as political organizer of the masses. It is necessary, as M.S. Gorbachev emphasized at the Congress of People's Deputies, "to organically pool the efforts of a Soviet power which is undergoing renewal and the political work of a party which is undergoing renewal."

Party committees now must not lose the initiative, they must intensify their work on the consolidation of all of society's healthy forces in the struggle to deepen perestroyka. Their activity must concentrate on shaping the people's political and labor activeness, and they must engage in constructive dialogue with all social forces and social movements standing on positions of socialism's renewal.

It is important to enhance the personal responsibility of every CPSU member for implementing the party line. Primary party organizations must be highly demanding in their appraisal of every communist's contribution to perestroyka and of his deeds and actions, they must nurture in every party member the qualities of a genuine party fighter and the ability to persuade and lead people.

The CPSU Central Committee is confident that the Kazakh Communist Party will rise to the difficult tasks of the time and will do everything necessary to fulfill the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union Party Conference decisions. Kazakhstan and our entire country will gain from this.

Gorbachev, Nikonov Meet Russian Republic Leaders

LD2807152489 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 28 Jul 89

[Text] On 27 July there was a meeting between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and leaders of a number of Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] oblasts and autonomous republics which have been subjected to severe drought. The state of affairs developing in agriculture was examined, particularly regarding gathering in the harvest, purchasing and processing produce, and ensuring supplies of fodder for livestock raising by collective and state farms and the population.

A statement on this matter was delivered by Comrade Nikonov. He noted that it is not yet possible now to make an assessment of the harvest for the whole country, but it is perfectly clear that a good harvest of grain and other agricultural crops has been grown in the Ukraine, regions of the northern Caucasus, the central Chernozem oblasts, the Volga district, the central zone of the RSFSR, Moldavia, Belorussia, and the Baltic republics. By using intensive technologies and new forms of economic relations, many farms, leasing and contracting collectives have obtained a harvest such as they have never achieved before. Collective and state farms have joined actively in selling grain to the state.

At the same time, regions of Bashkiriya and Chelyabinsk, Omsk, Kurgen, Novosibirsk, Sverdlovsk, Perm, and some other oblasts and republics are sustaining heavy losses from the drought, and a significant number of farms have been experiencing the attack of the elements for the last 2 or 3 years in succession. All this has created great difficulties in work and in obtaining the planned volume of output there. The situation requires the urgent adoption of unusual measures, both in the regions and at the center.

The first secretaries of CPSU oblast committees participated in the discussion of topical tasks for the current agricultural year in the situation which has developed, principally those connected with ensuring stable work by livestock farmers: Pokhitaylo, from Omsk; Shvyrev, from Chelyabinsk; Khabibullin, from Bashkiriya; Plekhanov, from Kurgan; Bobykin, from Sverdlovsk; Bogomyakov, from Tyumen; Chernyshev, from Perm; Zorkaltsev, from Tomsk; Kuptsov, from Vologda; Grishchenko, from Udmurtiya; (Buldayev) chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Buryat ASSR; and Bokov, chairman of the Novosibirsk Oblast Executive Committee. Sizenko, Ligachev, Voronin, Mostovoy, Pavlov and Paskar also spoke at the meeting.

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev spoke in conclusion. He said: We have invited to this conversation leaders of republics and oblasts of the RSFSR in which, to tell it straight, a difficult situation is developing because of the extreme weather conditions. We are dealing with the

situation in regions where the country's most important industrial centers are located: large producers of metal, oil and gas, and of machine building and other industrial output. Stable work by collective and state farms and all enterprises and organizations of the agro-industrial complex in those regions is a matter of large-scale policy, for we need to act to help the agrarian sector of that zone get out of the situation which has developed with the smallest possible costs and losses.

What do we need to do in connection with this? We must compensate for the possible shortfall from the drought by obtaining the maximum output possible from regions where a good harvest has been grown. For this we need great organizational and economic work and daily attention to the needs of crop producers, in order to make use as fully as possible of these opportunities for supplying the population with food products. It is necessary to increase fodder resources as much as possible everywhere, in order to maintain livestock numbers in the public sector and on citizens' private farms and not to permit a fall in livestock farming, for the restoration of lost positions in this sector requires, as you know, a lot of time and high expenditure. In these conditions it is especially important to prepare for the wintering of livestock and to help the population with fodder in good time. That is an effective way, and the shortest, to augment output. Concern needs to be shown everywhere for the procurement of potatoes and vegetables for organized trade in them. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev drew attention of the participants in the meeting to the need for the full utilization of all local reserves and potential, as it will be more reliable and cheaper than, for example, seeking fodder elsewhere. Naturally, the support of the towns will be required here, and we must move toward this.

The problem of the agro-industrial complex of the regions which have found themselves in an unfavorable climatic situation should be in the field of vision of the government of the RSFSR, the USSR, and the CPSU Central Committee. Real assistance is needed by these regions. This concerns allocating financial and material-technical resources, and also seeds, food loans, and mixed fodder to some farms.

Concern must be shown for people, those who work in the fields and on the livestock units, who are mastering lease-holding and financial autonomy, and conditions must be created for the normal economic activity of collective and state farms.

Party and local soviet bodies, front-ranking party organizations, managers, and specialists are urged to step up work directly among the labor collectives. Everyone must do his job in a conscientious and responsible manner.

Central Committee of All-Union Komsomol Meets

Meeting Summarized

LD2907211989 Moscow TASS in English 2056 GMT 29 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 30 TASS—A two-day plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Young Communist League [YCL] (Komsomol)of the Soviet Union came to a close on Saturday [29 July]. The main conclusion running throughout speeches by most of delegates was that All-Union Leninist Communist Youth Leaque [Komsomol] is in need radical changes and renewal.

Addressing the participants in the plenum, Vadim Medvedev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, pointed out that perestroyka laid bare the problems that had been accumulating for years, including those concerning young people.

Gradually Komsomol turned into a certain formalised outfit and there developed a gap between the apparatus and rank-and-file workers. Party members also bear responsibility for the situation that has taken shape in Komsomol, Medvedev pointed out.

If Komsomol really wants to be the vanguard of young people, he emphasised, it should combine its political goals with the interests of various sections and groups of young people. The main orientation of Komsomol's work, in the opinion of Medvedev, should be to draw youths and girls of the country into practical perestroyka efforts.

The participants in the plenum adopted a number of resolutions: on the state of affairs in the YCL, on the elaboration of a new edition of the YCL rules, and on restructuring of the YCL's international activities.

A keen debate developed over a draft resolution "On the 22nd Congress of the Young Communist League of Lithuania". The congress is known to have declared as unlawful the resolution of the bureau of the YCL Central Committee dated October 18, 1940, on granting YCL membership to the Lithuanian Komsomol.

The plenum decided to set up a commission of the YCL Central Committee to study the issue. The commission is to report the results of its work to a regular plenum of the YCL Central Committee. [Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1950 GMT on 29 July carries a report on the Komsomol Central Committee Plenum, which notes that G.P. Razumovskiy, candidate Politburo member and CPSU Central Committee secretary, participated in the plenum.]

Medvedev Gives Speech

PM3007160289 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Jul 89 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Restoring authority Through Action"]

[Text] Virtually every speech at the Communist Youth League [Komsomol] Central Committee plenum included an appeal to restore the Komsomol's authority and reinstate the trust of young people, which it has lost to a large extent. In a heated discussion, what predominated was the conviction that the Komsomol's role and authority can be either reduced or increased only by its own specific actions.

In the brief breaks between sessions, a lively exchange of opinions continued. V.A. Medvedev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and G.P. Razumovskiy, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, also took part in the discussions, which were of the nature of a dialogue. Concrete questions, answers to the point.... The topics—the results of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the course of the Supreme Soviet session, the reform of the political and economic system, present-day nationalities policy. And, of course, the problems of perestroyka in the Komsomol and its democratization.

The CPSU Central Committee secretaries viewed an exhibition prepared by the MOLODAYA GVARDIYA publishing house. During his inspection V.A. Medvedev expressed a number of wishes in connection with the work of the youth press, and stressed the urgency of publishing works devoted to the theme of Great October and the socialist ideals of perestroyka.

The central elements in the debate concerned state youth policy and problems of party leadership of the All-Union Komsomol. V.A. Medvedev's speech to the plenum participants was also devoted to these and other questions.

Your plenum, the CPSU Central Committee secretary said, is discussing questions of exceptional importance. We are indeed talking about the future fate of the Komsomol, about what it can and must be in the future.

It is quite right that comrades are analyzing the situation that has taken shape in the Komsomol in the context of the sociopolitical development of our country as a whole, which is at an exceptionally complex and crucial turning point. New sociopolitical structures and administrative mechanisms are taking shape, and power is really being transferred to the soviets. The party's role is changing substantially. It remains the ruling party, but is increasingly seeking to perform its role by political methods, discarding command and edict functions. A new self-regulating system of economic management is being created, albeit with difficulty, and the position of the individual as the master of production is being restored. A new situation is becoming consolidated in the spiritual and ideological sphere. It is based on trust in man, glasnost and openness, and broad social dialogue. Foreign policy, whose successes are acknowledged throughout the world, has undergone profound changes during these years.

But at the same time perestroyka has brought to the surface and exposed our weaknesses and problems that had accumulated over years and decades. These include the country's extremely complex financial situation, market imbalance, the poverty of comparatively substantial strata of the population, the violation of the principles of socialist justice, freeloading, leveling attitudes, most acute ecological problems, and various shadowy aspects of our life, including those affecting young people. And of course, the acute and painful problems of interethnic relations.

Passions are seething all around, discussions about the country's future paths of development are raging. It is not so easy in this kind of situation to maintain restraint and follow the signposts which have been put in place. It is easy to panic or embark on the path of senseless actions, which is in fact what is happening to some people.

What is the party's line in these difficult conditions? I believe that it is the only correct one—confidently steering matters along the path of perestroyka and pushing on with practical actions more rapidly and resolutely than before. Overcoming inertia and conservatism, preventing adventurism, uniting all the healthy forces of society and channeling them along the road of perestroyka.

The fiery breath of the present situation in the country, V.A. Medvedev went on to note, could not but affect the Komsomol, the young people. Dissatisfaction with the Komsomol's work is expressed everywhere, there is open talk of a crisis, centrifugal trends are intensifying. In this connection I would like to stress one thing—if it is justified to talk of a crisis, it must be borne in mind that this crisis did not just spring up today or even yesterday, it is of a long-standing, protracted nature. Gradually, step by step, the Komsomol became a kind of formalized structure. In time, it began to be regarded as an all-embracing organization of young people, and the quantitative growth of its ranks was apparently considered the main criterion. People began to be admitted to the Komsomol in whole groups, and at the same time for years on end it could not rid itself of the so-called "dead souls."

A gulf developed between the apparatus and the mass of ordinary Komsomol members, they lived in parallel and scarcely came into contact. The topmost structures functioned smoothly, slogans were proclaimed, initiatives were devised, rallies and demonstrations were held, but underneath apathy and disappointment were growing and political life was barely ticking over. Voluntary principles were weakened and an "official" ["shtatnyy"] bias emerged. There were trends toward self-isolation on

the part of apparatus workers and the growth of the bureaucracy—a phenomenon that, among young people, is unnatural, distressing, and ugly.

Perestroyka showed that life cannot go on like that. It is necessary to renew, resolutely to abandon the old methods and forms of work. Heated debates and a critical mood are a healthy process creating the conditions for the resolution of the problems that have arisen. This process is entirely in keeping with perestroyka, and must be developed and supported in every way, and not only in the Komsomol aktiv and the press, but first and foremost among the mass of Komsomol members and young people.

I would also like to say that we party members take our share of responsibility for the situation in the Komsomol, as well as for all the other processes of the country's development. But the main thing now is not to engage in self-castigation, but to seek solutions to the complex problems that have arisen.

In an atmosphere of excitement, it is extremely important not to lose your head, so to speak, to avoid hasty steps and to give careful thought to the main guidelines for perestroyka in the Komsomol. In this respect I would like to put forward a few thoughts. They reflect the content of a conversation held recently between M.S. Gorbachev and the Komsomol Central Committee leadership.

The starting point is that the socialist society in the course of renewal undoubtedly needs a vanguard political organization of young people that is close to the party and operates under its ideological influence and on a shared ideological platform. This is also in accordance with social experience, including world experience. Every major progressive party that cares about its future has by it a youth organization that is ideologically close to it.

In present conditions the Komsomol is perceived as an autonomous, independent organization formed on a purely voluntary basis from among the politically active creative forces of young people. Clearly we should not seek to bring the maximum number of young people into the Komsomol. But of course, the Komsomol must not adopt an isolationist position and become a sectarian group, it should preserve the capacity to exert ideological influence on the masses of young people.

The question naturally arises: What is the ideological content of the Komsomol's platform today? It is the same as the party's. It is perestroyka, the renewal of socialism, the complete eradication of distortions and misrepresentations of socialism, and the creative combination of Leninist principles of socialism with the conditions and results of modern-day social progress. We have to do serious work on the creation of a renewed, modern concept of socialism that will give society and young people valuable guidelines in the spirit of Lenin's behests and the ideas of October, taking into account mankind's best social achievements. But perhaps the most important thing is to involve young people in the practical work of perestroyka, on which the political stability and irreversibility of the changes that have begun largely depend.

Some steps have already been taken in this direction. They include the election of people's deputies representing the all-union Komsomol, although one must also agree with remarks that have been made here on the Komsomol's insufficient activeness in the election campaign. They also include the formation of the USSR Supreme Soviet Youth Affairs Committee on the Komsomol's initiative. All this is a practical recognition of the political nature of the activity of the communist youth organization. As chairman of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies editorial commission, I was convinced of the activeness of young deputies and their energy in defending young people's interests. And that is good.

I find it quite natural to raise the question of a major revision of the all-union Komsomol statutes, and also the formulation of a Komsomol political program that could give purpose to its practical activity. I think its slogan could be "The Komsomol and perestroyka."

Here it is important to ensure that the Komsomol's politcial aims are integrated with the interests of different strata and groups of young people: working class, rural, school, student, Army. If the Komsomol really wants to be the young people's vanguard, it should work with all strata of young people.

Take the student milieu, where a complex situation has arisen recently. Questions connected with students' military training, for instance, were raised urgently. As you know, a solution was found. We know that students are worried about the teaching of social sciences at higher educational establishments. I have received memorandums about this. I wish to report that the USSR State Committee for Public Education, after consultations with the Komsomol Central Committee among others, has drawn up proposals on perestroyka in the teaching of social sciences. These will be examined and will begin to be implemented in the very near future.

The Komsomol Central Committee proposal on convening an all-union student forum this year merits support. I think it will offer a wide opportunity to discuss ways of improving the training of specialists and the further democratization of all the activity of educational establishmetns.

Equally major sociopolitical problems should clearly be at the center of the Komsomol's attention in relation to other strata and groups of young people, too.

I entirely agree, V.A. Medvedev went on to note, with those who see one of the main avenues of perestroyka in the Komsomol in its further democratization. The plenum participants have rightly spoken about extending

the rights and increasing the responsibility of local Komsomol organs and about the optimum limits of the autonomy of union republic Komsomol organizations. Problems associated with the status of Russia's Komsomol organization within the all-union Komsomol structure should be studied carefully.

These questions demand a detailed, democratic discussion taking into account the opinions of all the republics' Komsomol organizations. They should be resolved within the framework of present-day nationalities policy. It is hardly necessary for the structure of a sociopolitical organization to mimic the federal structure of the state system. We should proceed on the basis of the Kosmomol's political nature and the common ideological basis and unity of views of its organization.

Speaking of party-Komsomol relations, V.A. Medvedev identified in the debates on this key question two themes that were heard at the plenum. One is criticism of party committees, including the CPSU Central Committee, for slackening their attention toward Komsomol affairs. The other is forceful rejection of diktat with regard to Komsomol organizatons and interference in the Komsomol's day-to-day work.

These two themes, the CPSU Central Committee secretary noted, reflect the existing situation and our real weaknesses and problems. Many forms of party leadership of the Komsomol should indeed be radically changed. This applies, in my view, to the issuing of direct instructions on specific questions of Komsomol activity and the resolution of many cadre questions, including the party membership of leaders of Komsomol committees, to say nothing of interference in the day-to-day work of Komsomol committees. The party should exercise its political and ideological influence on the Komsomol first and foremost through the communists working within the committees. And even then, not by monitoring their every step, but by relying on commitment to the political line and a high sense of awareness and responsibility on the part of communists.

This also applies, V.A. Medvedev went on, to party influence on the mass media. This is not exercised by the methods of permission or bans, strict control, and management, still less by giving orders (all this is a thing of the past), but through ideological influence on the information sphere, constant dialogue with journalist cadres, and the provision of information and guidance for them. I do not think any questions should arise, the CPSU Central Committee secretary said, if a party committee invites a communist who works on a newspaper or on radio and television, and if an enthusiastic, well-argued discussion takes place with him and there is an exchange of opinions and views on the problems arising. Experience shows that journalists themselves show a lively interest in this.

This by no means belittles the fact that the Komsomol itself should give its press better leadership and take responsibility for its work. Especially since the situation in the Komsomol press is causing some concern from the viewpoint of the insufficient thoughtfulness and one-sided thrust of certain publications and weaknesses in the study of young people's urgent problems. Substantial changes in working conditions and the resolution of organizational and cadre questions will certainly result from the adoption of a law on the press. Answering questions in this connection, the CPSU Central Committee secretary noted that we are all interested in the speediest examination and publication of a draft law for public discussion and subsequent adoption. Measures are now being adopted to accelerate this process.

A number of speeches, V.A. Medvedev noted, spoke about the holding of a CPSU Central Committee plenum on youth questions, and also the adoption of a party document to reflect new approaches to party leadership of the Komsomol. The CPSU Central Committee will carefully consider these proposals, the CPSU Central Committee secretary said, so as to present a common front in advancing to resolve the problems of the Komsomol's rebirth, the revival of its authority in our society, and its active involvement in perestroyka processes.

Concluding his speech, V.A. Medvedev expressed confidence that the Komsomol, renewing itself and full of initiative, will be at the party's side along the exceptionally crucial and important path of renewal of the socialist society.

Floods in Far East Cause 'Grave' Situation

LD3007130989 Moscow World Service in English 1200 GMT 30 Jul 89

[Text] The situation remains grave in the Soviet Far Eastern regions, where in some places torrential rains have brought the water levels to the critical mark. Over the past 24 hours two people have died in the calamity. A total of 3,000 local residents have been evacuated. The area of distress covers 13 districts with two cities. Communications have been broken with 150 cities and villages. Masses of humid air are moving into the region, which may cause more rain.

Zaykov, Ryzhkov Discuss Environmental Problems

LD2907231289 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 29 Jul 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] [Correspondent Tikhomirov] This is a real island, although it is surrounded not by water but by Moscow and its suburbs. It would take some searching to find another capital in the world where deer sometimes wander just 10 yards away from high-rise apartments, and ducks spend the winter on the roofs of institutions. This reserve is 110 sq km, and it is only thanks to it—and this must be realized—that Muscovites are not part of

the 20 percent of the country's population who live in ecological disaster zones—yet. [Video shows forest and lake then cuts to a dump strewn with paper and other trash. Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers and member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, Lev Zaykov, CPSU Central Committee secretary, member of the Politburo, and first secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee, and a large party accompanying them are seen walking through it. Shot then focuses on a pile of matteresses] This is also Losinyy Ostrov. No, not one of the numerous illegal trash dumps put up along forest roads and paths, but a quite official disgrace: a base for salvage scrap belonging to the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply. [passage omitted]

[Zaykov] What is all this mess?

[Unidentified official] It is always a mess like this, because everyone (?has become accustomed to it).

[Zaykov] You have become accustomed to it.

[Ryzhkov] A mess.

[Zaykov] A mess, and people are used to it, of course. [passage omitted]

[Tikhomirov] This is the vehicle base of the Ministry of Automotive and Agricultural Machine Building, but they (?have put in) only 40 vehicles, yet for them they have taken land away from the park. This was discussed today. [Video shows Ryzhkov and company entering truck park; party crowds round as Ryzhkov speaks, addressing man]

[Ryzhkov] Go away from here. Set an example. We will clear everyone away from here anyway.

[Man] We will try.

[Ryzhkov] Well, go voluntarily. Set an example.

[Man] We will.

[Ryzhkov] Do not be here in a month. Let them [nods off-camera] work out what is to be left and what is to be dismantled.

[Man] It can be done sooner.

[Ryzhkov] It can be done sooner. It can be done in 2 weeks, so that nothing is left.

[Zaykov] He can do it in a day. Get up and go. [words indistinct, all three speak at once]

[Ryzhkov] Yes. We have got them to do it thoroughly. People created it. Look, 300 years ago they created it. In 300 years we destroy ourselves. We ought to do just the opposite: Add to this wealth to hand it on to succeeding generations. We can not even properly keep what we received from somebody. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified man] Right by the village of Radonezh the trees are being felled and dachas are being built, next to Abramtsevo. There is simply mass felling of the Moscow area woods.

[Zaykov] This must all end of course, especially in the greenbelt. There is a ban, but they get in by all sorts of different loopholes and somehow or the other make their way into the oblast and build, even in the greenbelt. [video cuts to crowd of people standing by a large wooden house; Tikhomirov says it is (Torfyanniko) settlement] [passage omitted] [video cuts to Ryzhkov and party standing in the middle of a path in the woods]

[Ryzhkov] I think that along with all the immense questions facing the economy and the country—and you felt that at the congress and at the session of the Supreme Soviet—that there are thousands of questions of all possible kinds, which must be solved, which have become pressing, I think that the most difficult question will be the ecological one.

Here you see there is a clash between the interests of many different groups. State interests, collective interests, and personal interests clash here. We must make a reasonable decision to move forward and at the same time tackle the ecological problems step by step. This will be a difficult path.

Vorotnikov Meets Chelyabinsk Oblast Officials

PM1107083589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Jul 89 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Strengthening Collaboration Between the Party and the Soviets"]

[Text] Chelyabinsk, 1 Jul—V.I. Vorotnikov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium, and USSR people's deputy, who is visiting Chelyabinsk Oblast, met today with the oblast's party and soviet aktiv.

The main topic at the moment, he said, the topic that has the attention of the entire country, the topic that is being discussed everywhere, and not only discussed but also argued about, is the outcome of the CPSU Central Committee April (1989) Plenum and the first Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

The reason for this keen interest is obvious. The Congress was, undoubtedly, a landmark event that opened up qualitatively new opportunities for the renewal of Soviet society. Above all, because it was a real step forward in establishing a rule-of-law state, strengthening the power of the soviets, and further developing the processes of democratization. At the same time, the

Congress fully reflected the multifaceted nature, complexity, and contradictoriness of the processes that are under way in the country. It reflected the dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in the economy, the social sphere, and in interethnic relations felt by broad circles of the public. It revealed the sources of social tension in the country.

As is known, there are other opinions as to the significance of the Congress or specific decisions that it adopted. Voices have even been heard claiming that the Congress failed to live up to expectations, that it did not heed constructive proposals, that genuine "democrats" were in the minority at the Congress, and so forth.

What can be said in this context? Above all, surely, that the existence of critical, dissatisfied voices and divergent assessments and the fact that they can be heard also, if you like, serves to confirm the success of the Congress; to confirm new notions about democracy and glasnost, the tolerance by the party and society of divergent views, the understanding that a diversity of opinions is a normal and natural state; to confirm the party's confidence in the correctness of its positions and its readiness to discuss, argue, weigh up arguments, and persuade by force of the logic of its ideas rather than by force of pressure methods.

One very substantial reservation must be made here, however. A diversity of opinions is possible only if there is tolerance not just of other opinions but also of criticism when the flimsiness of your own positions is explained to you. You cannot claim that you are a "democrat," a "progressive," that you care about freedom more than others, while at the same time trying to slander and blacken your partner whose opinion, as distinct from yours, has won the support of the majority. Or trying to negotiate for yourself special, cushy conditions. Finding yourself in the minority, seeking to save your reputation by discrediting the majority by attaching unflattering epithets to it.

The Congress reflected more or less clearly the mood, or rather the alignment of forces, that is characteristic of society as a whole. What does it look like, expressed in broad terms? There can be no doubt that people who resolutely support perestroyka and favor profound transformations in various spheres and an intensification of the process of democratization predominate in society. And although far from all the views of this majority have crystallized, it is undoubtedly capable of sorting out its positions. Then there are those who are afraid of changes, who defend conservative views, and yearn for a quiet life.

But there are also people who pay lip service to perestroyka but who in actual fact have something else in mind—the renunciation of socialist principles, to be specific. Some of these pseudodemocrats cover up their true intentions, while others admit openly that they are waging a struggle for power. The influence of these groups on the atmosphere in society and people's mood must not be underestimated.

It is no accident that precisely these forces are trying to discredit the Communists. Today, when the party is channeling all its energy into working positive changes in the economy and other spheres of social life, this is particularly intolerable and demands unconditional condemnation and rebuttal. The attacks on the party must be perceived above all as a signal for a resolute stepping up of all our efforts. There will be no quiet life for us from now on. Incidentally, there never was one for those who were wholeheartedly committed to the cause, who sought to be in the thick of the masses and in the forefront of events.

Today, the speaker went on to say, the question of the role of the party has assumed new topicality. The leadership of society is a difficult task that history has assigned to the CPSU, having tried many of the forms of managing a vast, multinational state. We had a multiparty system in our country—both before the October Revolution and in the period immediately following it. That system was not vindicated in our conditions. To try to revive it would be a mistake. There is only one way open to us—strengthening the positions of the Communist Party and improving the forms of its work as the political vanguard of society.

Of course, we are not drawing on the lessons of history alone in reaching our conclusion.

Let us ask ourselves: Are there any other political forces in our country capable of ensuring the harmonious development of society, the coordination of all sociopolitical processes, and the cooperation of the various sections of our multinational state? The answer is obvious. There are no such forces. The little groups that are laying claim to an "alternative" role act under slogans of the renunciation of socialism and the disintegration of the country, and they are ready to destroy everything that was created during the difficult and—let us be frank—tragic years. Is there any need to add that in their concepts of the future state there is no room for communists.

We must not, we have no right, to renounce power for the sake of falsely understood democracy. On the contrary, if we really care about the strengthening and expansion of democracy, about true people's power, rather than just holding forth about it, we must reinforce the strength and the influence of the party. This is the way, and it is the only way, the question must be put.

The dialectics of the current stage of development are such that the strengthening of the party's leading role is directly connected with its switch to predominantly

political and ideological forms of work. Its long leadership of the economic sphere, in other words its implementation of functions that were not its own, was not conducive to the solution of economic tasks and at the same time prevented the party from attending to its main duties.

Incidentally, many of our current acute problems rank among those that the party first and foremost should have dealt with. They include the settlement of interethnic relations, the molding of the younger generation, and the ability to create and maintain a healthy moral climate in society. It is here that an intensification of negative trends has been observed.

It is particularly important today to correctly demarcate the functions of the party, the soviets, and economic organs. We must admit that as recently as 2 years ago this question had not even been raised. However, life is making us learn fast. A great deal has already been done toward this kind of separation of functions, as it were. This was graphically demonstrated both by the Congress of People's Deputies and the work of the USSR Supreme Soviet which it elected.

Naturally, in implementing the policy aimed at a definite separation of the functions of party and state organs, it is necessary to ensure businesslike, constructive collaboration between party committees and the soviets. In particular, we must not cease to pay attention to the work of people's deputies but must give them all-around assistance in the exercise of their powers and in the enhancement of their knowledge in the sphere of state building and law.

It goes without saying that we are only at the very beginning of a great task. Legislative acts will have to be drawn up in which the principle of investing the soviets with full powers in the economic, social, and political spheres of life, and also measures to overcome departmentalism and parochialism will find a consistent and concrete expression. The Congress emphasized that the reconstruction of the soviets of people's deputies at all levels, the democratization of their work methods, the all-around expansion of their rights and powers, and the unconditional subordination of the executive apparatus to the soviets are an indispensable precondition of restoring to the soviets the real levers of power. Much attention is being paid to improving the leadership of local affairs, which must be implemented on the basis of self-management principles while developing citizens' initiative to the maximum and enhancing the role of social organizations and truly democratic movements with a genuinely socialist thrust. The party Central Committee attaches special importance to the draft law on the basic principles of local self-management and local economy which is currently being drawn up.

Preparations for the new elections to republic and local organs of power which will most probably be held in the spring of next year are assuming paramount importance. A new law on elections is currently being elaborated by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. We intend to take careful account of the experience of the USSR people's deputies elections—both their pluses and their minuses. It is necessary to ensure a procedure that will make it possible to select the worthiest candidates and elect the best of them to the soviets.

All the transformations that are to be implemented in the soviets' work, V.I. Vorotnikov stressed, must pursue one aim—enhancing the soviets' effectiveness in resolving political and national economic tasks, developing the social sphere, and involving citizens more broadly in the management of state affairs. Their attention right now must be focused on the adoption of urgent measures to actively implement the economic reform and resolve problems connected with improving the financial situation, fulfilling the food program, and ensuring ecological safety.

We clearly understand the causes of the difficulties that have built up in the economic sphere. They are dealt with in detail in the documents of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies. Unquestionably, mistakes and miscalculations have been committed both at the center and at local level, in decisions and practical actions, above all in the implementation of the economic reform. Quite a few problems have arisen, for instance, as a result of enterprises' switch to contract work. Frequently supplier enterprises are trying above all to extract advantages for the collectives from these contracts, seeking to lower targets and push up prices to obtain what is essentially unearned profit. As a result, more money is paid out while output does not increase. The financial deficit is not reduced. As a result the economy gains nothing from this kind of work apart from an exacerbated imbalance in the market, higher prices, and unsatisfied demand for goods.

The approach of labor collective councils to the question of the electivity of enterprise managers is not always objective either. Frequently people ready to make promises are elected, or people who do not display the necessary exactingness, who try to be "kind" to the collective to the detriment of statewide interests.

A new government is currently being formed that will have new functions that will allow it to move away from day-to-day concerns and concentrate on key issues and influence the economy more effectively. The Supreme Soviet and its committees are elaborating proposals to tidy up the law on enterprises, the cooperative system, and prices. One thing is clear, however: The center will continue to delegate its rights downward—to republics and enterprises, and in this way the main burden of the work will rest on enterprises. Each one of them must, of course, consider itself responsible for the situation not just in its collective and sector but also in the state as a whole.

Or take the well-known phenomenon whereby the increase in wages constantly outstrips the increases in labor productivity. On average, the former is increasing twice as fast as the latter. And this discrepancy is incorporated in enterprise plans. It is true that the plans have to be approved by ministries, but it is done under pressure from the local level, not infrequently with the consent or even at the request of the soviet executive committees, and even party committees, and they ultimately also look after "their own." But if everyone acts like that, than there will soon be no "others" in our state.

The solution of other questions connected with this also depends on the work of the soviets. Take the very same market imbalance that creates conditions for hoarding. At the moment we are producing 50 percent more soap and detergents than in the past, but there are none on the market because they are being hoarded and used for speculation. It can happen that a shortage is caused by a one-off disruption in production, but more often than not it is a consequence of all kind of rumors and distortions, and sometimes even malicious intentions (as was the case with salt and matches, for instance). It is necessary to notice these processes and react in good time.

The RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman went on to dwell on questions of interethnic relations. He observed that their perceptible exacerbation in a number of regions is causing serious concern in the party and among wide public circles. The CPSU Central Committee Plenum on interethnic relations is being prepared with much responsibility.

You are, of course, aware of the serious outbursts of nationalism in a number of regions of the country. Naturally, these problems also concern the Russian Federation. Both because we are a multinational republic, and because by dint of its economic and political weight, the RSFSR objectively carries more responsibility for the state of affairs in the entire community of union republics.

What questions are involved here? First, the enhancement of the role of republics in the solution of socioeconomic tasks, outlined at the the 27th CPSU Congress, and the policy of reinforcing their independence and sovereignty demand that the corresponding management structures be duly improved in our republic too. It was rightly noted at the Congress that in terms of a number of relative indicators the Russian Federation is lagging behind some republics. Some of our administrative components are weaker, many ministries and departments necessary for the competent leadership of the national economy do not exist at all, the network of educational and cultural establishments is poorer, we do not have our own academy of sciences, and there are not many republic newspapers and journals. To this it must be added that the greater part of the republic national economy—mainly base and raw material sectors—comes under the jurisdiction of union organs. Understandably, no matter what the Russian management organs do, this circumstance reflects negatively on the integrity of the RSFSR's socioeconomic development. And all this is not just a drawback for us; it is not conducive to the establishment of equitable, harmonious relations throughout the union.

The speaker noted that proposals aimed at rectifying this situation have either already been introduced or are being elaborated. For instance, the question of the transfer of union construction ministries to the republic can be regarded as resolved. The republic State Committee for Construction [Gosstroy] is to be radically reorganized and invested it with the right independently and definitively to resolve questions pertaining to the planning, distribution, and construction of projects on RSFSR territory.

Proposals are being elaborated for creating an integrated republic system of material and technical supplies, establishing production associations and concerns on the territory of the republic, and transferring sectors currently under the jurisdiction of union ministries to the republic. The question has been raised of a substantial reworking of the normatives of mutual financial relations between soviet organs at all levels and union and republic enterprises and organizations.

At the same time, improving political structures, creating RSFSR organs of certain social organizations, and expanding the rights of the RSFSR Council of Ministers are being considered.

Changes are overdue also in the administrative-territorial setup of the Russian Federation. The shifts that have occurred in the development of individual oblasts in recent years, the changes in the economic structure of territories, the density and composition of their population, and the emergence of new socioeconomic ties among them—all this demands a new approach to territorial entities.

At the same time there is the task of improving the structure of the soviet executive organs at all levels. Proposals for improving the structure of ideological establishments, press, radio, and television are being elaborated. The question has been raised of creating an integrated academic science system in the republic. The question of considerably enhancing the legal status of autonomous formations and transferring to them a number of rights which currently belong to the Federation has become topical. It is proposed to expand and define more precisely the rights and obligations of autonomous republics and oblasts and create safeguards for the protection of the interests of all autonomous entities.

Describing the changes that will take place in the work of the republic Supreme Soviet and reporting on the work that is under way on amendments to the RSFSR Constitution, V.I. Vorotnikov set out a number of proposals

and observations on ways to improve the work of soviet and economic organs in Chelyabinsk Oblast and to enhance the role and activeness of party committees.

In conclusion the speaker replied to numerous questions from the meeting participants.

The chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium paid a visit to the Muslyumovskiy state farm and inspected the shops of the Chelyabinsk electrometallurgical combine.

V.I. Vorotnikov departed for Moscow on the same day.

Baklanov Visits Defense Industry Plant
PM1007152789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Jul 89 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Focusing on Perestroyka's Practical Work"]

[Text] The saturation of the consumer market with consumer goods depends to a considerable extent on defense enterprises, which have to sharply increase consumer goods output within a short period. The USSR Ministry of the Defense Industry's S.A. Zverev "Krasnogorskiy Zavod" near Moscow produces amateur photographic equipment and various optical instruments which are currently in high demand.

On 7 July O.D. Baklanov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, examined the state of affairs at this enterprise in building up consumer goods production. It was noted that poor use is being made of the plant's existing potential for meeting the demand for amateur photographic equipment. Moreover, the technical standard of the "Zenit" cameras that it produces lags behind foreign models—the high demand from consumers is explained by the lack of any competition and the population's increased purchasing power. But this is a temporary phenomenon, and if the plant's scientists and designers are unable to achieve new qualitative standards in their articles, the collective may find itself in difficulties after a certain period. The question of inadequate attention to increasing production of optical instruments for industrial and scientific uses was keenly discussed.

The discussions with workers focused on how to bring the reserves for boosting production efficiency into play more rapidly, and the need was noted to introduce forms of economic management which would encourage the workers' activeness.

The secretary of the CPSU Central Committee visited the plant's residential areas and centers relating to the social and consumer sphere, and chatted with residents.

At a meeting with the enterprise aktiv O.D. Baklanov shared his impressions of the work of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and gave his comments on the plant's work. Soviet people's high political activeness engendered by perestroyka is typical of your collective too, the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee noted. It is important that people act as genuine masters of their enterprise. They are really concerned about how to improve the technical standard of output and about social problems, which, regrettably, the association has in abundance. The housing lists are too long, yet own-resources construction methods are only used to build production projects. Subsidiary farming has not been organized, and this is affecting the supply of meat and dairy products to workers. Food organization has not been fully resolved, and there is a shortage of canteen space. The plant's leaders and party committee should seriously restructure their work to resolve these tasks. The secretary of the CPSU Central Committee answered numerous questions and took part in an exchange of opinions with the members of the aktiv.

O.D. Baklanov was accompanied by Minister B.M. Belousov, B.I. Balashov, secretary of Moscow oblast party committee, and other party and economic leaders.

Vlasov Addresses Russian Prize Winners
PM1007151989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Jul 89 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Russian Prizewinners"]

[Text] A group of scientists and specialists received the diplomas and insignia of winners of Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] State Prizes in the sphere of science and technology in Moscow 7 July.

A.V. Vlasov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, made a speech at the ceremony. Congratulating the prizewinners, he said that today is the second time that Russian State Prizes in the sphere of science and technology have been awarded since they were instituted. They are recognition for work by major scientists and talented specialists which is of great scientific and applied importance and goes beyond the bounds of regions and even republics. This means that the decision to award Russian prizes was correct. It provides an incentive for original scientific research and technological design developments and boosts the economy and culture of both the country as a whole and, of course, the RSFSR. The good tradition of encouraging the work of Russian scientists who think about the welfare and size of their motherland is thereby being developed.

All the prizewinning work without exception deserves a high assessment, A.V. Vlasov stressed. The glory of Russian science and technology is great and indisputable. And now we are honoring a new detachment of enthusiasts who are continuing these great traditions.

The awards were presented by F.A. Tabeyev, first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the RSFSR Committee for State Prizes in the Sphere of Science and Technology.

Belousov Attends Fishermen's Day Meeting

PM1007151389 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Jul 89 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "In Honor of Fishermen's Day"]

[Text] A ceremonial meeting devoted to the 70th anniversary of the formation of the Soviet fishing industry and Fishermen's Day was held in Moscow 7 July. A report was delivered by N.I. Kotlyar, USSR minister of the fish industry.

I.S. Belousov, member of the CPSU Central Committee and deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, took part in the meeting along with the leaders of a number of ministries and departments, scientists, and representatives of the capital's public.

CPSU Resolution on Purge Victims Viewed

PM1007104989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Jul 89 Second Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "At the CPSU Central Committee: On Perpetuating the Memory of the Victims of the Repressions of the Thirties, Forties, and Early Fifties"]

[Text] The resolution adopted by the CPSU Central Committee on this question notes that for the purpose of restoring historical and social justice great work is being done in the country to ensure the full rehabilitation of all citizens who were the innocent victims of the mass repressions of the thirties, forties, and early fifties. Measures are being taken to ensure that the rights of those rehabilitated and their relatives are strictly safeguarded and to compensate them for the material damage suffered, memorials to the victims of the repressions are being set up, and cemeteries are being opened.

At the same time, as appeals, letters, and statements addressed to the CPSU Central Committee demonstrate, work to perpetuate the memory of the victims of the repressions in a number of republics, krays, and oblasts is still inadequately organized and inconsistent. Some party and soviet organs are not showing sufficient activity and are making poor use of the potential of the public and the commissions that were specially created in accordance with the CPSU Central Committee resolution dated 6 January 1989 and the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree dated 16 January 1989.

The CPSU Central Committee has instructed the Central Committees of union republic Communist Parties, party kray and oblast committees, as well as Communists working in local soviets to step up the work to perpetuate the memory of the victims of the repressions, including those who died in exile.

The necessary measures are to be taken to designate the places of burial as official cemeteries and to erect monuments and memorials. The mass media are to regularly report on the measures being taken.

Soviets of People's Deputies are instructed to elaborate and implement measures to put the burial places of the victims of the repressions, including those who died in exile, in the proper order and to look after them. Internal affairs and state security organs are to be involved in this work on a broader scale. The necessary explanatory work is to be conducted to preclude unwarranted exhumations and reburials.

Soviet executive organs are instructed to resolve questions connected with finding the necessary resources for putting cemeteries in order and establishing monuments. There was support for the public's proposals to use voluntary donations collected by citizens.

First All-Union Cooperatives Congress Assessed

PM1107090189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Jul 89 Second Edition p 4

[Ye. Sorokin report: "Impasses and Horizons. Notes from the First All-Union Congress of Cooperatives in the Spheres of Production and Services"]

[Text] Moscow—Many people curse cooperatives. Unless public opinion displays understanding here, the very words "cooperative member" will probably soon acquire a negative meaning. A great deal about this new individual—the entrepreneur—frightens us. His desire to think in terms of "capital," "market conditions," "production risk," and even "representation fees." His inability to "toe the line" and bow to authority. His independent opinions, which often go beyond the bounds of familiar stereotypes. But the main thing to which many people react particularly sensitively is cooperative members' conviction that Soviet people can and must live in clover, they are rolling in money.

You could hear more than enough about all this at the first all-union congress. The discussion there was extremely complex. In his report A. Korobkin, chairman of the organizing committee for holding the cooperatives' congress, described the current situation in the cooperative movement as extremely contradictory. There is a mass of these contradictions. Certainly the main thing is that the forces that brought the cooperative system into being seem to be scared by what they have done. Resolutions restricting the new sector of the economy both in material and technical supply and in financial operations have sprung up like mushrooms after rain. The state sector, which saw the emerging cooperative movement as a future mighty rival, the congress participants said, began to pressure the administrative apparatus, demanding tougher penalties against its "precocious" competitor...

Unbelievably high price lists for output supplied to cooperatives are appearing. Soviet executive committees [ispolkoms] take months to examine their statutes. They stick to quite strange rules: Whereas a public catering worker who has been caught embezzling is fired, in the cooperative sector an entire enterprise is closed down because of one crook. Cooperatives have, in effect, become the hostages of local organs of power and it is the latter who have been given the right of establishing price and taxation levels and monitoring cooperatives' activity. The fervor with which people at local level have undertaken this job is surprising. Whereas, for instance, often you can go for years without seeing ispolkom members at a state enterprise, cooperatives seem attract many of them like a magnet.

However, A. Korobkin pointed out, the activity of cooperative members themselves also gives considerable cause for dissatisfaction. There are among the 2 million cooperative members not only people who, frightened by increasingly "progressive" taxes, want to make a pile before it is too late, but also outright self-seekers and machinators, people who do not value either the prestige of the movement as a whole or the honor of their own brand name.

However, many good things have happened in the cooperative movement over the past year or so. One can of course argue about the rapturous statements that cooperative members produced R6 billion of goods and services for the population last year while in the 1st quarter this year they produced in excess of R4 billion. But one thing is indisputable: The cooperative movement today is by no means made up of the notorious "shashlik vendors" and "rest room attendants," with whom everyone is fed up.

Production cooperatives—factories, plants, trusts, and administrations—are winning an increasingly large place within the movement. The surprising point is this: These organizations from the state sector only have to switch to the cooperative sector for a miracle to occur—a previously unprofitable enterprise becomes profitable. Although everything is still as it was: the prices of output and the rates of labor remuneration. This is easily explained: Once they become full masters of production, people count every kopek. Therefore the congress delegates' dissatisfaction with the notorious decree "On Income Tax on Cooperatives," adopted this February, was certainly understandable.

The discussion on taxes was certainly one of the most trenchant and principled. Economic science has proved that if the aim is to expand the cooperative movement, the 25-percent ceiling must not be exceeded under any circumstances. Otherwise the number of people paying the tax will simply drop. Instead of increasing treasury receipts, the flow of money will grow smaller with every passing year. Delegates asked the USSR Supreme Soviet to suspend operation of the decree. Their appeal pointed out that the decree is insufficiently well-conceived from the juridical and economic viewpoints. The most important thing is that the tax must be the same in both sectors of economic activity. Only then will one be able to talk about full-blooded competition.

It is already clear today that cooperatives are a force to be reckoned with. But this force... lacks power and rights. Anyone who feels like it can order it around and "direct" it as they see fit. The Law on the Cooperative System has only been in effect for 1 year but there is no ministry or department that has not published its own "laws on the cooperative system." That is why the question of legal regulation of the relations between the two sectors of the economy arises so acutely.

Whether you like it or not, cooperative members themselves are also to blame. In an endeavor to get rich quicker, they sometimes unjustifiably inflate prices. You will agree that, given the millions of poorly paid people, it is hard to tolerate the existence of new millionaires in our environment. Equal conditions for the functioning of the state sector and cooperatives are needed in order to ensure that such social injustice does not exist in the country.

Here is something that worried us before the congress began. V. Sevryukova and P. Romanov, cooperative members from Kazakhstan, came to the PRAVDA editorial office on the eve of the congress. It transpires that there are two cooperative associations in the republic.

"Our association—the 'Union'—has for some reason remained 'unrecognized' but the other will have 30 votes," they said in perplexity. "But the 'Union' was set up considerably earlier and includes almost 1,300 cooperatives, while the parallel association does not even have hundreds..."

My guests cited the most varied arguments, which can obviously only be investigated at the scene of the conflict itself. However, the struggle for "representation," on which one sensed considerable effort was expended, also occurred at the congress itself. The newly created union aspires to a monopoly and wants to "absorb" other union, republic, and regional associations and unions. I do not know whether that is good or bad. But as I listened to the impassioned speeches against the "state sector monopoly" and "bureaucratic racketeering," I thought that now is certainly not the time for cooperative members to tackle leadership issues. They are demanding the creation of their own trade union to defend people's social needs. What about their production and financial needs? Who is to tackle this if not the all-union cooperative association?

Something else must also be taken into consideration here. No matter how much cooperative members may aspire to exclusivity, they exist within the framework of the established system. Whom do you instruct the Ministry of Finance to deal with if it is simultaneously approached by the representatives of 3-4 cooperative

unions? Are they all "all-union" unions? In that case what kind of unified policy can there be for the country in the cooperative sphere? Cooperative workers are generally educated people. They also love to quote to V.I. Lenin. He wrote: Before uniting, you must draw the lines. The lines have already been drawn, so is it not time to act as a united front?

The struggle "for a place in the sun" may lead the cooperative movement into the deadlock of interunion squabbles. Moreover, it may lead to the demise of the movement itself. I believe that many resolutions aimed at restricting the cooperative sector "got through" because there was no one to uphold cooperative members' interests. In this connection the question of creating their own newspaper was raised in a timely fashion at the congress.

In general the word "own" was often heard. Whether it was a question of a trade union, a bank, or mining enterprises... Certainly, the "own path" is the path to which the cooperative movement must adhere. The path of a "parallel economy" will compel the state sector to act more vigorously. That is perhaps one of the main tasks of the USSR Union of Associated Cooperatives in the Production and Services Spheres which has been set up. Academician V.A. Tikhonov from the V.I. Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences was elected its chairman.

Military Leaders Sign Stroilov Obituary
PM1007160089 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Jul 89 First Edition p 3

[Obituary: "G.A. Stroilov"]

[Excerpts] Colonel General Georgiy Andreyevich Stroilov, retired, a participant in the Great Patriotic War and holder of the USSR State Prize, has died. He devoted his whole life to the cause of the defense of the socialist motherland and selfless service of the Soviet people and the Communist Party, of which he was a member from 1942.

G.A. Stroilov was born in Tbilisi on 3 November 1916. From 1937 he was in the Armed Forces. In the Great Patriotic War he fought on the 1st Ukrainian, 1st Belorussian, and Transbaykal fronts. In the postwar period G.A. Stroilov held a number of leadership posts in the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and the USSR Defense Ministry's central apparatus. [passage omitted]

D.T. Yazov, M.A. Moiseyev, P.G. Lushev, K.A. Kochetov, A.D. Lizichev, Yu.P. Maksimov, V.I. Varennikov, I.M. Tretyak, A.N. Yefimov, V.N. Chernavin, M.I. Sorokin, V.M. Arkhipov, V.M. Shabanov, N.V. Chekov, V.L. Govorov, D.S. Sukhorukov, Yu.A. Yashin, S.F. Akhromeyev, V.G. Kulikov, N.V. Ogarkov, A.I. Sorokin, I.A. Larin, V.M. Mikhaylov, P.I. Ivashutin, N.A. Makarenkov, N.A. Brusnitsyn, N.G. Gladkikh, Ye.A. Belyayev, V.I. Kochetkov, V.M. Rudenko, V.A. Pozharskiy.

Leaders Sign Actor Plyatt's Obituary
PM1007150389 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Jul 89 Second Edition p 6

[Obituary of R.Y. Plyatt]

[Excerpts] Soviet art has endured a heavy loss. Rostislav Yanovich Plyatt, People's Artist of the USSR, artist of the Moscow State Academy Theater named for the Moscow City Soviet, and an outstanding master of the stage, has died in his 81st year.

Life has lost an artist of brilliant and inimitable individuality and a man of rare charm and tremendous creative energy.

R.Ya. Plyatt was born into a jurist's family in Rostov-na-Donu in 1908. [passage omitted]

M.S. Gorbachev, V.I. Vorotnikov, L.N. Zaykov, YE.K. Ligachev, V.A. Medvedev, V.P. Nikonov, N.I. Ryzhkov, N.N. Slyunkov, V.M. Chebrikov, E.A. Shevardnadze, V.V. Shcherbitskiy, A.N. Yakovlev, A.P. Biryukova, A.V. Vlasov, A.I. Lukyanov, YU.D. Maslyukov, G.P. Razumovskiy, YU.F. Solovyev, N.V. Talyzin, D.T. Yazov, O.D. Baklanov, A.S. Kapto, V.G. Zakharov, V.T. Saykin, A.A. Goncharov, M.A. Gribanov, O.N. Yefremov, G.S. Zhzhenov, E.G. Klimov, YE.N. Lazarev, K.YU. Lavrov, L.F. Losev, L.V. Markov, YU.S. Melentyev, T.N. Pelttser, M.N. Prudkin, A.S. Smirnov, A.I. Stepanova, V.V. Tikhonov, M.A. Ulyanov, P.O. Khomskiy, and M.M. Khutsiyev.

Editor Comments on Gorbachev's Reforms
AU1007213589 Vienna PROFIL in German 10 Jul 89 pp 38-39

[Interview with Vladislav Starkov, editor in chief of the Soviet weekly ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, by Michael Siegert at the East-West Dialogue Forum in Alpbach: "Gorbachev—an Apparachik"; date not given]

[Text] [Siegert] Mr Starkov, your magazine is the most successful organ of glasnost. You publish authors like the former dissident historian Roy Medvedev, who has meanwhile become the most widely read interpreter of repressed chapters of Soviet history. How did you, as an official journalist, acquire these sources?

[Starkov] I have been reading everything by Medvedev for 20 years, also the things that were published in Samizdat. For some time, a KGB guard watched Medvedev's apartment, and when he was gone, I went to Medvedev on the next day. I published his study on Khrushchev as a series. It is now being published as a book. I made Medvedev popular in the Soviet Union.

[Siegert] In the West Medvedev's books have been known in their translated versions since the 1970's. Is it not dangerous for you to publish something like this?

[Starkov] Last summer they wanted to fire me after the 19th party conference. I had published some things that the Central Committee Propaganda Department did not like. By the way, this department no longer exists; it has been abolished.

[Siegert] What was it that the people of the apparatus did not like?

[Starkov] I published an interview with writer Vladimir Dudintsev (Footnote one) (In his latest book, Vladimir Dudintsev, who became known in the 1950's for his novel of the thaw period "Not By Bread Alone," describes the oppression of scientific genetics by Stalin, Khrushchev, and Trofim Lysenko), in which he posed the question of why every time Gorbachev goes abroad something happens against his course. The question was then even discussed in the Politburo. When Gorbachev was on vacation on the Crimea after the party conference, there was this attempt to get rid of me.

[Siegert] The question about undermining Gorbachev was posed once again by Roy Medvedev as a new people's deputy at the People's Deputies Congress and in front of 100 million television viewers.

[Starkov] I told him about my case.

[Siegert] When your post was at stake, Yegor Ligachev was the secretary for ideological issues and the second man in the party. It is said that he is behind an article in which Gorbachev's policy was attacked and which was published on 13 March 1988 in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. The author is Nina Andreyeva, a Leningrad chemistry teacher.

[Starkov] As an eye- and ear-witness I can report on a conversation with Yegor Ligachev on the day this article was published. Ligachev called a group of journalists for a meeting and lavished much praise on Andreyeva's article on this occasion. He said it was a model and stated that this is the way one should write.

[Siegert] Last September Ligachev lost the second place in the party and became the head of the Agriculture Commission. His policy in this field is now being greatly criticized. Is there a struggle for power under way between the progressive and the conservative wing?

[Starkov] I think this is exaggerated. As the title of my magazine says, I am dealing with facts and arguments. The whole matter seems to me like a quarrel among children: Who is stronger, the elephant or the whale? The question is meaningless because one is moving around under water and the other one on the ground.

[Siegert] But one gets the impression that the two protagonists represent an opposing policy: Gorbachev is in favor of market economy and private land ownership, Ligachev is in favor of the old forms of state ownership.

[Starkov] Gorbachev does not say anything like this. I would be very grateful to you if you could show me a speech by Gorbachev to this effect. You should thoroughly read his speeches and his book "Perestroyka"! In the West the differences of opinion within the Politburo are being exaggerated. I say: If one could see the contradictions more clearly, it would be better. I interviewed Boris Yeltsin, and he said that there is no crisis in the Politburo which might lead to a turnabout. He himself formulated the title of our interview: "There will not be a putsch."

[Siegert] But Yeltsin himself speaks of the advent of a revolutionary situation. Would not such a putsch be necessary so that the people finally get something to eat?

[Starkov] Yes, this is what I mean when I say that the contradictions are not profound enough. Of course, I am in favor of this revolution.

[Siegert] Gorbachev also speaks of "revolution," he is carrying out from above. Where are the masses? Can there actually be a revolution without a mass movement?

[Starkov] At present the masses are participating in the discussions. It is a process of democratization. I hope that the current political revolution will lead to a social revolution.

[Siegert] In every revolution there is the problem of violence. Will it end in your country as it did in Beijing?

[Starkov] Of course, we do not want a bloody revolution, a civil war, and a state of emergency. Unfortunately, there are already the first signs of civil war—in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kzakhstan, even in the Moldavian Republic.

[Siegert] Thus, you believe in the Beijing model?

Starkov: I do not want to, but, after all, we had the Tbilisi model. There, 20 people were killed at the beginning of April.

[Siegert] There is also another model in recent Soviet history, the events of Novocherkask. In 1962 price hikes caused a workers uprising there. Such price hikes also belong to the current program of economic reforms. There is already a silent inflation of 10 percent.

[Starkov] In Novocherkask abrupt price hikes were imposed. This will not happen now, precisely because of this experience. We have also learned from the Poles: In Poland there have always been strong reactions to price hikes.

[Siegert] Are there not differences of opinion within the Politburo concerning this question? After all, the price reform has been postponed for 3 years now. The reformers say that there is no real market without eliminating subsidies. Ligachev is posing as the defender of the workers' interests.

[Starkov] I am sorry, but I cannot follow you. You see this too much with Western eyes. I understand that journalists want to see dramas and tragedies. There is also a connection with this almost heathen idolatry, which Gorbachev enjoys here in the West. He has changed much in the field of international relations. But in his own country? Let us take the issue of price hikes. Gorbachev does not want to raise the prices, and Ligachev wants everything to remain as it is in any case. Do not forget that Gorbachev himself was an apparachik, a very progressive one with great sensitivity, but he also belongs to the apparatus. Without the apparatus nothing works in this system.

[Siegert] What is the root of conservatism, which also keeps Gorbachev tied down?

[Starkov] When I listened to the People's Deputies Congress I asked myself: What is hindering Gorbachev most, the climate in the Politburo or his own concept of socialism? Might it not be the case that a conservative concept of socialism has developed among the people, a concept which is very hard to change? Then this would not be a struggle just between two persons at the top.

[Siegert] We are always looking for the old struggle between the "Russians" and the "Westerners" at the top, and Ligachev and Gorbachev offer themselves as poles in this quarrel. Ligachev likes to present himself as the protector of Russia's beautiful scenery, its monuments; one notices that he would like to be the champion of Russian nationalism.

[Starkov] Russian nationalism in the old sense has long disappeared. You must also see that there is a social problem behind the national problem. If the people do not have any bread any more, the question of whether someone is a Russian or not becomes mute. Of course, there are always Russians who say that if I were a Jew I could live better, or Armenians who want to get rid of their Azerbaijani neighbors or the other way around.

[Siegert] Where would you start working?

[Starkov] The answer is simple: Everyone must get freedom!

[Siegert] Freedom to do what?

[Starkov] Everything! For instance, permitting my editorial board to buy the field outside. Now this is still prohibited. We are making an annual profit of R50 million with our newspaper. The money disappears into the state's money chest, and we do not know what happens to it. It is a bottomless pit. I only earn R350 per month. (Footnote two) (According to the official exchange rate 7,000 schillings, about 1 and ½ times the average Soviet salary.)

[Siegert] What would you do if you had entrepreneurial freedom?

Starkov: We could translate our magazine for the West. This would yield foreign currency. But if we just have to give it to the state again, we have to ask ourselves whether there is any use in this work for us.

[Siegert] There are already restaurant cooperatives. Would this not be a starting point for further reforms?

[Starkov] In this field, too, the cart has been put before the horse. In reality, the Moscow cooperative cafes are just castles in the air; they lack the basis in production. They buy their foodstuffs in the state shops, and there is nothing to buy there.

[Siegert] Thus, cooperatives and private business not only in the tertiary sector, but also in industry and agriculture?

[Starkov] Yes. Thousands of people write to us that they want to work in a self-employed way and ask how they should go about this. I am convinced that if it were possible to freely buy and sell land, everything would be sold within a month. With the current lease system, one has to go the bureaucrat, persuade him, bribe him—but the land still belongs to him. He only leases it for a certain period and keeps giving orders to the people. No wonder that only very few people accept this offer.

[Siegert] In the People's Deputies Congress freedom of speech was introduced first. Do you now expect action?

[Starkov] The people say: The dog's leash has been lengthened and the dog has been permitted to bark.

[Siegert] Are you also such a dog on a leash with your magazine?

[Starkov] I am also a representative of my people. However, our feeding dish has been moved even further away.

USSR Television News Chief Interviewed

PM1207133489 Paris LE MONDE in French 11 Jul 89 p 15

[Interview with Eduard Sagalayev, head of Soviet television news, by Annick Cojean in Moscow; date not given]

[Text] [Cojean] To what extent has the glasnost policy influenced the work of television journalists?

[Sagalayev] Glasnost first forced us to change our view of news. For instance, some time ago events like those now taking place in Central Asia did not exist for television and were not regarded as news. News was, for instance, exceptionally high milk production in a collective farm [kolkhoz]; or a Politburo member going to the airport to welcome another party member on a working visit. It is very simple: Anything which was profitable to us could be seen on the television. Anything which might be unpleasant for us could not be seen.

[Cojean] Who do you mean by "us?" Profitable to whom?

[Sagalayev] To the leadership apparatus—the communist party, the government.

[Cojean] Who is providing the impetus for this change?

[Sagalayev] It is difficult to answer that. It is like an avalanche rolling down the mountainside and causing a snowball phenomenon everywhere. The process affects politicians and journalists who had never thought of retaliating but who now dare to say no everyday.

[Cojean] What role are you playing yourself? Do you give instructions to journalists?

[Sagalayev] I am trying to inculcate a state of mind in them. I tell my subordinates each day that their main consideration must not be promptings and instructions from the government, but the rules of professionalism and the choices of their consciences. I also believe in the need to balance feelings within an editorial board and to have the broadest range of public opinions represented in it. This is crucial, in view of the fact that the USSR only has one television network.

For a time I was in charge of the magazine program "Vzglyad" [Look] which just 6 months ago was still regarded as very left-wing (Footnote) (The "left" in current Soviet terminology represents the radical reformist wing. The "right" is represented by the party conservatives—LE MONDE editor's note) and produced by left-wing journalists. However, journalists with centrist or even conservative positions have now been included in that editorial team. And I am convinced that the director of a French television channel has more freedom than I have to get rid of such journalists. Unfortunately, the trade unions are very strong in our country....

[Cojean] The party apparatus has not readily agreed to lose its perogatives. How does it still exercise control over radio and television?

[Sagalayev] By the appointment of cadres. However, the latter are no longer mere agents. My appointment as head of news when I was previously head of the youth department, strikes me as an obvious sign of the leadership's desire to shift the official network more to the left. Perhaps I, too, am playing a puppet's role....

[Cojean] Do you have to be a party member to be a senior television cadre?

[Sagalayev] Yes. But the editorial board now includes middle-ranking cadres who are not party members, and that was unthinkable a short time ago. This is also true—and this is more important and significant—of television journalists and announcers.

White Telephone

[Cojean] What links do you have with state officials? Is one of these telephones a direct link to the Kremlin?

[Sagalayev] Yes, this one. (He pointed to a white telephone on his desk bearing the Kremlin's arms—LE MONDE editor's note). It rings sometimes and I can always telephone Mr Gorbachev. But, believe me, at present it is very dangerous to use this telephone to give directives or orders.

[Cojean] Why?

[Sagalayev] Because I could immediately give an interview to the press, for example to MOSCOW NEWS, to tell the story and report that attempt at pressure. Any attempt to oust or fire me would then be a public admission of vengeance.

There is a riddle which clearly illustrates the relations between the government and journalists in the days of glasnost: Why is a fly like a minister? The answer is: Both can easily be killed by a newspaper!

[Cojean] The televising of the congress debates was a great first for the Soviet public. Did the journalists see that as a kind of go-ahead for in-depth investigation?

[Sagalayev] Of course, that is done but...it is difficult to explain to you. You have to be born here to understand the paradoxes. The journalists clearly intend and want to make a detailed investigation of the roots of the evils which are gnawing at society. But their position is very different from that of the deputies who enjoyed total impunity in the debating chamber, in Gorbachev's presence. The journalists will be personally responsible for what they write. And they have two conflicting feelings: fear and boldness.

[Cojean] So, fear has not vanished, despite glasnost....

[Sagalayev] It exists. And I do not rule out the possibility that some of the most virulent deputies wondered how long it would be before they were arrested. There is fear in the blood.

[Cojean] All the Western countries attached considerable importance to the coverage of events in China. Soviet television, however, was very discreet.

[Sagalayev] The volume of news on China may have left something to be desired although we gave information everyday. Gorbachev's visit to Beijing explains that choice. We did not want any deterioration in the relations which had just been reopened with so much difficulty.

[Cojean] Is this the journalists' problem?

[Sagalayev] That is an interesting question and raises the problem of the position occupied by Soviet television. So far, especially abroad, it has been thought to reflect the government's viewpoint. This is particularly true of the main daily news program which I run. However, we have been trying to prove that the reverse is true for 4 years. But the picture is firmly anchored abroad. The Western countries think that anything that is said on the "Vremya" program is the official voice, the Kremlin's opinion—even if a journalist takes care to specify that it is a personal viewpoint—and they even question government circles on what they have heard the previous day.

This hampers us greatly and stems from the television monopoly. That is why I think it is very desirable to set up a new television network which is independent of the government and run by cultural associations (writers' union, film producers, and so forth). This is a crucial point. It is impossible to obtain complete freedom of expression while there is an monopoly on the means of expression.

[Cojean] The written press has often inspired television in France. Can it not play that role in the USSR?

[Sagalayev] The press is more exciting everday. Some people in our country even say that reading is now more interesting than living.... But we do not yet have democratic tools: There is no law on the press, no workers' organization in the media.... When that is the case, it will give us weapons. And we will no longer be guests in this world of glasnost, but the people who inhabit it.

CPSU Seen 'Lagging' in Own Perestroyka

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[Article by L. Onikov: "The Party and Perestroyka: Discussion Forum—Why Is the Vanguard Lagging Behind?"]

[Text] It was 2 years ago, at the CPSU Central Committee June (1987) Plenum, that M.S. Gorbachev for the first time drew the party's attention to the fact that an "alarming trend" had emerged—a number of party organizations were lagging behind the predominant mood and dynamic processes which were developing in society.

Today the party's lagging behind in perestroyka is no longer news to anyone. It has been bluntly stated at the CPSU Central Committee April (1989) Plenum, the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, and recent plenums of major party organizations—the Moscow City and Leningrad Oblast organizations.

This discussion continues today almost everywhere, including in the press. In so doing the emphasis is usually placed on noting the fact itself, and sometimes very substantial and distressing examples are cited of party organizations' manifestly lagging behind the overall process of perestroyka that has seized the country. Blistering, sometimes ignominious instances are described of passive defense by Communists when faced by loudmouths who accuse the CPSU of every mortal sin.

But in these anxious reflections and discussion you almost never hear the **main** question—about the **causes** of this lag. Yet they, the causes, are far more evident and acute than 2 years back. And without an in-depth explanation of them it is completely impossible, on the one hand, to understand the nature of this curious phenomenon that has befallen us whereby society's political vanguard, which itself put forward the idea of perestroyka and laid a fine foundation for it, suddenly and incomprehensibly found itself in the rearguard, at the tail end of the process; while, on the other, unless you clarify these causes, it is impossible to overcome this perestroyka-endangering lag and make up the leeway in double-quick time, thereby ensuring, as befits the vanguard, the leading position in the revolutionary renewal of society.

Individual, particular causes for the lag have been written about in the press, of course. I mayself have taken part in this discussion on the pages of PRAVDA. But it is essential right now to take the following step: To somehow assemble these causes together, identify what's paramount, and present the process in an integrated way.

Unexpectedly—such things do happen!—a request from the Political Publishing House to review the manuscript of the "Dictionary on Party Building," which is being prepared for republication, helped. I read both the manuscript and the first edition, which came out in 1987, and automatically compared all the questions of the theory and practice of party building **as laid out in the dictionary** with party life today and the progress of its perestroyka. And—a strange thing—in the book everything, apparently, is correct, there are no mistakes, while in life... in life everything is not the way it is in the dictionary, but quite the contrary.

This is not a penchant for wordplay. According to the dictionary, everything in party building, it transpires, is very well-ordered and sensible. There are no acute problems, let alone contradictory ones, and certainly no crises. I agree that one should not, of course, seek answers to the causes of the party's lagging behind in a dictionary. But the idyllic state of well-being inside the

party that permeates the book automatically makes one look more acutely at the processes occurring in the party, and particularly those which have condemned it to lag behind.

What, then, are the main causes of the party's lag? And—this is particularly important—how, after overcoming the manifest loss of momentum in perestroyka, the party could resurrect its Leninist primacy as society's political vanguard?

The answer to these questions cannot, of course, be clear-cut. We are dealing with a whole range of causes. One of the most important is that **internal party democracy**—that chief source of Communists' political activeness—has become frozen at the pre-perestroyka level. And this in a situation where every stratum of society has been embraced by rapid democratization.

Let us compare the degree of democratic spirit prevalent in the recent elections to the Congress of People's Deputies and the recent party report-and-election campaign. Our press has cited as an indicator of high democratic spirit within the party the fact that 1,117 secretaries of rayon party committees [raykom] and city party committees [gorkom] were elected on a contested basis from two or more candidates. This translates as 8.6 percent of the total number of secretaries. Some 269 raykom and gorkom first secretaries, or 6 percent, were similarly elected. Only 7 oblast party committee [obkom] secretaries, or 1 percent of the overall number, were elected. Whereas at the Congress of Soviets 74 percent of deputies were elected on a multicandidacy basis. The difference, as we can see, is not to the party's advantage.

The Achilles' heel of internal party democracy and, consequently, of the restructuring of party organization is the low level of self-management and of self-motivated [samodeyatelnyy], that is to say, social principles, in party work. It is well known that the most precise criterion of the development of democracy is the extent of direct, actual participation by the entire mass of people in shaping political decisions, implementing them, and the monitoring of this. Applied to the party, this means the active involvement of the entire party mass in its life—not just elected, executive organs and their apparatus, but all Communists. And via precisely those self-motivated, social principles.

I will venture to say that throughout the years of Soviet power the development of social, self-motivated principles in the party has never been in such a wretched state as today.

Let us remember again Lenin's words: "All the party's work is conducted, directly or via representatives, by all party members on an equal footing and without any exception." "All the work," "all members," "without any exception"—that's the Leninist formulation of the question. Vladimir Ilich repeatedly observed that party organizations cannot work normally without a good apparatus. But he made no fundamental distinction between staff (the apparatus) and nonstaff (the social principles) party work. Even in his day the expression "nonstaff party apparatus" was current.

Party work is a single, indissoluble system of elements of organizational-political and ideological-educational activity. It is hardly necessary to prove that Lenin attached prime significance to organizational work—just look at the names of his works: "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back," "What Is To Be Done?" and so forth. But, according to Lenin, organizational work means the party's ability to organize, to lead the **entire multimillion mass** of working people along behind it, and to work in their midst. Stalin, in establishing the omnipotence of party committee bureaus and their staff apparatus, objectively **opposed** the apparatus to the party mass. Under Stalin and for many years after him the content and meaning of organizational work were radically distorted. They were reduced essentially to the point where one group of party functionaries, taking advantage of the extreme centralization and relying on administrative power, commanded a subordinate group of similar functionaries by means of injunctions. Self-management and the independence of the mass in Lenin's concept were discarded.

The sorry history of Lenin's idea of social principles in party building may be most briefly summarized as follows: Beginning in the early thirties Stalin dealt it a deadly blow by giving the apparatus essentially all the reins of power. That raised a wall between executive party organs (the bureau) and their apparatus, on the one hand, and the party mass and the formally functioning, leading, elected organs on the other. Is this not the most profound reason for the superficial twaddle about "criminals belonging to the party apparatus" and for attacks on the party in general? And one of the most important tasks of the restructuring of party work is to eliminate this obstacle. The party is not the party committees and their apparatuses, as has become quite firmly rooted in the mass consciousness. The party is almost 20 million equal members led by leading, elected party organs—from raykom plenums to Central Committee plenums and congresses of the CPSU.

For truth's sake it must be said that under Stalin primary party organizations were obliged by the Statutes to help the raykom and the gorkom in their organizational work. Even then social principles were still alive in the party, albeit in a very truncated state.

N.S. Khrushchev made a heroic leap forward when he sought to restore Lenin's idea of the active participation of Communists in internal party life. The establishment of Communist social self-management was proclaimed. However—as happened more than once with this undoubtedly great politician—he moved away from Stalin but did not move toward Lenin. But in this instance he was motivated more by intuition than a knowledge of

the subject. He clearly did not understand that the **main condition** of the development of social principles in the party is the granting to Communists of **real rights** to direct and active participation in party life. Rights were not given. The party apparatus fully preserved its old positions. Lenin's idea was compromised. Which gave party bureaucrats of the Brezhnev mold the opportunity to completely discard this great idea as an unnecessary trifle.

But then something unlikely happened. The 27th Congress, the first truly great congress of a truly great perestroyka, took a **step backward** on this question, even compared with the years of stagnation. The last traces of nonstaff principles in party work were skillfully eradicated from the Statutes. The list of basic obligations of party committees at all levels **excluded the item** on the "broad involvement of Communists as nonstaff workers in the conduct of party work as social activity." Furthermore, the list of the primary organization's tasks also **excluded the item** which states that it "helps the okrug committee, gorkom, and raykom in all their activity..." As a result of a verbal balancing act the **obligatory** need for nonstaff principles in the work of raykoms and gorkoms was also omitted. At the same time the new edition of the CPSU Program left out the following provision: "The party must go forward and in the organization of its internal party life set an example and a model of... communist social self-management."

Even in our time, which is full of contradictions, it is hard to find a more curious contradiction: The CPSU has adopted a firm course toward the establishment of the socialist self-management of the people, and in the party itself the principles of social self-management have been reduced to virtually nothing. And this in conditions of a politicization of virtually all sections of the population which is unprecedented in depth and scale.

I foresee objections here: Are social principles not applied in the work of raykoms and gorkoms already? They are. But this is qualitatively different from the practice of Lenin's years and a number of years since. The fundamental difference is that today, for example, commissions of party committees are formed, as a rule, **from the members of elected organs** and aktiv members, the overwhelming majority of whom belong to the party committee **nomenklatura**, whereas under Lenin **rank and file Communists** were the majority. Those Communists, involved on the basis of social principles, enjoyed broad rights, participated in party committee sessions, had access to documents, and so forth. The range of questions resolved with their assistance was also an order of magnitude higher than today. Finally, according to Lenin's scheme, the greater the party's numerical strength, the greater also the proportion of Communists participating in this work on social principles should be. But now their proportion is surely at its lowest in history.

I am convinced that it is the development of social principles in the party and the direct involvement of all Communists in its activity which is the main question in the development of internal party democracy and the restructuring of all party work. The heart of the problem is at the point of contact between primary organizations and raykoms and gorkoms, in that place where all party organs from the CPSU Central Committee down are **directly coupled** to the entire 20-million strong party mass. This is where the fate of perestroyka is settled.

Many people today complain about the powerlessness of Communists, who so often find themselves in dire straits nowadays, and about their sluggishness, muteness, and impotence. With a sense of rueful envy they recall the individual and group initiatives of our forebears in the legendary twenties. Our predecessors felt at home on the streets and squares. In their ability to win over the mass, to refute their opponents' arguments, and to triumph in seemingly hopeless situations the Bolsheviks were without equal.

That ability doesn't come to you ready-made. It can be molded **only and exclusively only by experience of direct personal participation** in party life, which was the banner of those tumultuous years.

In Moscow in the twenties, for instance, one party member in six was directly involved in the practical implementation of the gorkom and raykoms' line. The number in the country's major industrial centers was approximately the same.

That has stopped today. Communists are increasingly alienated from the raykoms where they are on the party register. This alienation is our punishment for the passivity of the so-called rank and file party members and their loss of militant qualities. That punishment is inevitable, just as the subsequent withering and dying of party life are inevitable.

The resolution of the 19th party conference contains an extraordinarily important provision: "The degree of Communists' involvement in the activity of party committees does not correspond to the requirements of the fundamental restructuring of party work, the development of internal party democracy, and the establishment of the socialist self-management of the people." A year has passed. What has been done? Practically nothing! That is the reality.

Communists as citizens, as the most conscientious and most active section of society, are of course in the front ranks of the perestroyka now under way in the country. The elections of USSR people's deputies and their Congress proved this with indisputable clarity. But the party members' opportunity to prove themselves in perestroyka in this actual capacity of theirs, as members of the CPSU, has been sharply reduced since the level of internal party democracy fails to rise up to the demands of the time. In the conditions of real transfer of many functions of power from the party to the soviets, and following changes in the forms and methods of party influence on the latter's activity—exercised through

Communists working in soviet organs—there must also occur a redistribution of power within the party itself between the apparatus and the entire party mass. Unless it overcomes Communists' alienation from the elaboration and implementation of party policy, the party will be unable to acquire the strength and prestige of the people's political vanguard.

On the eve of the revolution Lenin wrote about the "wonderful means" which would enable us "to increase tenfold our state apparatus" at a single stroke. This means is the involvement of the masses in the running of the state. That was in the conditions of a largely illiterate, peasant country. So why should we not be able now, in the course of revolutionary perestroyka, to increase our party apparatus tenfold by involving the many hundreds of thousands, the millions of Communists—the most conscientious and best section of Soviet society—in party committees' work on social principles? The party mass and the party apparatus are not antipodes. In Lenin's view, they are comrades in the common party cause.

Look at the way the so-called informals and their leaders run their affairs and improve themselves. They cannot be accused of lacking the ability to polemicize, to make emotional speeches, to promptly and effectively amend their slogans and tactics, or to capture the mood of the masses. Why are they successful in this? Simply because they are involved on a daily basis in the real political process, in real life.

So, what is it that prevents the party from democratizing itself at a pace that is faster than anyone else's, as befits a leader? Where is the ultimate hiding place of that monstrous and secretive force which is so inexorably opposed to perestroyka? In my view, the situation has been negatively affected to a large extent by the fact that, during the first 4 years, we tried to restructure the party on the basis of pre-perestroyka normatives, instructions, regulations, and so on. Unfortunately, to this day we have failed to create a comprehensive mechanism for the party's perestroyka, which would provide incentives and guarantees for the development of internal party democracy.

The old documents outlined the **borderlines of glasnost** in party affairs, the role and position of the party committee apparatus, the nature of its work, the real correlation between leading and executive organs, the procedure for preparing draft resolutions, their implementation, and so on. Party raykoms and gorkoms, for example, have exerted themselves for exactly 4 years to restructure their work on the basis of instructions ratified in 1981, at the very height of the onerous years of stagnation... Until quite recently, not a single word, not a single comma had been changed in these instructions!

The old instructions unequivocally ruled out glasnost in party work. Secrecy was elevated to the point of absurdity and was, one could say, total. Collegiality as Lenin understood it could not be exercised on the basis of these instructions, nor could the activity of gorkoms or raykoms be monitored from below. The instructions rendered absolute the omnipotence of the party committee bureau and its staff apparatus. This is what actually alienated almost all party members from active and direct participation on party work and its perestroyka.

This organizational citadel of bureaucratic and administrative edict methods, erected way back in Stalin's era, stood unshakable until the very last moment. The dead, as the ancients used to say, had the living in their clutches. This is where, in my view, the **main brake** was to be found.

Some people would probably question this: Is the author, as an apparatus official, not exaggerating the effect of sundry instructions and other paperwork? I am not exaggerating. But I know one thing for sure: It is impossible to unfetter initiative by relying on instructions alone—lively efforts by living people are needed here. But when it comes to fettering initiative and lively thinking, all you need is just a single, perfidious piece of paper—or the absence of one.

And so, the charge of CPSU Central Committee resolutions, which were of the greatest importance for perestroyka and were adopted after the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum and the 27th Congress, was gravely diminished by the old normative documents. An analysis of the stenographic records of oblast and kray party organization plenums which preceded the 19th party conference showed that their work was virtually unaffected by CPSU Central Committee resolutions which were conceived for party-wide application and were in principle aimed at the development of democratic principles (on the Perm Obkom, on admission to the party in Tashkent Oblast, on Leningrad's Petrogradskiy Raykom, on glasnost in Vladimir Oblast). Virtually nobody mentioned them—it looked as if they had been simply forgotten.

Some current normative provisions are also contained in the party's main organizational document—the CPSU Statutes. For example: "The CPSU Central Committee shall hold at least one plenary session every 6 months." Or: "Young people aged up to and including 25 years shall join the party exclusively through the All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League." But there are also certain declarative articles which are not endowed with normative effect. For example: "The CPSU shall build its work on the basis of... broad glasnost." Or that democratic centralism means, in addition to everything else... "collegiality in the work of all organizations..." Such statute provisions must be backed by special normative documents elaborated in conformity with them. Were there any normative and open guarantees of "broad glasnost" or "collegiality" in party work provided in connection with perestroyka? No! And without guarantees, these are words and nothing but words...

It would appear that, in the interests of restructuring party work, the forthcoming 28th CPSU Congress ought to **give normative effect to the most important statute provision about internal party democracy.** Today, for example, the statute formulation of internal party democracy **does not contain even the principle of glasnost.** It probably ought to include provisions about broad, unsponsored activity by Communists and social principles in the work of party committees at all levels. And in order to prevent them hanging in the air as nothing but declarations, it would be worth specifying in the Statute—as it was done in Lenin's time—that they must be backed by **publicly operating** [glasno deystvuyushchiye] normative provisions and comments.

It would be pointless to seek the answer to many acute and painful questions concerning the development of internal party democracy in the dictionary I mentioned at the beginning. Even though it does contain formal articles about glasnost and voluntary principles. The dictionary covers almost all questions of party building and explains the meaning of 292 terms and ideas. Strangely enough, however, it does not examine terms like "personality cult," for example (or did it have no effect at all on party building?), or "deformation of Lenin's principles of party building" (or were they not deformed?). Nor is there any special article on "The Concept of Restructuring Party Work." There can be no argument that the need for such an article inevitably arises. Observations over a period of 4 years have convinced me that not only Communists but also the party aktiv (I have asked hundreds of people) lack a clear and accurate idea of the concept of perestroyka in its work. I think that this is yet another factor which dooms the party to lag behind.

Why is it that the "Dictionary on Party Building" to all intents and purposes evades these acute questions and sore spots? I am well aware of the lofty professionalism of its authors. They know as well as anyone else the real state of affairs within the party, its ailments and its defects. It is obviously a matter of an obsolete approach which has yet to be overcome. After all, as a rule according to pre-perestroyka yardsticks, whenever a party official encountered an acute negative phenomenon he tried to **conceal** it. But according to perestroyka criteria, in contrast, it is incumbent on him to **reveal** it, to analyze it, and to suggest ways out of the prevailing situation.

Unfortunately, the dictionary cannot promote perestroyka by, as it were, explaining and canonizing the obsolete norms, principles, and forms of party life in years past. But the authors are perhaps not the only ones to blame for this. They have only unwittingly revealed the—bluntly speaking—unenviable level of the true state of the theory and practice of party building. A level totally unsuitable for our party, which is called upon to be the real vanguard of perestroyka.

Problems of Bureaucratization Emphasized

PM2907163089 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Jul 89 Second Edition p 1

[Viktor Gorlenko article under the rubric "Topical Theme": "The Decision: Why It Sometimes Remains on Paper and Does Not Work for Perestroyka"]

[Text] How many times we have rejoiced: "A decision has been made at last, things are moving!" And nothing has happened. Why not? First, unjustified haste and the desire to achieve success without profound analysis and accurate forecasting can negate the effects of any action. And second, a part was played by the germs of that most dangerous disease—bureaucracy, which penetrated the corridors of worker-peasant power in its very first years of existence.

Look at Ye. Drabkina's memoirs. She writes, in particular: "If Lenin had been asked to answer light-hearted questions like those that Marx' daughters asked their father, in answer to the question: 'What do you hate most of all?' he would almost certainly have said: 'Bureaucracy!' In any event, nothing angered him as much as manifestations of bureaucracy..."

All the manifestations of the "state vice" were dangerous—red tape, official indifference, incompetence under cover of overbearing arrogance. But Lenin was much more disturbed by bureaucratic attitudes to work and the substitution of organizational fuss for getting on with the job.

"I am terribly afraid that we will die of reorganizations, without completing a single practical job...," Vladimir Ilich wrote to G. Sokolnikov. "I am mortally afraid of reorganizations. We spend all our time reorganizing, and take no practical action... Really, I am mortally afraid. Do not give way to this weakness, or we will fail."

"Fail"—precisely. You cannot put it any more bluntly than that. That was then. But now?

Now, for instance, the all-union State Agro-Industrial Committee [Gosagroprom] is passing into oblivion. On 5 April 1989, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium abolished this gigantic department (nearly 3,500 employees), and its elimination is to be completed by the beginning of November. What was the reason for this drastic, but urgent surgical operation? After all, the formation of the Gosagroprom was associated with the possibility of feeding people to their satisfaction and at long last filling the counters of food stores with tasty and nutritious food. They did not think it out, they were hasty. The agro-industrial committee, after swallowing up a number of ministries, failed to cope with its task, and instead of becoming the proposed catalyst, it turned into a brake on the development of agriculture.

Not so long ago, PRAVDA cited a remark ("Where Is Gosagroprom Taking Us?" 6 March 1989) by an economist from Gosagroprom who was desperately defending his own department. "Bear in mind," he said excitedly, "that no sector of the economy has been prey to as many upheavals and shakeups as the agrarian sector..." The present "shakeup" in the rural sphere is, according to his calculations, the 28th! That is to say, during the existence of soviet power, every 2.5 years (approximately) there has been something new, fresh, and, of course, advanced, which for some reason has thrust the countryside, together with the peasants, back into a regression.

But why? Largely, I think, because of haste and thoughtlessness (albeit with the aim of more rapidly overcoming holdups), because of the inability to examine all the consequences of the **decision** being made.

A decision on a state scale is first of all the supreme responsibility. At the same time, in the brief age of perestroyka we have already accumulated a substantial collection of resolutions, laws, decrees, and other directive measures, as they are called, that are hasty and therefore do not work for renewal. Let us recall some of them.

To begin with, the package of documents on combating drunkenness and alcoholism. Society's health, ridding it of intemperate traditions—no task could be nobler. But was it appropriate to adopt the "Attaboy!" method, on the bold principle of pitching into the fight, and then...

And then, we know what happened: Defeat on many fronts.

I am sure that if that decision on a package of antialcohol measures had been delayed at that time for 3 or 4 months (for thorough preparation and detailed consultations with medics, economists, psychologists, criminologists, and, finally, the public) it would not have been necessary to backtrack and maintain a shameful silence now about a problem that remains a priority.

The urge to be hasty and engage in instant bureaucratic campaigns is hard to cure as yet. That is why in some places the lease system gives way to total "conversion to the lease system," the introduction of new technology to "computerization," and what happens is this: One resolution contradicts another, the third needs amendments, stipulations, and instructions, and the fourth is simply wrong.

A good cause—economic accountability—is interpreted in a distorted way by some leaders, which leads not only to economic losses, but—and this is worse—to tragic human losses. How many accidents have already resulted from thoughtless "conversion to economic accountability" in railroad transport—solely because of arbitrary personnel cuts. The other day I read the report on the collision at a crossing between a diesel locomotive and a bus carrying children. The Gorkiy railroad, which has gone over to economic accountability, has "released" a number of crossing keepers, including the one at the site of the disaster, in order to economize. Economizing on people's safety is a crime, that is axiomatic.

Incidentally, about cuts in general. We all enthusiastically hailed the decision about a sharp reduction in the number of managers. What came of it? As has rightly been noted, the reduction in the ministries' apparatus by apparatus methods resulted in nothing but an increase in the number of officials at enterprise and association level. According to figures from the State Committee for Statistics, 1.7 million people now remain in ministries, departments, and other management organs, while the management personnel of enterprises and organizations totals some 13 million (it might not look all that many, but it must be borne in mind that security workers, typists, and messengers, formerly on the nomenklatura, have now been excluded from it).

Constant upheavals for the sake of upheavals cannot benefit the cause, perestroyka, that is clear. The fine-sounding titles of a number of programs are not, of course, an object of criticism in themselves. The object of criticism is the **quality** of a given program. How profoundly has it been validated?

Take a program that concerns millions of Soviet people, the all-union "Housing-2000" program, which, translated, means providing every family with an individual apartment or house. To that end it is necessary (according to the USSR State Planning Committee's calculations) to build 36 million new apartments between 1986 and 2000. First, according to more detailed calculations, 18 million more apartments are needed. Second, the rate of housing construction in this 5-year plan is markedly behind the planned rate. We still lack a mighty resource base, and therefore it is rather premature to build up the hopes of all those people who have spent years waiting in line for the new housing they want...

It is not difficult to recall a number of other targeted programs concerning trade, consumer services, drug production, transportation, the storage and processing of agricultural produce, and regional development, much of which remains unrealized.

So we must not be hasty in issuing reports and declarations, we should not hurry to break down the old mechanism without knowing what the new one will be like. After all, the good householder, before redecorating his room or his kitchen, has a very good idea beforehand of what he needs, and provides himself with materials and tools. Otherwise soon there is chaos and family life is reduced to "camping out."

On the other hand (let us remember the July wave of miners' strikes), can one postpone the adoption of decisions on urgent, key problems? Make haste slowly? A contradiction, but not an impossible one to resolve.

The main thing is to learn to think and ponder precisely as much as is necessary for the cause, for the end result, which should be tangible and realistic in every detail. Science is far from simple, but you can do nothing without it. Ultimately it is a question of real people, of their daily concerns, their lives, which are far from always untroubled or easy. People, working people, must be seen behind every line of the document recording every decision. The short-sighted "just in case" approach strains patience, generates protests, and ultimately damages the economy, and therefore the people's well-being.

The USSR Supreme Soviet, the "Message to the Soviet People" says, guarantees that in the course of the present session and the fall session it will adopt a number of very important laws. The guarantee of confidence in parliamentary decisions is their consistent implementation.

And another thing, it would be very nice to stop the growing avalanche of paper, because here we are looking at a record for the Guinness Book of Records: The management sphere produces circulars at the rate of one page per person per day...

Let there be fewer of them, these decisions and resolutions, but let each one be well thought out and weighty. Let each one work!

Because "giving way to the weakness of reorganizations" and of cavalry charges on the armored defenses of stagnation problems is risky, and useless to boot. Without practical action, we will indeed "fail."

Internal Troops' Role, Problems Viewed
PM1107113189 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Jul 89 First Edition p 4

[Colonel R. Makushin commentary under the rubric "After the Briefing": "Protecting People"]

[Text] This is precisely how Major General A. Griyenko, member of the Military Council and chief of the USSR Ministry of Interior Internal Troops Political Directorate, defined the main task of the internal troops.

Alas, recent events in Fergana and Novyy Uzen have provided the troops personnel with broad scope for demonstrating their readiness and ability to implement this task.

The briefing was devoted to the internal troops in general—their history, tasks, mode of action, composition, and so forth. Despite the all the novelty of this information, journalists, naturally, were interested above all in the aforementioned events. This is what was said on this subject at the briefing.

During the period 4-30 June, during the curfew in the Fergana valley, troops opened fire on six occasions. This was done only in circumstances when it was impossible to ensure citizens' constitutional rights and personal safety and troops' own safety by other means. According to preliminary data, the use of firearms has been deemed justified by the prosecutor's office. Nonetheless, criminal proceedings have been instituted in all cases. The final conclusion will be made by the investigating authorities.

It is important to note that in all cases attempts were made to appeal to the extremists' reason and to induce them to comply with the law. The situation was complicated by the fact that the rampaging youths were armed with firearms and blade weapons. By 3 July, 9,215 firearms alone had been confiscated.

Firearms, home-made explosive devices, hand-grenades, and petrol bombs were used against the servicemen. Many servicemen were injured. Three servicemen sustained gunshot wounds and 161 received other injuries, 34 being hospitalized. Gangs of thugs were looting, stealing, raising fires, and killing people irrespective of their ethnic origins. So 103 people were killed, including 32 Uzbeks, 2 Tajiks, 50 Meskhetian Turks, and 19 people of other nationalities; 754 residential houses, 28 state institutions, and 275 cars were burned or destroyed; 700 people were detained for disturbing the peace and 9,092 people for violating the curfew.

According to the testimony of the mass media and the population, the internal forces were the main and only guarantor of security and order in the region during the initial period...

Currently the numerical strength of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs internal troops totals around 300,000 men. This figure is not rigid. It may change (upward, inter alia) in accordance with the situation in the country. The internal troops have 22 types of special means at their disposal which can be divided into three groups: individual defense means, active combat means, and plain special means. They were described in detail and certain of them, for instance a serviceman's protective suit and various containers of the gas known as "Cheremukha," were demonstrated.

Naturally, the briefing participants spoke to journalists about what is particularly worrying them at the moment.

There are acute questions concerning the social and material protection of troop personnel during their efforts to maintain public order. The servicemen lack a great many things that would provide them with complete protection and help them to avoid a great many injuries.

Of late the situation in the correctional labor colonies which are guarded by the troops has sharply deteriorated. The number of cases of hostage-taking by convicts, premeditated murder, attempted murder, and resistance to representatives of the troops and the adminstration of the protected installations have increased several-fold. In no case have the terrorists achieved their aims. When

all types of persuasion were exhausted, special snatch groups were sent in using live ammunition, as a result of which a number of terrorists were killed or injured. All hostages have been freed. Unfortunately, this has not passed without casualties among internal troop servicemen. Thus during the effort to free the women seized by brutalized thugs at a Semipalatinsk Oblast Soviet Executive Committee Internal Affairs Department correctional labor colony Major V. Romanov, a political officer, was killed.

These are only some of the tasks and problems facing the troops. Their high-standard solution will be a contribution to the nationwide program for combating crime.

A film about the internal troops was shown during the briefing. It is going on general release.

'Normalization' of Situation in Novyy Uzen Viewed

PM1007115689 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Jul 89 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Normal Life Taking Its Course"]

[Text] Novyy Uzen (Guryev Oblast), 7 Jul—The appeal made by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in his appearance on Central Television, to show the highest sense of responsibility to present and future generations in the country in resolving the problems of interethnic relations, met with understanding and an appropriate response among the people of Novyy Uzen. This is indicated by the normalization of the situation in the city and the nearby settlements. People here expect the lifting of the curfew from day to day.

Infringements of the law have been reduced to a minimum in the city. And those that occur are committed, as a rule, on ordinary grounds. Mobile groups of militia and servicemen are visiting labor collectives and carrying out wide publicity work. They are helped in this by the members of the "Birlik" and "Solidarity" committees, who have drawn up a platform for joint activity. It is largely thanks to their constructive actions that the exodus of people of Caucasian nationalities from the city has stopped.

By a decision of the city soviet executive committee, nine cooperatives have been closed, seven of them trade and purchase cooperatives. They had all violated the provisions of the relevant government resolutions and were obtaining incomes that were far from in line with the services offered to the people of Novyy Uzen. At the same time cooperatives that help to fill the market with necessary goods are receiving all-around assistance to further improve their work.

Polish Lithuanian Language Friction Discussed

LD1207133089 Vilnius KOMJAUNIMO TIESA in Lithuanian 30 Mar 89 pp 1, 2

[Article by Professor Zigmas Zinkevicius, administrator, Baltic Philology Department, Vilnius University; Poet Marcelijus Martinaitis; Albertas Zalatorius, doctor of philological science, head scientific co-worker of the Institute For Lithuanian Language and Literature, entitled "Truth Must Win"]

[Excerpts] "Discussions" among Lithuanians and Lithuanian Poles have recently increased in our press. We are placing the word discussions in quotes, because we are not referring, in this case, to an argumentative defense of one's own opinion, but rather to empty-worded abuse, simply. This type of "discussion" is useful in one way, however. It has become clear, as they say, "where the dog lies buried." We see, that persons "defending" Polish interests, dislike intensely to be reminded of their Lithuanian roots, when they are told their ancestors spoke Lithuanian, after all. However, that is the truth! In order to become convinced, one does not need to sit by the archives. Take Russian scientists (not Lithuanian) P. Kepenas, A. Ritichas, Polish scientists,' A. Fiiatris (printed Anonymous), J. Rozvadovkis, or finally, O. Chominskis [names rendered in Lithuanian] etnographic maps, drawn up 150 years ago, and later, compare their data with the present situation in the Vilnius region, and no doubt will remain there. For those who do not have sufficient time to compare that much data, it would suffice to glance at the end of 16th Century Historical Atlas of Poland, Zhechpospolita language development map, to become convinced that 400 years ago, all of the current Vilnius region and Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic's [SSR] border lands, up to Gardinas, Lyda, Asmena, Svyrai and Breslauja [names rendered in Lithuanian from old map], did not contain any sign of Polish language. You may also read what the Polish Historian, J. Ochmanskis, who is researching Lithuania's history, and Lithuanian etnographic boundaries during the Middle Ages, writes. You will see that the Vilnius region has, for centuries, comprised the ethnographic nucleus of Lithuania, that this is the historical "Lituania propria," (actual Lithuania) and that Poland did not enter into this area, at all.

Recently, Petras Gaucas, chief of Vilnius University Cartography Laboratory, conscienciously (we verified his sources) explained all this in several articles. We emphasize: He did not write down his own thoughts, but rather, facts, derived from distinguished and respected Russian and Polish scientist sources. Instead of refuting these facts (it is truly impossible to do that), P. Gaucas was abused and insulted. His findings, supposedly, are lacking in "sober reason and historical truth" (L. Bzozovska), they are "erroneus and insulting to the Poles," and they are "permeated with nationalism and chauvinism" (Teacher A. Stankevicius). It is asserted, P. Gaucas' goal, in writing these articles, was "to convince the reader,

everything Polish, or conncted with Poland, is bad" (Vilnius Politechnical Institute Lecturer, R. Narunecas). Such "out of nothing" assertions simply abound in "discussion articles."

An old Vilnius teacher (now a pensioner), Vincas Martinkenas, who had written also, on the same subject, suffered even an uglier attack. He was simply given a dressing-down. Supposedly his article "reeks of stupidity and limitation," it expresses "his overflowing chauvinism," (A. Bernatovich et al.), it doesn't fall in "with the spirit of restructuring," "it is carried over from the stagnation period," (A. Klimasevska et al.), it seeks to "pit Lithuanian and Polish nationalities against one another," it "is reminiscent of the Stalinism era," "pity, oh pity, the poor students who had (such a one) him as a history teacher," (H. Klimaviciene), he is accused of "attacking the Polish minority's position in Lithuania," he can be "characterized as a Pole-consumer" (G. Berlovicius), "you have betrayed us," (K. Ksivicka) etc..

Why such accusations? For having written the truth? Some of these "discussion participants" got going to such an extent, that they began to distort the author's thoughts and the editorial staff of TARYBINIS MOKYTOJAS, had to correct them.

G. Berlovicius made accusations of a fabrication, that following the war there existed a rumor, Vilnius region would again become a part of Poland, that there would be no need for the Lithuanian language, etc... "is it not, perhaps, the dream of a chauvisnistically inclined author?,"—concludes the attacker. Indeed not, Comrade Berlovicius, for your information we must tell you, that such a rumor, of unknown origin, was indeed going around, and was heard, more than once, in 1951, by participants in the dialectological expedition. [passage omitted]

All articles that mention the Polonization of the Vilnius region, are generally considered "anti-Polish," and TARYBINIS MOKYTOJAS," which publishes them, is labeled as spreading "anti-Polish propoganda" (H. Klimaviciene). Teacher A. Stankevicius is irritated by the fact, P. Gaucas is constantly dwelling on notions of "slavicization" and Polonization." These processes, however, truly have taken place, since ancient times and (are continuing still) along the eastern borders of the Lithuanian language area (and not just there). This can not be denied. This is clear, not only to every Lithuanian language historian, but also to a researcher in language relations between the Baltic and the Slavic languages, including Polish scientists. Read the highly respected Polish linguist's, Academician Janas Safarevicius [name rendered in Lithuanian] well-known study of place names with Lithuanian origin suffix, iszki, prevalence and you will discover, how far east the ethnographic Lithuanian language boundary extended, long ago, and how this boundary began to retreat westward by degrees, because of slavicization, until it reached its present position.

The Polonization was not decided by any supposed population migration from Poland. In truth there never had been any mass migration from Poland. There could not have existed any. Polish feudal lords were not permitted to acquire Lithuanian estates, be appointed to higher government positions, in spite of the fact, they had been trying to attain said things. By this token, the peasants were even more restricted where migration was concerned, since they were serfs attached to the estates. Only individuals moved at various times, as did people from other countries. For the most part, these were craftsmen and priests, especially. To blame Vilnius region Poles, who had been from the 13th-14th centuries prisoners of war (as having supposedly Polonized the area), or the mythical Mozurs during the 7th-8th centuries, as is done by CZERWONY SZTANDAR, is more than ridiculous, since there exists no chronological basis for this. After all, the Polish language found its way here, many centuries after these events! The true reason for the appearance of Polish language in Lithuania was Polonization, which has been rather well researched by scientists, and is for some reason "unfamiliar," only to the "discussion participants."

Because of historical circumstances, unfavorable to Lithuania, Polonization was begun with the Lithuanian Grand Duke's estate and the feudal nobility. Later it engulfed the wide masses of nobles, and from the 18th century—even the peasants, who became Polonized en masse, during the 19th-20th centuries. During the last years of the existence of the Common Republic (Zhechpospolita), Polish language was introduced throughout all of Lithuania: state offices, churches and schools... Circumstamces were such that life itself forced people to use it. Without this, an educated person could not establish any type of career.

Following the baptism (1387), there was no separate church province established in Lithuania. Both bishoprics—Vilnius and Zemaiciai—were under the jurisdiction of the Gniezn Archbishop. Priests were almost exclusively Polish. They felt as if they were in Krakow. They equated Lithuanian customs with paganism and considered the Lithuanian language "pagan," a contradiction to the "Catholic" Polish language.

One could either pray in Polish, or burn in hell forever. One had to choose and, naturally, the majority desired heaven. If you are catholic—you are Polish. The instilling of such views caused great harm, not only to the language but also to the nation. [passage omitted]

Polonization in schools was conducted in a no less stubborn manner. The Education Commission of 1773 tasked the schools to merge the republic nationalities into one common nation, which had to be Polish. Belorussian and Ukrainians, as Slavs, were naturally considered Polish, but the Lithuanians still needed to become Polonized. After Lithuania was annexed to Czarist Russia, there were in addition to patriotic motives of resisting czarism, added motives to protect

catholicism. Polonization increased. The Lithuanian language remained solely on the peasants' (serfs) lips, but even here, the thought that Lithuanian was a "khamska mova," [transliterated from the Polish] (low form of language) suitable only for the "kitchen and the barn," was stubbornly forced upon them. Force was resorted to in schools: if a student spoke out in Lithuanian, he was shamed by having a certain shaming board, referred to as, meteling, hung from his neck, which he had to continue wearing until another was heard speaking Lithuanian. No one recognized Lithuanian as a nationality, at that time; Lithuanians were considered Polish.

Intensive ridiculing of Lithuanian everywhere—in church, on the estate and in school, affected the peasant mentality. They started being ashamed of their native tongue, avoided using it in public and tried to learn the language of the "elite." Following the Revolt of 1863, the Czarist regime also contributed to the destruction of the Lithuanian language, by abolishing the Lithuanian press. In the face of a Lithuanian book (prayer book) shortage, Lithuanians were forced to use readily available Polish prayer books, which were not prohibited; this was especially characteristic of eastern Lithuania, which was too distant from Prussia, to enable the book carriers to supply it with Lithuanian books. Thus, in seeking to Russify the area, the czarist regime, unwittingly shoved Lithuanians into the Polish embrace. Thus, it is not at all surprising, that even some famous Lithuanian writers and symbols of patriotism such as, V. Kudirka and V. Kreve, peasants' descendants, growing up in distant Suduva and Dzukija rural areas, were initailly strongly influenced by the Polish language and culture. V. Kudirka, used Polish publicly and during the first years of his studies, while V. Kreve wrote his first compositions, over 100 poems, in Polish.

Vilnius region differed insofar, as its common people were not becoming Polish, but Belorussian, instead. This was decided by an extraordinary linguistic situation. Alongside the prestigious Polish language, two nationality languages were in use: Lithuanian and Belorussian. The latter, referred to as "prasta kalba" [common language], (.."po prostu") [rendered in Belorussian], enjoyed many privileges, compared to Lithuanian. Since it was close to the Polish and, especially, Russian, it created many conveniences for the peasants; it was easier to comprehend the Polish-speaking priest and estate master, as well as the Russian speaking government official. Poland is far away, while Belorussian villages are adjacent, sometimes squeezed in between Lithuanian ones. In having to deal with his neighbors, on a daily basis, a Lithuanian would unconsciously learn their language. Since this language was officially deemed to be a Russian dialect, this tendency toward Belorussian was encouraged by the czarist regime. Since the czarist regime treated Lithuania as "iznachalno russkiy kray" (rendered in Russian—"Initially Russian Territory"), which needs to be "re-Russified again." Thus, Lithuanians became "tuteisiai" [Russified term derived from "tut," here] (locals) "Poles" who use the "common language."

Polonization of Vilnius region was increased following World War I, when this area was annexed to Poland. [passage omitted] We can refer to a study recently published in Poland: Makowski B. Litwini W Polshe 1920-1939. Warszhava, 1986. [preceding passage rendered in Polish—Lithuanians in Poland 1920-1939, by B. Makowski, Warsaw, 1986.] Lithuanian schools, associations and nearly all of the press, were forcibly shut down. Read the secret letter, by Vilnius Governor, L. Bocianskis, detailing how Lithuanianism should be struggled against. (CZERWONY SZTANDAR should publish it). [passage omitted]

When the Lithuanian Republics regained the Vilnius region in 1939 and put an end to further Polonization, in many areas it was already too late: in some areas Lithuanian was forgotten, or else, remembered only, by the elderly. War broke out and was, in turn, followed by Hitlerite occupation. Lithuanians became targets for terrorization by white Poles, from "Regional Army" ranks. There ensued violence, even murder. This was often recounted, with terror, by the esteemed Vilnius Writer, Marcelijus Siksnys; this was also recently discussed, on television and in the press, by Teacher Vaisnyte (changed to Voisnys). Almighty dictator Stalin's terror made cowards of the people and forced them to obediently carry out any government directive. Attempts to revive Lithuanianism were, after all, regarded as nationalism. This was exploited by the Polonizers. There commenced a Stalinist form of Polonization. Strong agitation was directed against Lithuanians in Vilnius region, around 1951, employing even rough administrational tactics. Lithuanian schools were closed and replaced by Polish ones. In Trakai Rayon alone, nearly half of the Lithuanian schools were closed. Things were the same in other rayons, also. The then Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic Deputy Minister of Education, V. Vysniauskaite, the ministry's Inspector, J. Cukerzis, Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Representative For Educational Affairs, Vidmontas, Director, Vilnius region Education Department, B. Purvinis and others, kept an especially high profile in this activity. They served the function of Vilnius region Lithuanianism executioners. A very sharp blow had been dealt. The Lithuanian language was pushed out. Young people quickly started to become denationalized. [passage omitted]

In 1950, Zagare Village Lithuanian school, was contrary to the residents' wishes, converted to a Polish school. Zagare residents made several futile appeals to Vilnius Rayon Education Department and the Ministry of Education; each time their request was denied. An anonymous letter, signed by Kabulas (such a person does not exist in Zagare, as well as in any of the neighboring villages), was received by the Rayon Party Committee, which asserted, a Lithuanian school was not needed, since there were no Lithuanians in Zagare. After another appeal by the residents, to the ministry, finally a list of parents was drawn up in August of 1957, in which many expressed a desire for a Lithuanian school. This list was taken by Bozhenov, while the rayon education department received a falsified list. The majority of parents, supposedly had signed in favor of a Polish school.

Fortunately, the rayon administration did not believe it this time, and sent a commission to investigate the matter. At long last, in the face of all parents' (with the exception of two) stubborn insistence, a Lithuanian school was opened, but alas, not for long. It was totally done away with in the primary school network reduction. [passage omitted]

Everything written by V. Martinkenas and other authors, in TARYBINIS MOKYTOJAS, is the sacred truth. Denationalization of Vilnija is—a national tragedy. [passage omitted]

At a Supreme Soviet session in 1965, the subject was brought up by the noted Lithuanian Writer, Supreme Soviet Deputy, A. Vienuolis.

Unfortunately, no one dared to print his speech, in those days. Many Vilnius region residents, whose passports list them as Polish (and who consider themselves that, also), don't know the language, even. The language of their daily relationships is—the Belorussian dialect "po prostu." After the war, Belorussian schools were opened for such people, in Belorussia, while in LiSSR they were assigned to Polish schools. Since Polish is more difficult for them than Russian, the majority attend Russian schools. For example, according to passport information, there are 62 thousand Poles in Vilnius Rayon, but only 3.5 thousand are receiving their schooling in Polish and barely 3220 are subscribing to Polish newspapers. In Trakai Rayon, where there exist about 20 thousand of such Poles, the rayon Polish newspaper has only 690 subscribers. People read in the language best understood by them, namely, Russian. The Poles are demanding Polish schools be opened for all such passport Poles. We are not against them principally, but they must not be foisted upon either Lithuanians or Belorussians.

Nowhere in the Soviet Union do Poles enjoy such wide-ranging political and citizen rights, as they do in Soviet Lithuania. According to 1979 statistics, 403,169 Poles reside in Belorussia, yet not a single Polish school exists here, nor are there any cultural centers, newpapers, television or radio programs. A similar situation exists in the Ukraine and other Soviet republics. Thus, wherein lies this oppression here, against the Poles, over which they are constantly whining?

There is not the slightest doubt, that the Polish language (and the Belorussian "po prostu"), in Lithuania, and consequently, also in the Vilnius region, are part of a creole. Without the earlier mentioned data, it is also explicitly demonstrated by the country's name index, especially its oldest segment—"hydronimia" (river and lake names)—totally Lithuanian, but slavicized. It is even more explicitly demonstrated by the local Polish language itself. It becomes obvious, to any linguistic historian, it had its beginnings not in any Polish dialect, but their common language (just as in the case of all creole languages). It is, in essence, "Polish on the lips of Lithuanians." [passage omitted]

Such are the facts and they must be taken into consideration. One can not escape from them. Frequent assertions in CZERWONY SZTANDAR articles, that Poles have lived in the Vilnius region for ages, are possibly aimed at deceiving less educated people. [passage omitted]

Deceiving people, in the manner of Docent, Philosophy Department of the Vilnius Pedagogical Institute, Ivanas Tichonovicius (Jan Ciechanovicz), who in his articles and at meetings announces, that Vilnius region has been inhabited by the Poles for ages, is digraceful. After all if one wishes to discuss this subject, it should be done among specialists, but don't deceive decent farmers. [passage omitted] Our Ministry of Education should look into this matter, seriously. Children's deception should be firmly stopped. [passage omitted] Such individuals turn meetings into anti-Lithuanian and antistate demonstrations. Lies and incitement bring poor results. Influenced by instigations young people resort to hooliganism. Incited students, at Nemencine Middle School, beat up a Lithuanian student on 29 October 1988. Lithuanian national symbols were torn up, at that school. The Lithuanian national flag has been torn from Soviet buildings of Mickunai, Lavoriskiai, Vaidotai and other Vilnius Rayon areas; in Suzionys, it was defiled, more than once. After all, this is vandalism. Here is more. Some time ago, crazied hooligan "Poles," somwhere between Benekalniai and Varenava, beat up one of our best known dialect experts, Lithuanian Language and Literature Institute's Scientific Co-worker, Candidate Philological Science, Aloyzas Vidugiris, who was researching the Vilnija dialect.

An individual chooses his own nationality. It is his sacred right.

No one is to pressure him or to use force against him, in this respect. This is especially true in the spreading of most demogogical rumors, stating Lithuanians don't recognize the fact "there are Poles in the Vilnius region," "they need schools in their teaching language," etc. It is painful to hear deceived, decent farmers asking in fright: "Will we be permitted to speak Polish, after Lithuanian becomes a state language?" The instigators whose "activities" give rise to such questions, should be ashamed. In their state, Lithuanians have never forbidden anyone to speak in any language, including Polish. Such thoughts can only be given rise to by an evil-minded agitator, seeking to create national hatred.

It is time for everyone to realize, that Lithuanians have nothing against the Poles, or any other nationalities, but they can not and will not tolerate Polonization of Lithuania. They denounced it in the past and are not going to come to terms with it now.

Lithuanian Internal Affairs Ministry Defended

LD1007131089 Vilnius TIESA in Lithuanian 6 Apr 89 p 3

[Article by Alfonsas Builis, chief political section, Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs, entitled "Crime...But What Is The Militia Looking At?" under the rubric, "Society And The Law"]

[Excerpts]**A comparison of the 3-month period of the current year with the same time period of last year, reveals crime in the Republic has increased by 66.3 percent. Criminal offenses have increased. The number of crimes is especially significant in the republic's large cities: an increase by 105.3 percent in Vilnius; 117.8 percent in Kaunas; 121.7 percent in Svencionys Rayon; 72.1 in Vilnius Rayon; 51.7 percent in Panevezys City. Theft of socialist property increased twofold and there has been a threefold increase in private property theft. Robberies, hooliganism and open thefts have also increased.**

Internal organization workers must act to prevent crime occurrence and to make certain that not a single lawbreaker escapes the punishment he deserves. What is being done? What problems are encountered? [passage omitted]

We are modernizing the structural makeup of our units and are arming the militia with new equipment. [passage omitted]

Unfortunately, law enforcement organs have not managed to ensure effective means of combatting criminal activity and lawlessness. Militia efforts are insufficient for the enforcement of socialist justice and public order—the public needs to show more active involvment. We must not remain conciliatory toward drunkeness, theft of socialist and private property, speculation, and bribery.

I could furnish many examples attesting to the self-sacrificing work of militia officials. [passage omitted]

We receive many letters, whose authors, often entire collectives, thank our workers for stopping a criminal, saving a life, defending an individual's dignity, honor, and property.

People have reason to become angry, bacause they don't receive militia assistance in time. There are, unfortunately, instances of negligence and abuse. We try to be sensitive to people's complaints and statements, regarding unlawful activities on the part of militia personnel. Many such complaints have no basis, however, we investigated all of them thoroughly. On the other hand, one's actions should always be above reproach, so as not to give rise to any complaints. According to the old adage, "there exists no home without smoke." I will venture to say that negative phenomena in the militia's work are—painful exceptions.

Currently there are none, and there can not be any, forbidden topics, and recently there have appeared, in the press, a number of complaints of shortcomings in the militia's work. We do not cover them up, either. In general, openness is a mighty force. This is why, well-founded criticism, be it even of the sharpest variety, becomes a good antidote. Also, there appear some articles in which the inappropriate behavior of certain members of the militia are viewed as the entire scope of militia activity. Sometimes cheap sensations and opposition to the militia's lawful actions are sought.

The militia is not isolated from society. Individuals who come to work for us are from the same society that exists today. There is no equipment which would allow us to examine the morality of someone preparing to work for the militia. There are methods, however, of decreasing the likelihood of immoral individuals joining militia ranks.

Now we are examining the old instructions for selection of candidates for militia service. Obviously, it is expedient to introduce a probationary period, no shorter than a year's time. A person of good character may, after being exposed to actual work and militia work characteristics, turn out to be psychologically unprepared for this type of work. We don't always succeed in helping them to become good militia officials.

In the event the situation merits this, we remove from our ranks, those who have compromised themselves and either can not, or will not carry out the duties required of them. We think such instances should be announced publicly.

For example, Militia Lieutenant, Inspector, Public Order Section, Vilnius City Public Affairs Administration J. Vaitkunas was relieved of his duties, on charges of discrediting the militia worker's name, poaching and possession of a hunting rifle without a permit. Criminal charges for theft of state and personal property have been brought against S. Linkevicius, inspector, Special Road Service Patrol Unit, State Automobile Inspection Administration. Militiaman, Mazeikiai Internal Affairs Section, V. Dauksa, was sentenced to 3 years imprisonment for causing injury to a citizen. Last year, 373 militiamen were dismissed from militia ranks.

Obviously, we are not going to solve all education problems, with punitive actions, and firm dismissals of those officials who have transgressed. The entire party and political education process has to be newly organized, in keeping with the demands of the times. The moral and material worker incentives of adequate working, living, and rest conditions are, by no means, to be relegated to a status of the least importance.

Another sensitive problem concerns living accomodation provision for militiamen's families. Currently, nearly 40,000 of our workers have no place to live, many

along with their families, are seeking shelter in dormitories and privately rented rooms, living in rural areas, tens of kilometers away from their work places. Provision of living accomodations is within the jurisdiction of local soviet executive councils. Their capabilities are far outstripped by the demand, however. It is imperative to solve this vital to us social problem, sooner.

A law which would clearly and concretely legalize principles, rights, and duties of internal organization workers, is currently of vital importance. Undoubtedly, certain contradictions will always remain between criminals, lawbreakers and militia personnel.

I would not expect that the 22,000 drunk drivers, 47,000 sobered up individuals, or the 8,500 home brewed liquor manufacturers, sellers, and buyers, who were penalized last year, would feel thankful to the militia personnel.

[Passage omitted] At times, we hear, the militia is inactive. We should not forget, however, that criminals don't like openness and there are no crimes, practically, without witnesses...

Is everyone aware of the fact that the calm in our cities, villages, and our homes is not only a concern for the militia, but also that of every citizen? It is a pity that many people's associations have practically stopped their action. [passage omitted] The renewal of such a public institution should, first of all, become the concern of the public itself, workers' collectives, and party and soviet organs.

We obviously want to utilize existing laws to their highest potential, in order to support public order. It is important to attain respect and observance of laws and to hold everyone responsible for their violation. We must all learn to live under democracy and openness conditions, learning how to assess social phenomena.

Crime is an intricate social problem. We need to pool our efforts in working in a unified and purposeful manner, to solve it.

Restoration of Rights of 'Exonerated' People Urged

18001378 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
18 Jul 89 Morning Edition p 3

[Article by Yu. Feofanov: "Drop the Legal Proceedings"]

[Text]**"I herewith advise you that the criminal case relating to you involving giving bribes...embezzlement of state moneys, misuse of a service position, and the organization of an official forgery is dropped on the basis of Paragraph 2 of Article 208 of the UPK [Criminal Procedures Code] of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] for failure to prove your participation in the performance of a crime, episodes of giving bribes..., receiving bribes, committing official forgery—on the basis of Paragraph 2 of Article 5 of the UPK RSFSR for the lack of a corpus delicti in your actions. I inform you simultaneously that the restrictive measure against you and your written undertaking not to leave the area are rescinded... The attachment of your property has been removed... Investigator of the RSFSR Public Prosecutor, judicial adviser N.A. Pudova. 19.06.89."**

Readers are usually confused by the first formulation of a person's acquittal—"for failure to prove." They say, in fact there was a crime, but they just could not prove it. Many sensible jurists even propose changing this "slippery" formulation, especially because it is absolutely equal in judicial force to two other reasons for exoneration—"lack of a corpus delicti" and "for lack of a crime event." Why, they say, leave a "shadow" on the restored honor of someone who just yesterday was under suspicion and was accused of grave deeds. I have already written and will repeat: This should not be done. Because the meaning of justice first and foremost is to establish objectively, to the extent possible, precisely this: Whether the accusation of a person's guilt was proved or not proved, whether it dispelled the slightest doubt of the guilt of the suspect, or whether the accusation is based on flimsy evidence. And if it is not proved, whether it has dispelled doubts before the court—meaning that the person is clean in the eyes of the law and the people. This is the fundamental principle of the law and justice, and it is hardly necessary to limit oneself so that "public opinion" would not think about it.

I wanted to emphasize this from the very start, because I foresee readers' letters which will assert that since this is a trade worker, it means he cannot be without sin, it means.... I had to read such "reasons" in countless letters.

And so, the case has been dropped. Anna Semenovna Garina, the former director of supermarket No 39 of the Moscow trade establishment "Gastronom" was completely acquitted. For these times, when law is gradually taking on force and value, the event is normal. But there is one essential detail. An article was published 3 years ago in IZVESTIYA ("On That Side of the Counter," No 219, 1986) which was based on a conversation with Anna Semenovna , which was held, as it stated in the newspaper, "in an unusual place." At that time we talked on the premises of the investigative department of the RSFSR Public Prosecutor, and the investigator and an escort were present. Anna Semenova was kept under guard and, as an exception, they allowed me to meet with her. I tried not to "stigmatize" the accused, although her guilt did not raise any doubts in me—she herself asserted it. Garina then gave her consent to publish our interview. I wanted, first, to tell the public of the fact of the exoneration of the director of the supermarket, which is located in a prestigious place in Moscow—in the Olympic Village; second, to understand the reasons for the frank confession, and, finally, how the rights of a person unjustly accused by the state are restored.

The first is accomplished by the fact of this article. And the second... To retell that correspondence is hardly worth it—an interested reader can look in the newspaper. So I will dwell only on the main episode. Anna

Semenovna explained: In her work at that time she always had "to give" to someone: the checkers, the dispatchers, the loaders, the office cleaners, the medical inspectors, and, in addition, to ranking officials in the trade organization for commodities that support the plan.

I cite from the interview that was printed in the newspaper:

"Before this, as Anna Semenovna told it, she never stooped to taking from sellers. From the materials habdlers (persons responsible for the store's materials.—Yu. F.)—yes: four sections plus the order department—by 100-200 rubles per month. And she gave out about the same—mainly to the trade organization... "

"Did I understand you correctly: You gave out everything that you took?"

"Yes, in 5 years I took in about 10,000 and gave them out..."

"Meaning, an unselfish crime?"

"What can I tell you? The prestige of the store is not my prestige..."

"Anyway, let us dot the 'i's.' It means that you did not get a half kopek for yourself?" Anna Semenovna hesitated a little, and it seemed she smiled!

"Something was left, of course"—though she had some difficulty in naming the monetary equivalent of the indefinite "something."

These words literally followed like a refrain: "You and I live under different psychological conditions," "I doubt that you will understand me." "I already said: We will not understand each other," etc. Inasmuch as the question concerned the specifics of the moral climate in trade, about the permissibility of eating without paying, about taking something, and about whether to consider this theft or not, I also took all of these "You will not understand me" into account at face value. She, as it became clear in our meeting, put an entirely different meaning in these words.

"In court," I tell her, "you denied your testimony to the investigators, and you denied that you received 10,000 in 5 years for bribes for trade officials and for the payment of necessary work in the store?"

"Yes, categorically."

"But do you recall our interview? You told me personally that you collected 'tribute' from the 'material handlers,' and that you gave bribes in trade. And I wrote this, and the newspaper printed it. Why did you say this?"

"You forgot the situation in which the conversation took place? There was preparation before it. The investigator confronted me with a condition: Be 'frank' in the meeting with the press—say that you took bribes and gave bribes."

"But not to slander yourself, so that we would criticize you sharply in the press?"

"Of course not. But they promised that they would change the restrictive measure, and they promised to let me out of prison. For a promise to be let out, you will say more than that about yourself."

"Let us suppose there was no press. You would have confessed even without this. Moreover, as I know now, you compelled your subordinates, who are also under arrest, to give false testimony against you, you forced them to do this in a confrontation, and they thereby took nonexistent blame themselves."

"Yes, that is so. But again you do not understand a person, an innocent person, who for months and years is torn from the world, who is kept under horrible conditions in investigation cells. No, I stood firm , stood firm a long time—look at the investigation reports. But when they arrested my son... I was ready for anything, and I begged for one thing—to let me say farewell to him."

"Did they let you?"

"Yes, under the pretext of a confrontation. And I kept my promise to the investigator: Under his dictation, I confessed to everything 'openheartedly.'"

"And the investigator..."

"They deceived me grossly."

What happens in an investigation isolation room is kept a big secret up to the present time. Not only from the public, but from relatives, and from friends. Even the "other side" of justice—the defense, does not have access to the actions of the investigative authorities. A person is isolated from the world in the full sense of the word. The fact that this is a negation of the very idea of justice, an infringement of the right to defense, which exists in civilized states as axioms, has been talked about quite a bit in our press, and this was discussed at the Congress of People's Deputies. I would consider the immediate abrogation of this lawlessness no less important than the abrogation of the infamous Article 11.

But now we are discussing something else. This kind of a situation is advantageous to an investigation—under conditions of inaction by the law and the silence of the press. And more frequently defendants are refusing to give testimony, and they are disclosing illegal methods in trials. I fully allow that these disclosures are not always well-founded, and that it is very possible that an inveterate offender calumniates in an investigation in order to

avoid being answerable. This cannot be disregarded. But even the investigation, as the saying goes, has nothing to trump with. I asked judges more than once: "The accused charged illegal pressure by the investigator, why did you not call him as a witness?" "But what would this give," they answered, "the investigator will testify that there was no pressure, and that the confession was made voluntarily. And that is all, and you will not prove anything." True, you cannot prove anything. Just as you will not prove the reverse: The investigation resorts to methods forbidden by law.

Therefore, I also treated the words of Anna Semenovna guardedly. Incidentally, I wrote in that news report: "Garina fiddles with several school notebooks which she holds in her hand." At that time in our interview in the presence of an investigator, I did not think of looking into the notebooks, and she could not hand them over. And everything was laid out in them that she had said at the trial.

Indeed her words are in the court's interlocutory order:

"In addition, Garina declared that she was crushed by the news about the arrest of her son, she asked for a meeting with him, and she was granted such a meeting on 27 May 1986 under the pretense of a confrontation. On the following day, six confrontations were made with her, at which she, being emotionally distraught, confirmed everything, wanting to return to her cell quickly. Garina also revealed that she began to give grateful testimony in connection with the fact that the investigator promised to change her restrictive measure which prohibited her from leaving the area. She told the court that on 28 October 1986 she signed the charge made against her and that she gave a grateful deposition, because on that day she was sick, and a physician was called for her in the investigation office, and medical aid showed up. Moreover, because she suffered from low blood pressure, high arterial pressure figures were recorded. THE LAST FACT IS CONFIRMED BY A MEDICAL CERTIFICATE WHICH IS AVAILABLE IN THE CASE FILES (my emphasis—Yu. F.)."

It is emphasized because, as the physician explained to me, such a condition in this case is close to a stroke [predynsultnny]. It is right at this moment that they forced a person to sign a basic document that predetermined fate itself!

This decision was made in the Moscow Municipal Court on 1 March 1988. Garina and also five other officials of the supermarket faced the court. Under the chairmanship of G.A. Smorodinskiy, the court, which was participated in by people's assessors N.V. Nikitinskiy and V.M. Smirnov, looked into all episodes in a thorough way. In 79 pages of the decision, the materials of the preliminary investigation were subjected to devastating criticism. The whole charge was based on confessions that were not reinforced by anything. How they were obtained is related. All of the defendants denied their testimony, and the charges collapsed.

For example, the investigation asserts that the employees of the supermarket got money by means of defrauding the buyers. The court states: For the period 1981-1985, 40 checkups were made, and in a majority of cases the weighings of commodities made for the checkup had a true weight, and in 4 cases out of 40, short weights were recorded of 1, 4, 6, and 7 kopeks... Controlled purchases were made frequently by employees of BKhSS [Fight Against the Theft of Socialist Property], and "no violations of trade regulations were uncovered in this..." Another passage: "Protocols drafted in an improper way cannot have evidentiary force." In a third: "Garina is charged with being responsible for the theft of R16,400..." This sum is far-fetched, what it consists of is not known. The 79 pages of the decision are speckled with such phrases. And the conclusion is made that "the investigation was done superficially, in a one-sided way, and with serious violations of the UPK RSFSR... the accusation in a number of cases contradicts the materials of the case, and it is not corroborated in the prosecutor's findings by evidence." The investigation was conducted by the RSFSR Public Prosecutor. In the court, the witnesses—packers, loaders, and mechanics—talked about the use of illegal methods against them.

The court released the defendants from custody, except for Garina and also a senior salesman. Their case was remitted for further inquiry, but the "flaws" of the investigation which the court had indicated could not be corrected , and further inquiry did not give anything. The case is dropped, and Garina and her colleagues have been exonerated. I think that it was not easy for the court to reach this decision. But it functioned the way the law requires; it did not succumb to an accusatory bias, and it did not take into account the "facts" that were published by the press—I have in mind my own article.

Much, very much has changed in court rooms. But in the approaches to them (the preliminary investigation) and after leaving them (in the event of acquittal or exoneration after the further inquiry), everything still seems to be vague.

Anna Semenova was incarcerated 6 days short of 2 and ½ years. And the case dragged on for more than a year. To dispel the calumny of the preliminary investigation, the court, in essence, pronounced a verdict of "not guilty."

Garina immediately turned to the RTO [Rayon Trade Department] of the Gagarinskiy Rayon and to the Mosgortorg [Moscow Municipal Trade Organization]. According to an ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet "Concerning Compensation for Damages Caused a Citizen by the Illegal Acts of the State and Public Organizations, and also of Officials"—she must be reinstated in her former position, and if this is not

possible (liquidation of the enterprise, position reduction, or other reasons provided for by law), she must be given equivalent work. The Gagarinskiy trade organization "Foodstuffs" sent a paper—go to Mosgortorg. In Mosgortorg, they said:

"Do not insist on your former job. We will select something in another rayon."

I rang up the personnel office of Mosgortorg. They told me that Yuriy Petrovich Maloyedov, the chief, is personally handling the Garina matter. Alas, he was on a business trip. She hopes, understandably, that everything will be resolved fairly, although she cannot understand why she cannot obtain a position in the Gagarinskiy Rayon, where she has worked for 20 years, and was singled out for many awards, including state awards.

But restoration of the rights of those exonerated is a special question. And rather complicated. I recall an IZVESTIYA article about the director of the Surgut sovkhoz [state farm], and I myself wrote about General Yevsyukov, both of whom were fully acquitted by the court; both cannot get back their illegally removed positions, and the court does not have the right to restore justice. Such a law is welcome to a bureaucratic system and enables it to trample further on a victimized person.

We have recently seriously encountered a problem concerning not only illegally repressed persons but entire peoples. Justice requires that not only their rights be returned to them, but also their land, home, and property. How can this be done within half a century? There is no property, other people live in the homes, and the land is occupied. Evict the current owners? What about them? By restoring justice, cause another injustice. I do not know how to get out of this blind alley. I do not know how to restore fully the rights of those who were repressed a half century ago and their legatees.

But there can hardly be an obstacle to returning a position to a person in his prime or providing an equal one. And what is absolutely necessary: To repent before those who were innocent victims yesterday—a year, 2 years, and 3 years ago. Anna Semenovna is having a difficult time, although it is within the authority and the power of the trade chiefs, the same public prosecutor who dropped the case, to reinstate her in her job and in public opinion. However, one does not sense a particular zeal—rather an annoyance: "She came like a bolt out of the blue."

Not long ago we heard and saw how the Supreme Soviet appointed A.F. Katusev to the position of Chief Military Prosecutor. He was asked one particular question relating to the fate of General Yevsyukov—I wrote about him in IZVESTIYA. In 1985 the general was accused of theft and misuse of R300,000, he was discharged from the Army, and removed from the party. The general took the case to court for 3 years, and he succeeded—he was acquitted by the Military Collegium. But no one is hastening to reistate him in the Army and his position, as usual. And what did we hear from the mouth of the then still aspirant to the high post of prosecutor? The disgraced general, he said, had concealed fancy rugs from the entrance of his apartment, and he failed to turn in a tape recorder. My God, I thought, they accused a person of appropriating 3 million to no purpose, and they ruined his life and a brilliant career. They should confess and honestly tell the Supreme Soviet about the grave mistake of the military prosecutor, if it was a mistake, and not something more. No, they will hunt out something, in order to save face. They are ready once more to defame a person who was legally acquitted by the court—just so they would not have to do the decent thing: To make amends to him in every possible way for their guilt, to repent, and to rectify themselves. The realizaion of words about the value of a person in a socialist society is not turning out here in any way. Personal ambitions outweigh everything.

Acquittal of a falsely accused or convicted person is a great occasion for society, and it should be a great occasion. But justice in the full sense of the word is restored by people, official people. Society expects elementary humanity from them toward the aggrieved. Will this happen?

Metropolitan Visits Ukrainian Penal Colony

18001387 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 Jul 89 p 2

[Article by S. Kiselev, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent for the Ukraine: "Prison and the Ten Commandments"]

[Text] Filaret, Metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia, patriarchal exarch of the Ukraine, visited a maximum security prison colony in the village of Bucha, near Kiev.

Truly the church bells are ringing: It seems that for the first time in the 70-year history of our country a clergyman has gone to a prison, as they say, without an escort. On the contrary, His Eminence was shown honors that are only conferred on inspecting generals. The visit was held on the initiative of the UVD [Internal Affairs Administration] of the Kiev oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee]. N.I. Zakovorotnyy, the chief of the political department of the Kiev oblispolkom, explains:

"Our system of corrective labor institutions has virtually not undergone changes for the last several decades, and it does not at all promote the reeducation of a person. Today we are trying to give it a human face. The experiment is continuing in the Bucha colony for perhaps the 2d year: Any prisoner who works conscientiously, fulfills the plan by 120 percent, and who does not break the rules, can 'knock off' half of his term. Our turning to the church—an attempt to involve it in the spiritual reeducation of the prisoners—is also an experiment. One would like to believe that it will be successful..."

When Metropolitan Filaret spoke in the club of the colony, where about 700 prisoners were assembled (the others heard his speech over the camp's internal broadcasting system), I followed the reaction of the hall attentively. And I did not see repentant sinners who, like Kudeyar-ataman, were prepared to saw the "huge tree."

But it turned out that the outward reaction of the auditorium to the noble words of the clergymen was deceptive. That "zeks" [prisoners], who were accustomed to the peremptory shouts of the cellblock guards [vertukhay] and the soul-saving talks of the prison staff operatives ("operov"), treated the words of the Lord with far more faith and hope than one would expect.

"Society has rejected us," one of them told me. "It is our own fault, but we are rejected. And if the church will help us and society to trust one another, I am personally ready to put into practice (that is what he said—to put into practice) those 10 commandments about which our village priest talked in my childhood."

The prisoners are ready for contacts with the church. The church is also ready for a revival of those traditions of Russian Orthodoxy, which always strived to give spiritual help to lawbreakers. But will the state be ready in the person of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] to be an intermediary in these contacts?

Prisoners in the Bucha colony have already been permitted to wear small crosses next to the skin, for which not very long ago one would have earned the penalty of a solitary confinement cell. And the chief of the colony promised that the gift of the metropolitan—a Bible and a separately published Gospel—will be placed in the prison camp library and that they will be signed out freely. That the records of church choral music, which were given as a gift by His Eminence, will be played over the camp's broadcasting system. He reported that he plans to make a room available for future spiritual conversations with clergymen, where the prisoners could make confessions and take communion. But will not this experiment turn out to be local, just as the experiment with the reduction in a prison term with good behavior, which virtually has not yet left the confines of the Bucha ITU [corrective labor institution]?

One more thing is worrisome: During the years of stagnation, when state atheism, which became more dogmatic than theology, fought not with religion but with believers, the very idea of such church activity in a corrective labor institution would have been nipped in the bud. But today as well some kind of professional atheist can be found who will see in this the possibility of a negative influence of the church on the scientific-materialistic outlook of the prisoners. And it might be listened to from force of habit...

"I received a note in the auditorium," Metropolitan Filaret said to me, which said: "If you had come here earlier, it is possible that there might have been fewer of us here today." Assessing these words quite soberly, I, nonetheless, cannot agree with him. Yes, the church, its influence on today's processes, is not, of course, a panacea for immorality, and it cannot be a substitute for those who "by virtue of their official duties must prevent crimes and punish for them. But the church can and should ease the lot of those who are in places of confinement, and it should try to influence their consciences. I do not doubt that we will be supported by representatives of other professions as well.

Contents of Journal KOMMUNIST Reported

PM1007134589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
4 Jul 89 Second Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "Latest Issue of Journal"]

[Text] The 10th issue of the CPSU Central Committee's theoretical and political journal KOMMUNIST opens with an account of the meeting at the editorial office with a group of USSR people's deputies. The participants gave their first impressions of the work of the new supreme organ of power and expressed their thoughts on the role and place of the party and the soviets in our society and on the position of the people's deputy.

The section "Perestroyka: Theory and Experience" contains an article entitled "High-Technology Production Units and the Conversion of the Defense Industry" by Ye. Kuznetsov and F. Shirokov. The problems of party renewal and the difficulties involved in seeking new forms and methods of party work are analyzed using the example of party organizations in Voronezh Oblast in Ye. Khokhlov's notes "At the Limit of Trust."

V. Lakshin's reflections "Morality, Justice, Humanism. Margin Notes in Philosophy Books" are carried under the rubric "The Spiritual Life of Society."

The rubric "Debates and Discussions" features L. Kuks's article "Social Consciousness: Complex Interconnections With Practice." M. Guboglo's article "National Groups in the USSR" is pegged to the CPSU Central Committee plenum on the improvement of interethnic relations in the USSR.

A. Frolov's article "Ascent to the Specific" is dedicated to the philosophical legacy of the well-known scientist E.V. Ilyenkov.

The section "Public Opinion" contains a sociological review, readers' letters, and V. Nefedov's analytical commentary "How Is the Lease Developing?"

The possibilities of earthquake prediction are examined in N. Shebalin's article "The Elements and Us," which is carried under the rubric "Science and Education." Little-known and previously unpublished reminiscences of participants in the October Revolution appear in the section "Pages From History."

The restructuring of the food complex in the CSSR is described by A. Ulyukayev and Ye. Shashkov in the report "Three Views Plus Commentary." The article "Using Their Experience" by N. Simakova and I. Usachev is carried under the rubric "The Modern World: Trends and Contradictions."

Economic

Economic Statistics Cited for First Half of Year

LD2807211289 Moscow TASS in English 1903 GMT 28 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 28 TASS—The report of the USSR State Committee for Statistics on the socio-economic development of the country in the first six months of 1989, published today, shows that the Soviet economy continues to be converted toward meeting social needs.

If industrial output went up 2.7 per cent as against the same period last year, the production of consumer goods showed a 7.8 per cent increase. The number of workers and employees slightly dropped (by 0.7 per cent) in the first half of the year, but the labour remuneration fund significantly increased (by 9.5 per cent). This is explained both by the deficiency in the new procedure of distributing factories revenue and the transfer of about 60 million workers of non-productive sectors to new higher wage scales and salaries. True, this increase in cash incomes is not covered today by the adequate offer of goods. As for payments and privilges to the population from public consumption funds, they exceeded both last year's level and the planned assignments.

The value of consumer goods produced in the first half of the year amounted to 206 billion roubles. The output of virtually all types of goods for the population has increased with the exception of household electric appliances, stitching machines, bicylces, motor-cycles and cars, whose production has dropped.

The output of food products has grown 2.9 per cent. True, a drop was recorded by some indicators. The country has produced slightly less animal oil, margarine, fish products and granulated sugar than in the same period last year.

Because of the shortage of some foods in state trade customers began turning more frequently to cooperatives. As a result, average prices for food purchases went up three per cent in the first half of the year as against the same period last year.

The provision of paid services to the population has markedly increased—10.2 per cent.

Strikes Cost 2 Million Days in Jan-Jun 1989

PM3107085189 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 28 Jul 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "USSR Economy: Half-Year Results"]

[Text] The basic results of the USSR's socioecomic development in the first half of this year were described by N.G. Belov, first deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Statistics, at the USSR Foreign Ministry press center on 27 July.

On the one hand, the speaker noted, positive trends bound to progressive structural changes are intensifying. However, the state's financial position remains difficult, other unresolved issues persist, and new serious problems are emerging. The rate of development of scientific and technical progress is manifestly inadequate and the commissioning of housing and other facilities in the social sphere has slowed down. An acute environmental situation persists in a number of regions in the country. Such unusual phenomena for the USSR as strikes, stoppages, and other forms of mass absence from work are becoming a fact of life. In the first 6 months 2 million working days were lost as a result of this.

Particular tension is generated, the speaker noted, by the imbalance in the consumer market, which is caused by the growth in the population's monetary income outstripping the supply of goods. The labor remuneration fund, for example, in terms of the national economy as a whole increased by 9.5 percent in the first half-year, and the average monthly wage by 10 percent. At the same time the growth in productivity of social labor amounted to only 2.8 percent.

The acuteness of the housing problem is not being alleviated: While in 1986 the increase in the commissioning of housing through state capital investment was 7 percent and in 1987 10 percent, housing construction fell by 1.2 percent in 1988. This decline has not been stopped this current year.

The number of crimes increased by 32 percent, and per 100,000 inhabitants it increased in all union republics. The growth in juvenile crime is causing alarm.

The country's agroindustrial complex produced foodstuffs worth R68.3 billion, and this is 2.9 percent up on the corresponding period last year. The increase in meat production in the first half-year compared with the same period last year was 211,000 tonnes, and for milk 851,000 tonnes. However, this is inadequate for planned expansion of output of basic foodstuffs by food industry enterprises.

The situation in transport remains tense. Although the plan for freight dispatch was met, the targets adopted by transport enterprises were below the level for the corresponding period last year. Public passenger trains continue to arrive late at their final destination.

Winding up his speech, N.G. Belov said that the first 6 months' results indicate that work in all sectors and regions has to be seriously stepped up if the planned levels for the current year are to be attained in the second 6 months. It is necessary, he stressed, to almost double the rate of economic growth, which is extremely necessary for successful progress in all areas of restructuring.

'Greens' Picketing Threatens Fuel Supply

18001397 Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 29 Jun 89 p 1

[ELTA report: "Ecological Conflict: Causes and Solutions"]

[Text] On 27 June, Director of the Mazheyki Oil Refinery Bronislovas Vaynora called the Lithuanian Telegraph Agency (ELTA). He reported that a critical situation has emerged at the enterprise: The day before, it worked at half of its capacity, and at the moment only one line is in operation. The main reason is that there is nowhere to pump the manufactured products, because all seven available tanks as well as the tank cars are full of fuel oil. The tank cars remain unloaded at the Klaypeda Enterprise for Export Oil Shipping, because of a posted picket of the "greens". If empty tank cars are not found soon, the refinery will have to shut down. This means that a shortage of gasoline, diesel fuel, and other refinery products manufactured at Mazheyki will become a threat.

On the same day, an ELTA correspondent approached the organizers of the picket, representatives of the Klaypeda club "Zhveyone." They explained that the Klaypeda Enterprise for Export Oil Shipping is ecologically dangerous: Most of the equipment is worn out, and its rated capacity has been considerably exceeded. This poses a danger to nature and the safety of people, because in the event of an accident it is difficult to conceive of its consequences. This is why as early as this spring the "greens" organized a picket demanding that they process only as much fuel oil a month as the safe intensity of operations would allow, and to plan for an amount of exported fuel oil corresponding to the current potential of the enterprise. However, as early as 20 June, the monthly amount was exceeded here, and beginning 25 June the "greens" resumed picketing. The enterprise was shut down, because tank cars with fuel oil were not let through. The danger of paralyzing the work of transportation arose, not only in the republic, but also in Latvia and Kaliningrad Oblast. On 27 June, at 1800 hours, the "greens" removed the picket.

On 28 June, a meeting was held at the Council of Ministers of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] to discuss the situation. It was chaired by Chairman of the Council of Ministers Vitautas Sakalauskas.

Director of the Klaypeda Enterprise for Export Oil Shipping Martinas Gusyatinas explained that this large quantity of fuel oil is being shipped abroad according to a resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers. The enterprise has approached the USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee], the USSR Gossnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply], and even the arbitration office on many occasions. However, this issue has not been resolved. The volume of work is still unclear, and contracts with suppliers still have not been signed.

In response to the question on what the problem was, Chairman of the Lithuanian SSR State Committee for Fuel Yonas Lanyauskas explained: The contracts are not being signed because the struggle is going on for a considerably lower volume of work of the Klaypeda enterprise, and therefore, lower plan for profit. Negotiations with the USSR Gossnab are in their a second month now, through the capacity utilization of the enterprise has been reduced by approximately one-fifth for the period between the beginning of this year to the present compared to the same period last year. Y. Lanyauskas also noted that the two pickets have thrown the national economy of the republic considerably off balance. Losses due to the shortage of refinery products already amount to approximately 2 million rubles.

Subsequently, Chairman of the Klaypeda City Executive Committee Alfonsas Zhalis, First Secretary of the Klaypeda City Party Committee Valentinas Greychyunas, Chairman of the Commission of Exports Genrikas Puskunigis, and other participants in the meeting took the floor. Various opinions were voiced concerning the picket and the priority nature of the products of the Mazheyki Oil Refinery. Such volumes of deliveries of fuel oil were set which would not disrupt the technology, would not inflict damage on nature, but would meet the needs of the republic in an optimal manner.

In summation, V. Sakalauskas said that an agreement has been reached with USSR Gossnab Chairman L. Voronin on a considerable segment of the currency generated by fuel oil exports being channeled into the reconstruction of the enterprise. It is also necessary to sign contracts with the suppliers soon, and to implement fire prevention measures.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party Bronislovas Zaykauskas and Deputy Chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers Yuriy Rusenko took part in the work of the meeting.

High Prices Lead to Market Boycott

18270128 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 22 Jul 89 p 4

[Article by I. Sidorov, Leningrad: "They Boycotted... Themselves"]

[Text] On a Saturday in the beginning of July, people in a resolute mood appeared at the Torzhkovskiy market in Leningrad, urging visitors "not to buy anything from these profiteers."

On the very same day, pickets appeared at some Leningrad markets, carrying placards such as, "We will fight the market mafia!" The unusual word "boycott" was in the air.... This is how an idea took life that was tossed from the television screen by USSR People's Deputy A. Levashev: As a sign of protest against the excessively high market prices, millions of townspeople with two days off should demonstrate by refusing to make purchases at the markets. They should confront the effrontery of the high-handed hucksters with the solidarity of the buyers!

The appeal was published in the local newspapers, and an employee of the Lengorispolkom [Leningrad city soviet executive committee] approved it during a popular morning radio broadcast, promising that the authorities will try on those days to establish serious competition for the petty private tradesmen: The vegetable shops will be crammed with fresh products.

Three weeks later I am talking to A. Ignatyev, chief of the cost accounting association of the kolkhoz [collective farm] markets of Leningrad. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich talks about the consequences of the action:

"Up until today, the markets, and this also means Leningrad residents, were already short 1,600 tons of fresh vegetables and fruit..."

Why did the enticing appeal for consumer solidarity turn into empty shelves?

The market is a clever thing!

Do you know that practically all fresh cucumbers offered at markets in the northwest are grown in a narrow 15-kilometer stretch of the Estonian coast of Lake Chudskoye. The soil there is right for them, and there are many centuries of experience. But freshly pickled cucumbers are brought to Leningrad almost exclusively from the village of Ternovoye, near Kharkov. Not only the people of the city admire them, but the whole country. Cucumbers here are pickled on a very large scale. Early cherries, apples, and apricots are supplied by only 5-6 Moldavian villages.

The buyer, who goes to a granny who would offer the best pickled sauerkraut, does not even suspect that at that very moment a ramified system of supply of kolkhoz markets in mobile equilibrium is working on him. If Leningrad "argues" with the village of Ternovoye, which is unknown to a majority of the population of Leningrad, there will be no freshly pickled cucumbers on the counters. And it is amazing that the contemporary motorized kolkhoz farmer goes to trade in Leningrad, because in Moscow the prices in the markets, let us say, are one and a half times higher. But in the scantily supplied Vologda, the gifts of the earth are generally snapped up at fabulous prices. What is it that attracts reliable suppliers to the banks of the Neva?

They go to Leningrad for good service and respect.

The kolkhoznik, who is able to bring his product to the market, is a staid and serious person. He likes the command market agent to talk with him in an understanding way in the village dining hall, so that the contract on delivery is agreed to in a proper way. He values the refrigerator that is sent opportunely from Leningrad, a good reception in the "Severnyy Palmir," [Palmira was an ancient caravan trade center in Syria], the comfortable market hostel, and a normal working place.

Leningrad, understandably, is worried by the competition of other cities. Here they think about how to interest the market controller, who gets 75 rubles a month, in more qualitative work with the villagers. Since December of last year, all Leningrad markets went over to leasing. The principle is the same as everywhere: A specific percentage of the profit is deducted for the state, and the rest is for development, for everyday social and cultural needs, and for salaries. The more they catered to the traders, the higher were the earnings.

In 6 months, the labor productivity of the workers of the Leningrad markets grew by 37 percent, and salaries by the same amount. Simultaneously, which is much more important for us, the delivery of products to the market grew in 6 months by almost 11 percent, or by 2,000 tons.

Naturally, the immutable law of the market also went into action: As the supplies increase, prices decrease. Not by a lot, but by comparison with last year, they succeeded in falling: Early potatoes began to cost on the average 1 ruble 56 kopeks instead of 1 ruble 76 kopeks, and beets were cheaper by 2 kopeks, for an average of 63 kopeks—pickled cucumbers were 5 kopeks cheaper—radishes...

But then the boycott broke out and broke this logical chain.

Svetlana Chaban from the village of Gradenitsa, which is near Odessa, sells plums.

"I am here by myself, my people have gone mainly to Moscow. Why take a risk?"

The city's prestigious and largest market, the Torzhkovskiy market, is in a crisis. The counters are half empty. In July the market lost 700 tons of products—and the trader is not hastening to go there. The negative balance is growing at the Torshkovskiy and other markets, because the news is spreading ever more widely through the abundant villages of Moldavia, the Ukraine, and the Baltics: There is a boycott in Leningrad! You cannot shout to the whole Union that this is an isolated case, and that this will not happen again. Alas, a transformation is taking place in the established delivery structure—the villagers are reorienting themselves on other regions. When will this city of 5 million people restore

these ties, if it will be able to do so at all? Right now one thing is clear: Everything that the city received from the introduction of leasing in its market economy was "eaten up" by the 2-day boycott.

We very much like to quote Lenin, but it seems that his short precept "learn to trade" does not appeal to very many at all. Learn to trade—means to comprehend the very delicate market mechanism, to master its secret levers, and to achieve the desired result, not by forced administration, but by organized competition, with the ruble. Put pressure on the free trader—he will simply hide in his shell, together with his commodities.

Obvious? But how can we be silent about it when even our own bosses do not teach us anything? In 1976 the Lengorispolkom already established "maximum prices" for agricultural products. Tradesmen then simultaneously moved to other regions, and for 3 months the city was short 10,000 tons of foodstuffs. Then why did the Leningorispolkom today virtually support the appeal for a boycott instead of trying to knock down the market prices with the competition of state trade? Despite the promises, the stores were practically empty. Why, finally, are the fathers of the city not taking realistic measures to develop a network of markets, of which there is such a shortage? The Porokhovskiy market is occupied by a base of the raypishchetorg [rayon foodstuffs trade organization], Troitskiy—by a warehouse, and the Sennoy is in a horrible ruinous condition. There they are—the reserves of influence on the trader! But it is easier, of course, to make a purely administrative decision to join the "fury of the masses..."

I see two dangers in the brief episode with the unsuccessful boycott. The first is political: In a situation of understandable irritation with the overall shortage, it is extremely irresponsible, I believe, to hurl proposals around about mass actions that are capable of heating up the situation, but that do not help matters. Here and there windows of cooperative shops in Leningrad were knocked out on those days—what, do we still need another Novyy Uzen? God forbid such a thing.

And the second danger: An ineradicable passion for administering in an economy that is happily getting along with the appeals of perestroyka to form a market mechanism. This passion is nurtured by decades of obeisance to "strong measures" that has been drummed into us. The editorial office receives letters: Enforce trading according to "normal" prices! Stop! This also concerns the villages, the state enterprises, and the cooperatives. And so the Azerbaijani kolkhoznik, who wants to take his products to Russia, is taxed with an excessive tax, and the Georgian is prohibited entirely from thinking about trade "on the side." The world is heading along the path of economic integration, but we, pursuing a near-term objective—fulfillment of the plan for local deliveries—are erecting protectionist barriers. When will we begin to apply those same economic levers about which there is so much talk?

The temptation is great once again to use "quick and reliable" methods—a directive supported by force—in our limping economy. But this path leads to a dead end. Let us not succumb to such temptations.

Organization Imports Food, Consumer Goods

18270124 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 12 Jul 89 p 3

[Interview with A.K. Krivenko, general director of "Prodintorg" by A. Balebanov: "Prodintorg: How It Trades With Other Countries"]

[Text] **Many letters come to the editorial board requesting information on how the mechanism of foreign foodstuffs purchases works in our country. Sharp criticism of this mechanism quite recently resounded in a number of speeches at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies. The SELSKAYA ZHIZN correspondent met with A.K. Krivenko, general director of the "Prodintorg" [Association for the Export and Import of Foodstuffs under the USSR Ministry of Trade] all-union foreign economic association (VVO), and requested that he answer the questions most frequently asked in the readers' letters.**

[Balebanov] Aleksandr Konstantinovich, tell us, please, what your organization is and what its goals and structure are.

[Krivenko] "Prodintorg" has already been in existence for over 45 years. The organization is involved in the import and export of foodstuffs. Today, we have a R3.5 billion turnover in foreign trade prices. Of this sum, 95 percent goes toward import of foodstuffs. Export accounts for the remainder.

[Balebanov] What comprises this 5 percent?

[Krivenko] We export, that is, sell abroad, goods which in principle are of little significance in providing our population with foodstuffs. For the most part, this is agricultural by-products. For example, bone meal and ground feathers, intestines, etc. This also includes those low quantities of foodstuffs, which by special government decree are designated for aid to various foreign states. Thus, this 5 percent export does not do any damage to our country.

Now, on the structure of "Prodintorg." Our organization includes five specialized firms, each of whose names speaks for itself: "Meat," "Milk," "Oil," "Sugar," and "Tobacco."

[Balebanov] For example, what does the "Meat" firm do?

[Krivenko] All of these firms implement export-import operations. And the most important task of the "Meat" firm is import.

[Balebanov] Nevertheless, the idea slips through our press sometimes that a significant part of our country's meat, along with the bones, is going toward export. And that it is made into cat food and dog food abroad. Is that really the way it is?

[Krivenko] Let's clarify things. In general, we do not export meat as such, with the exception of a small quantity of canned meat, which by government decree we deliver to certain countries as aid on a case-by-case basis. "Prodintorg" exports by-products exclusively. This is usually offal. Not even bones, but second category production. Export of first category by-products is categorically forbidden. Now, it is true that "Prodintorg" has transferred these functions to the republic foreign trade organizations, directly to the kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms]. As far as dog food and cat food are concerned, indeed, in the FRG, canned food for domestic animals is made with our by-products and various additives.

[Balebanov] According to Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics], we purchased 858,000 metric tons of meat in 1987. Didn't its import increase recently? After all, this is a kind of deficit.

[Krivenko] Meat imports have even been reduced somewhat.

[Balebanov] In connection with what? The lack of hard currency?

[Krivenko] Precisely. And we do not have in the plan for this year the same quantity of meat which we have purchased previously. But these reductions hover somewhere from about 100,000-200,000 metric tons annually, depending upon world prices.

[Balebanov] The "Milk" firm is also concerned primarily with import?

[Krivenko] Yes, it is. This firm supplies dairy products such as butter, powdered milk, and cheeses, etc.

[Balebanov] And how about infant formula and child nutrition in general?

[Krivenko] "Prodintorg" and "Soyuzplodoimport" [All-Union Association for Fruit Import under the USSR Ministry of Trade] deliver small consignments. This, of course, is a special case, and we should spare no expense.

[Balebanov] You said that the "Milk" firm imports dairy butter, so what then does the "Oil" firm import?

[Krivenko] This firm imports a significant quantity of vegetable oils from practically all capitalist countries. Mainly, we purchase the so-called tropical oils, such as, for example, palm and coconut oils, that is, oils not produced in our country. In addition, for the country's provisions, we also buy soybean and sunflower oils.

[Balebanov] Do you purchase olive oil?

[Krivenko] We purchase olive oil literally in miserly quantities. There is only one reason for that: to save hard currency. Judge for yourself: Olive oil is four times more expensive than sunflower oil.

[Balebanov] Now let's talk a bit about the "Sugar" firm.

[Krivenko] I want to mention straight away that this is now the most "acute" firm. And at times, I have to devote 50-60 percent of my working hours to it. This firm is exclusively involved in importing sugar.

[Balebanov] Only in importing?

[Krivenko] Export exists only by intergovernmental agreements, therefore, let us say that there is none. As for import, I can say that one out of every four teaspoons of the sugar put in tea was supplied by "Prodintorg." We purchase sugar primarily from Cuba.

[Balebanov] What then would you say about the recent assertion in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY of V. Yegorova, department chief for sugar, confectionery and tea trade of the USSR Ministry of Trade, that the sugar problem will not be resolved any time in the near future?

[Krivenko] She is a trade specialist and apparently knows what she is talking about. As far as "Prodintorg" is concerned, our plan assignment for the current year is to supply 4.3 million metric tons of sugar. And we will fulfill this plan. If there are going to be supplemental government decrees on sugar purchases, we will fulfill them as well. In light of this, I would like to say a word about our confectionery industry. The amount of sugar it demands! Mountains of it! The food-industry workers should think about both saving sugar and people's health.

[Balebanov] About health, incidentally. Are there plans for purchasing the so-called harmless sugar, that is reduced calorie sweetener, a different sort of sugar substitute like aspartame, produced by the U.S. firm "Monsanto," and similar products?

[Krivenko] There are, indeed, more than a few sugar substitutes. Quite recently, one U.S. firm brought us samples of one such substitute. But we noted on the box containing the packets the warning: "The U.S. Food and Drug Administration cautions that excessive consumption of this product may cause cancer." After seeing such a warning, we didn't even submit this substitute to the USSR Ministry of Health for review of the matter of purchasing it.

[Balebanov] But perhaps it is worth submitting, nevertheless?

[Krivenko] You know, I worked in the United States for many years, and know by experience that if they warn their population about a danger, they can be believed on that score. I recall, 17 years ago, we tried to sell crab, Pacific saury, and several other products in the United States. So they studied these products in various laboratories for a year and a half. Then, when the samples were approved, the Americans demanded to send their representatives to our plant in order to follow the entire technological process and see whether there were any violations. In the event that they found any harmful substances in a delivered consignment, then the entire consignment would be returned or destroyed. So, believe me, their control has been and remains very strict.

Well, as far as diabetics and others in need of sugar substitutes are concerned, of course it can be consumed in small doses. But all the same, I am convinced that we must start up production of such substitutes here.

[Balebanov] What does the "Tobacco" firm do?

[Krivenko] It exports and imports cigarettes.

[Balebanov] Where are they exported to?

[Krivenko] For example, we sell a very insignificant amount to Japan and the FRG for specialized shops. We import cigarettes from Bulgaria, Cuba, and India as well.

[Balebanov] And how do you explain the fact that not that long ago, imported cigarettes such as "Marlboro" and "Salem" and other Western brands were openly for sale? I understand that there was some sort of exchange, apparently...

[Krivenko] Absolutely correct. We were then using a form of barter. We are not spending hard currency on cigarettes, and if that happens, it is more likely the exception rather than the rule. People are writing to us, asking why we were supplying so many cigarettes during the fight against smoking. They say that it is better to export our own tobacco, and let people smoke it over there. But even as it is we are not providing our population with enough imported cigarettes. Additionally, there are, with Bulgaria, for example, long-term agreements, and we must fulfill the obligations we have taken upon ourselves.

[Balebanov] It is possible to assert that "Prodintorg" shows preference to the socialist countries in its work?

[Krivenko] A total of 82-83 percent of all the goods we import are from socialist countries.

[Balebanov] What criteria guide you in purchasing these or those products?

[Krivenko] This is high-quality production with competitive prices with optimally acceptable delivery periods.

[Balebanov] It is to be assumed that "Prodintorg" is guided strictly by the state plan and government decrees. To what department are you subordinated?

[Krivenko] We are subordinated to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. And it should be said that in view of the changes taking place in the country, the ministry has begun to show great flexibility in working with us, granting us more independence and rights. Although there are factors, unfortunately, which our outside of the competence of our ministry. For example, we must have our hard currency account in order to leave the ministry's particular degree of guardianship and be more independent. However, such a decision must be made not by MVES [Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations], but by the government.

[Balebanov] Does it seem to you that government decree No 203 "On Measures of State Regulation of Foreign Trade Activity" granted MVES too many rights, and that the ministry has monopolized all foreign trade?

[Krivenko] It seems to me that MVES has not received so many rights, and that for the time being it is learning to regulate foreign trade relations. The guiding principle of the ministry is absolutely correct: Each enterprise must have competitive production if it wishes to enter the foreign market. But it is necessary to regulate the matters of export and import of goods still strategically important to the state. Otherwise, the state will lose colossal resources. After all, an enterprise is often prepared to sell anything in order to solve its immediate problems. Do you know, for example, how many want to sell meat abroad?! Comrades like that come to the ministry and say that their enterprise fulfilled the plan of meat sale to the state, and it wants to sell the surplus on hand for hard currency. And it has happened that they sold it. And later, "Prodintorg" bought that same meat abroad, spending hard currency on it, you understand. Thus, foreign economic relations must be regulated in the name of the interests of the country's national economy.

[Balebanov] What principally new things has life introduced into "Prodintorg's" work?

[Krivenko] One of the recent government decrees allows use of resources earned by an enterprise for purchase of consumer goods abroad. And "Prodintorg" has begun to conclude contracts with many enterprises, and for hard currency earnings, we procure any sort of foodstuffs for them. How does this work in practice? Some enterprise sells its goods through us. And on the order of this enterprise, "Prodintorg" purchases, let's say, canned meat, cheeses, sausages, anything they request.

[Balebanov] And are they turning to you eager for help? What percentage do you take for your brokerage services?

[Krivenko] We take a negligible percentage, something like 1.7 percent, in order to cover our overhead. Other organizations take up to 5 or even 7 percent. But we have no need to be petty (after all, we have an enormous turnover), and we simply have no right to take from workers the money which they have earned. So they come to us eagerly.

...When our conversation came to an end, Aleksandr Konstantinovich smiled and said:

"Do you think that 5 years ago, I could simply meet with a journalist like this? Imagine! I would have had to get an appointment with the minister himself in order to get permission for such a meeting. And it would be uncertain as to whether or not he'd see me about it....

Baklanov Discusses Arms Conversion in Ukraine
LD2807052289 Moscow TASS in English 0446 GMT 28 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 28 TASS—Oleg Baklanov, secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, visited the Kharkov industrial complex on July 24-26. One of the centerpieces of his discussions there was the conversion of arms manufacturing and a possibility of using part of its potential for the solution of major social problems facing the country.

During his meetings with workers of the Malyshev production amalgamation of Kharkov they discussed in detail ways of drawing this industrial enterprise as soon as possible into the solution of peaceful problems connected with national economic development of the USSR.

Baklanov said that a mass production of the new goods turned out by amalgamation—a highly manoeuverable motor car, a compact and powerful engine and machines for the food industry—should be started as soon as possible. Cooperation, including with other arms manufacturing enterprises, should be used more widely for this purpose.

Participants in the discussion touched upon another side of the conversion problem: arms reduction should in no way bring down the level of the country's defences. The meetings showed that this problem worried people who asked Baklanov numerous questions on this issue. He stressed that in order to ensure the country's defences it was necessary to regard this problem from an entirely new angle—not through the quantity of weapons, but through a higher technical potential of all that is supplied by the arms-manufacturing complex to the Soviet Armed Forces.

Participants in conversions with Baklanov said that it was necessary to introduce in the civilian industries as much as possible all the advanced methods used by the defence industry. Specifically, it is important to transfer to civilian industries the most effective technologies and materials, a high level of the organisations of work and an exacting attitude to the quality of products. It is especially important to promote the growth of labour productivity. There is another promising way: the assimilation of some types of defence machinery in the national economy.

These problems were analysed in detail at Baklanov's meeting with activists of the production amalgamation. He dwelt upon the main trends which are typical of the present decisive stage of perestroyka and stressed the need for increasing the contribution of every labour collective in the fulfilment of these talks. One of the tasks is to increase the output of consumer goods for the internal market.

Baklanov asked many questions about living conditions of Kharkov residents. People judge perestroyka by concrete changes in their lives. This is why, he said, concern for people's needs is the priority task today. A lack of attention to the needs and requirements of people is impermissible. It costs too much to society.

TASS Reports on Maritime Kray Floods, Damage
LD2807131189 Moscow TASS in English 1225 GMT 28 Jul 89

[Text] Vladivostok July 28 TASS—Rivers burst their banks following torrential rains in the eastern and several central regions of the Maritime region (the Soviet Far East). Virtually all villages in the Partizan Valley are flooded. The Partizanskaya River washed away a large bridge near Yekaterinovka village. Communication lines with the stricken area have been disrupted. The water intake facilities at the port city of Nakhodka were in the flood zone.

Two major industrial plants—the "Bori" amalgamation and the Khrustalny ore-dressing combine—are closed down. There are 3,500 houses and flats in the flood zone. 130,000 hectares of farming land are under water. Vegetable crops have been destroyed in many regions. Torrential rains do not subside. A powerful typhoon Judy is advancing on the Far East from the Japanese islands.

According to a regional commission for combating natural calamities, the damage inflicted on the economy of the Maritime region is estimated at several million rubles.

Gold Discovered in Urals City
LD2807120189 Moscow TASS in English 1150 GMT 28 Jul 89

[Text] Nizhniy Tagil, Urals, July 28 TASS—Nizhniy Tagil residents offered their services to city authorities in dredging several rivers flowing through the city. When studying silt dredged from the river-bed, experts spotted tiny yellow particles. Later analysis confirmed the find.

The gold content of the sand is low. But the personnel of a territorial inter-sectoral association for the dredging of rivers decided that the effort was worthwhile. It is, of course, unprofitable to set up an independent production process but gold can be produced in conjunction with other work.

The dredging of only one and a half kilometres of river-bed in the downtown area enabled the association to recover more than five kilograms of gold in excess of quota and to hand it over to the Novosibirsk plant of non-ferrous metal.

Following the sale of the gold on the external market, the Nizhniy Tagil City Executive Committee opened a currency account with the bank and deposited 59,000 dollars on it.

It was decided that the funds would be used to buy medical equipment and to meet other city needs.

The search for gold is continuing.

PC Desktop Publishing System To Be Marketed

LD2807221989 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2215 GMT 28 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow, 28 Jul (TASS)—The Soviet-Italian-French enterprise "Interquadro" will begin selling Xerox Ventura Publisher, a PC desktop publishing program, on the Soviet market. This is envisaged by the agreement signed here today between the joint venture and the British firm Rank Xerox.

Considering the growing demand of Soviet publishers and media for modern publishing equipment Rank Xerox has worked out jointly with the Soviet publisher Progress a fully Russified desktop publishing system, Ralph Lend, general director of the Eastern European department of the British firm, told a TASS reporter. He remarked that in the USSR there exist more that 200 major publishers which issue 8,500 newspapers and more that 5,000 magazines. According to our estimations, the USSR demand for personal computers amounts to 20 million. With the ever growing amount of printed materials, a means of increasing productivity such as the Xerox Ventura Publisher is a necessity. I am sure that the agreement with Interquadro will make possible a noticeable acceleration in the computerization of printing in the USSR.

Agricultural

Order Encourages Flow of Grain to State Reserves

LD2807220889 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 28 Jul 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] We have just received the following report. A USSR Council of Ministers order was signed today on the organization of additional procurements of grain and oil-bearing seed crops in the collective farms, state farms, and other agricultural enterprises over and above the quantities envisioned in the contracting agreements concluded for this year. In these cases farms will be able to acquire trucks and cars, buses, and building and other materials on conditions applicable to sales in response, under the procedure, and according to the norms that operated in 1988.

The government's order is intended to increase the inflow of grain and oil-bearing seeds into the state reserves during the current year. For this purpose the appropriate material and technical resources have been allocated.

Scientific

'Cosmos-1870' Satellite Mission Concludes

LD3007155489 Moscow TASS in English 1547 GMT 30 Jul 89

[Text] Mission Control Center July 30 TASS—A protracted space mission, involving the Cosmos-1870 artificial earth satellite put into orbit on July 25, 1987, has concluded.

The mission programme included testing methods of long-distance probing of the earth with the help of the first Soviet-made all-weather high definition radar station.

During the two-year operation of the Cosmos-1870 satellite, radar scanning of the earth's surface, including natural formations on the territory of the Soviet Union and some other countries as well as extensive areas of the world ocean, yielded numerous pictures which fully confirmed the radar station's technical efficiency and the efficiency of the satellite's universal space platform capable of carrying research apparatus weighing up to four tonnes and providing a base for installing various-purpose space equipment.

The materials obtained have been transferred to the state "priroda" research-and-production center, the space research institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Radiotechnology and Electronics of the USSR Academy of Sciences and other organizations for use in the interests of science and the country's economy. Some materials have been transferred to specialists in France, Finland, Sweden and the United States of America.

Today, the mission control center issued commands to change the space orientation of the Cosmos-1870 satellite and to set its engines in motion. As a result of the slowing-down, the satellite entered a descending trajectory and ceased to exist in the dense layers of the atmosphere above the designated area of the Pacific Ocean.

Journalists Invited to Cosmonaut Training Center

Describe New Space Equipment

LD2807151789 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 28 Jul 89

[Text] Today in the Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center there was a press conference for a large group of Soviet journalists. Our correspondent Vladimir Bezyayev also attended it.

[Bezyayev] Quite honestly, calling that meeting a press conference does not say anything. As far as I can remember, it is the first time that journalists have been given such an opportunity to get acquainted with new equipment, to ask absolutely everything they want, and most importantly to receive an exhaustive answer from any specialist, and not just to ask questions but to argue as well.

Lieutenant General Shatalov, head of the cosmonaut training center did not just introduce to us the crews preparing for a regular flight, but also told us in detail of the forthcoming program. Nobody avoided trenchant questions, for instance, on the significance of the space programs for the national economy and spoke honestly and openly of the difficulties which the cosmonauts might encounter, unforseeable difficulties—in other words, the risk.

The concrete reason for our meeting was to become acquainted with new models which, in the course of this year, are to supplement the orbital complex Mir. Model "D" [do oshasheniya], for instance, will allow the crew the previously unseen luxury of showering every week. Through the airlock of this same model, and not through the hatch of the docking port, they will be able to go out for a long-distance walk in open space. To accomplish this, an SPK [sredstvo peredvizheniy kosmonavtov] has been created. We journalists still call it a space bike, but in essence, it is a small independent [Avtonomnyi] spaceship which will make it possible for the cosmonauts to leave and return to the ship, and to examine or repair artificial earth satellites.

Model "T" is decoded as "Technological." It is to fly in the second stage, and the name itself shows what it is destined for. A great deal of time is required to describe everything that has been seen and I will try to do that in a separate broadcast, including also the opportunity for you to hear the voices of those who in approximately 1 month are to take off from Baykonur.

Naturally, I will now list their surnames. Two crews are preparing for the launch. The State Commission still has to decide which of them will fly. But meanwhile I shall say that you know three of the cosmonauts well—that is Aleksandr Viktorenko, Aleksandr Serebrov, and Anatoliy Solovyev. The fourth is a person new to you; he is the ship engineer and already the third Aleksandr—Balandin.

The preparations for the flight are continuing.

Meet Crews for Mir, Kvant Missions

LD2807162389 Moscow TASS in English 1513 GMT 28 Jul 89

[Text] Stellar Township July 28 TASS—The next manned mission to a Soviet orbiting complex consisting of the space station Mir (Peace) and the research module Kvant (Quantum) is expected in the middle of next September and will last several months.

Briefing reporters on plans for the flight, Air Force Lieutenant- General Vladimir Shatalov, chief of the cosmonaut training centre in this town outside Moscow, said that two crews are preparing for it.

One is Colonel Aleksandr Viktorenko, the commander, and Aleksandr Serebrov, the flight engineer. The other pair is led by Colonel Anatoliy Solovyev whose flight engineer, A. Balandin, is the only space rookie among the four.

The crew who will go to the orbiting platform will receive two specialised modules, the first of which is to blast off in the middle of October.

The mission will also involve research in the interest of science and the economy and a space walk to test a manned maneuvering unit using engines based on compressed air cylinders and enabling a cosmonaut to move about in the vicinity of the platform.

Military

Journalists Shown 'New Long-Range Bomber'

LD2907160489 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 29 Jul 89

[From the IZVESTIYA review]

[Text] IZVESTIYA publishes a report from a secret airfield of the long-range air force. At the airport journalists, and not only military journalists, were shown our latest new long-range bomber, the Tupolev Tu-164.

It was displayed, as the authors of the report note, with openness and trust, which would have been previously unthinkable. The combat and navigation capacities of the aircraft were described. This report also cites the approximate cost of one of these machines: tens of millions of rubles. It is an imposing sum, which is far from prompting one to thinking in terms of bravura. The same goes for the next item, about the life of those who sit in the pilot's seat of this plane.